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INTRODUCTION

Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas
ome is the ultimate refuge. For most of us, there is a need for a
place where defenses can be down, where retreat can be had from
both the offensiveness of others and offensiveness to others. And, for
most of us, home is that place.'
Regrettably this is less so every day. The inflow to urban areas, the
cheapening of construction and the trend towards multi-family housing
all have contributed to make being at home, for more and more
people, an increasingly social encounter. No longer are the neighbors
left behind at the street or front door. The neighbor's stereo, the dog
that barks next door, the upstairs tenant's parquet floor-these are
types of annoyances which can be with us all the time. And, at the
same time, there is the plague of neighbors who complain that our own
stereo, children, parties and activities are too loud or2 otherwise annoying. Such are concomitants of modern urban life.
It is not suggested that these problems are new. Nor does the
modern tendency to cram an increasing part of the population into
high-density housing present any particularly unique new factors
which in themselves would suggest the advisability of reexamining and
reworking old solutions. The relevant factors which are new seem to
be largely attitudinal: greater emphasis on tenant 3 protection, espe-

H

1. It would be nice to avoid the psycho-sociological thicket. However, people routinely engage
in activities through which they seek as well as deprive others of noneconomic values (e.g.,
psychic values). If the law is to rationally intervene in and regulate such activities, it must try,
explicitly or at least implicitly, to take into account what these values are. The present inquiry
concerns the private creation of conduct norms for situations where the interplay of psychic or
like noneconomic values and aims tends to predominate. Unhappily, mere questions of definition
might bog down the discussion for all time. Nonetheless, at the minimum, an explicit statement
can be made as to what the relevant values are assumed to be. That is all that any reference to
alleged psycho-social values purports to do herein.
2. Moreover, indications are that the segment of the population housed in multi-family or
other non-detached housing will, by economic necessity, grow larger and larger as the per capita
land area-particularly around desirable urban centers--continues to decline. One recent study,
sponsored by three agencies of the federal government, has estimated that the cost of developing
new housing on a non-detached plan can result in savings of up to 44 per cent compared with the
cost of single-family housing. See Real Estate Research Corp., The Costs of Sprawl: Executive
Summary 3 (1974), reported in Time, Nov. 4, 1974, at 63. The capital cost figures could not of
course take account of the noneconomic (psychic) cost of crowding, but the question remains open
whether people can or will incur greater monetary outlays in order to avoid such non-cash costs.
3. The discussion herein focuses on residential leasehold tenants. However, the problems
discussed are, on the whole, not problems unique to the landlord-tenant context as such but apply
in the case of all multi-family housing. Thus, even though the multi-family housing in question
may happen to he owner-occupied, as in the case of condominiums, the same sorts of problems
may be expected.
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cially in tight housing markets; a judicial wariness about supporting
attempts at private oppression under the guise of freedom of contract;

and a reconfirmation and bolstering of a policy of tolerance under
which certain differences among people (e.g., racial or religious) must
be tolerated and a growing feeling that other differences (e.g., "lifestyle') should be.
The present Article suggests that the problem of incompatible
neighboring tenants can be most efficiently and "justly" dealt with by
permitting a substantial degree of landlord control over tenant

behavior-with the removal of offending tenants, at the landlord's
instance, being the most effective sanction of ultimate recourse in the
effectuation of such control. For some courts, ceding this power of
control to landlords would require a measure of constraint which they

may find uncustomary or even distasteful. As institutions charged with
doing justice, the courts' instinct to intervene in the norm-creating

process is undoubtedly great, even when the parties before the court
have ostensibly agreed beforehand to the norms of behavior (and

consequences of violation) which are to apply. Of course, such intervention is appropriate when the privately established norms or conse-

quences contravene some articulable public policy, such as prohibitions on visits by members of racial minorities or incarceration of an

offending tenant as a sanction. But the courts have not limited their
second guessing on the propriety of agreed norms or sanctions to cases
The question arises as to the extent to which the rules developed and being developed to serve
in the landlord-tenant context can be adapted to fill out a body of law on community associations
and the like. The case of cooperative ownership, which is landlord-tenant in form but owneroccupant in common understanding, is an intermediate case. See Comment, Restrictions on the
Use of Cooperative Apartment Property, 13 Hastings L.J. 357 (1962). The general tendency
seems to be to treat the status of the cooperative tenant vis-a-vis the "landlord" according to more
or less the same rules which obtain in ordinary landlord-tenant relationships. See, e.g., the
analytical methodology in 1915 16th St. Co-op. Ass'n v. Pinkett, 85 A.2d 58 (D.C. Mun. Ct.
App. 1951); Zamzok v. 650 Park Ave. Corp., 80 Misc. 2d 573, 363 N.Y.S.2d 868 (Sup. Ct. 1974);
Justice Court Mut. Housing Cooperative, Inc. v. Sandow, 50 Misc. 2d 541, 270 N.Y.S.2d 829
(Sup. Ct. 1966); 1 American Law of Property § 3.10 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as
Am. L. Prop.]; 2 P. Rohan & M. Reskin, Cooperative Housing Law and Practice § 1.03 (1975);
Note, Legal Characterization of the Individual's Interest in a Cooperative Apartment* Realty or
Personalty?, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 250 (1973). This treatment of cooperative arrangements may
have interesting consequences, for example, the possibility that the person who is in effect the
"owner" of an apartment can forfeit the right to possess the apartment. See, e.g., 1915 16th St.
Co-op. Ass'n v. Pinkett, supra; Green v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 232 Md. 496, 194 A.2d 273
(1963). The economic pressure resulting from such a forfeiture may mean that the cooperative can
force a cooperator to sell his property in certain events-where the arrangement has gone
sour-even though no express right to force such a sale is reserved. Compare the trial court and
appellate term opinions with the appellate term dissent in 930 Fifth Corp. v. King, 64 Misc. 2d
776, 315 N.Y.S.2d 966 (Sup. Ct. 1970), aff'd, 71 Misc. 2d 359, 336 N.Y.S.2d 22 (App. T.),
rev'd, 40 App. Div. 2d 140, 338 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Ist Dep't 1972).
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where the adverse effect on the tenant violates some clear public
policy. In New York, for example, tenants have been allowed to
physically attack their neighbors, 4 gas themselves in the kitchen, 5 keep6
accumulated garbage and "unhygienic" animals in their apartments,
and play piano scales twelve hours per day7 without jeopardizing their
possessory rights or losing the sympathy of the courts. Perhaps the
courts in such cases ask themselves, "Where can these people go?" But
where can their neighbors go? 8
The essential concern should be how best to maximize the security
and the utility of possession for urban residential tenants in a world
where activities, habits, lifestyles and tolerances vary but where the
emanations and by-products of each person's life activity will sometimes unavoidably spill over, affecting the activities and tranquility of
others. That is, for people whose respective activities and tranquility
are not fully reconcilable (as long as they remain in physical proximity), how can the burdens of dislocation be minimized, both by
minimizing the likelihood that an "objectionable" tenant will be forced
to move and at the same time minimizing the likelihood that a tenant's
"objectionability" will leave his neighbors with no choice but to move
or to suffer "unduly."
Fundamentally, the problem is one of environmental regulation.
And environmental regulation is itself a problem, broadly speaking, of
nuisance.
The effect of nuisance law is to limit each possessor in the use of his
real property for the benefit of neighboring possessors. Thus, a possessor of land, or of space in a building, cannot do with absolute
justification all that he pleases with his premises, and this is true
despite the fact that the possessor normally has exclusive use, enjoyment and control of his possession. There is no paradox here; it is
4.
1965).
5.
aff'd,
6.

Valley Courts, Inc. v. Newton, 47 Misc. 2d 1028, 263 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Syracuse City Ct.

7.

Twin Elm Management Corp. v. Banks, 181 Misc. 96, 46 N.Y.S.2d 952 (N.Y. City Mun.

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Moldoff, 187 Misc. 458, 63 N.Y.S.2d 385 (App. T. 1946),
272 App. Div. 1039, 74 N.Y.S.2d 910 (lst Dep't 1947).
Truncali v. Kusstatscher, 61 Misc. 2d 500, 306 N.Y.S.2d 174 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969).

Ct. 1943).

8. In the recent case of Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc., 393 Mich. 393, 224
N.W.2d 843 (1975), where the landlord was held responsible for offensive conduct caused by a
tenant, the dissenting judge observed that imposing such responsibility on landlords will make it
more difficult for "troublesome" tenants to find a place to rent. Id. at 420-21, 224 N.W.2d at
855-56.

On the other hand, the fact that "courts ... 'make it impossible' to evict troublesome tenants"
has been cited as a contributor to the abandonment of buildings, which has the effect of reducing
the housing stock for all. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1974, at 42, col. 2.
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merely that the "premises" which a possessor exclusively controls
cannot be defined simply as the volume enclosed by the premises'
dimensions in space.
It is a physical reality that one person's premises are other persons'
environment, and vice versa. The overall environment, consisting of
everybody's individual possessions, is thus a "common asset" belonging
to all who are in physical proximity. This is particularly true when the
premises involved are stacked, apartment upon apartment, into great
monuments to the social instincts of urban mankind.
Unlike space, which possessors may occupy on a separate and
exclusive basis, the environment of neighboring possessors is not
physically allocable. It is simply not susceptible to division into parcels
whose owners have equal and corresponding rights of exclusive dominion and control: if any individual possessor is permitted to enjoy an
absolute right of use, this will unavoidably result in a more limited
right of use for the others. The spill-over from activities in one
neighbor's space will impinge on the absolute utility of the space
possessed by the others. 9 If we are not to countenance unequal
freedom to use the environment (whether achieved by right of law or
by sheer power), then limitations upon the use of all-presumably for
the maximum benefit of all-must be introduced.10
The traditional law of private nuisance is by no means the only
source of such limitations on the use of the commonly owned environment. To remedy situations not effectively dealt with by the law of
private nuisance, a number of other legal devices (e.g., zoning codes,
9. For example, an apartment building environment cannot be used as a quiet surrounding at
the same time that it is used as a place to engage in a noisy activity. Either the noisy neighbor
must cease his sound-generating activity or the quiet-seeking neighbor must cease his use of the
environment as a place of quiet. Either way, one of the incompatible uses will be impossible and
the person who is forced to yield will be limited in his freedom to use.
10. An analogy may be drawn between the environment of a multi-tenant building and
running water in its natural state, a more traditionally recognized "common asset." Like running
water, such an environment is not publici juris (commonly owned) in the sense that it is bonum
vacens which anyone may appropriate by merely asserting control (e.g., by filling the environment with noise). Rather, like running water, it is publici juris only in the sense that all may
make "reasonable" use of it who have a right of access to it. See note 260 infra. See also McBryde
Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Hawaii 174, 193-98, 504 P.2d 1330, 1342-44 (1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 976 (1974); Embrey v. Owen, 155 Eng. Rep. 579, 585 (Ex. 1851); Mfason v. Hill, 110 Eng.
Rep. 692, 700-02 (K.B. 1833); 3 Kent's Commentaries 439 (12th ed. 1896). Under the law of
nuisance, absent private agreements concerning use (or in the event of their unenforceability),
specific norms regulating the use of the environment, as in the case of running water, will take
the form of refinements upon the meaning of the term "reasonable" as used in the preceding
sentence. See note 260 infra. However, as with running water, the rights of and limitations upon
competing users of an environment ought to be modifiable and thus regulatable by mutual
agreement. Such agreements are the mechanism for regulation discussed in this Article.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

land use regulations) have been resorted to, generally involving public
intervention to effectuate local environmental control. Although the
limitations on use imposed by such devices are couched in terms of
restrictions upon the use of individual possessions, they are in fact, like
the law of private nuisance, environmental regulations. This Article
will attempt an analytical examination of a method for achieving this
environmental regulation privately, a method which has a conceptual
basis at least as old as the defeasible estates in land."
II.

SOURCE OF AND MOTIVATIONS FOR LANDLORDS'
POWER TO CONTROL TENANT CONDUCT

If one were to approach this topic with something of a historical
bent, one might well begin with the traditional power of the feudal
barons: exercising control through their manorial courts, the lords of
yore could impose their will, nearly without limitation, upon the
assorted villeins within their demesnes. 12 Indeed, were one to ap-

11. It will be seen that this private mode of environmental regulation has been accorded a less
than warm reception by the courts. Perhaps the coolness of the courts' reception is directly related
to the very ancientness of its conceptual underpinnings. See discussion in note 13 infra. Although
transferors of land have long been able to control the transferee's use of the land, the exercise of
such power to achieve desired environmental goals is apparently a comparatively recent phenomenon. See Bordwell, The Common Law Scheme of Estates, 18 Iowa L. Rev. 425, 441 (1933).
Prior to the mid or late nineteenth century, it would probably be difficult or impossible to find
examples of transferor-imposed land use controls that were not aimed solely at achieving some
purpose (economic or otherwise) of the transferor himself. See id.; cf. First Universalist Soc'y v.
Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N.E. 524 (1892) (to assure fulfillment of purpose of transfer); Lovat v.
Ranelagh, 35 Eng. Rep. 388 (Ch. 1814) (repairs, mode of cultivation); Descarlett v. Dennett, 88
Eng. Rep. 290 (Ch. 1722) (not to suffer a way across the land). For a more recent example, see
Oldfield v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 26 N.J. 246, 139 A.2d 291 (1958).
In any event, prior to the advent of widespread subdivision-type land development, viz., the
parceling out of land (or space in a building) to a number of transferees who take from a common,
entrepreneurial transferor, it is unlikely that environmental regulation for the benefit of transferees was an important motivating factor in the creation of defeasible estates. However, the
adaptation of the defeasible estate device to private land use planning for the benefit of the
transferees (especially in the landlord-tenant context) has seemingly not triggered a reevaluation
and modification of the basic rules pertaining to that device. But cf. Goldstein, Rights of Entry
and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 248, 250
(1940); Williams, Restrictions on the Use of Land: Conditions Subsequent and Determinable
Fees, 27 Texas L. Rev. 158 (1948). However, where such adaptation has occurred, two major
assumptions underlying those rules (that the transfer creates no continuing relation and that the
transferor is merely benefiting himself as against the transferee) are not necessarily applicable.
Moreover, the hostile attitudes of courts toward private land use restrictions themselves (see notes
23-25 infra), stemming from a time when land was relatively underdeveloped and its usefulness
for all purposes was to be encouraged, continued to carry influence in situations where, in light of
modern ideas about land use planning, their appropriateness is doubtful.
12. Nonetheless, even in the manorial courts, the practice appears to have been a good deal
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proach this topic with an unsympathetically critical bent, this would
be the ideal place to begin. For the application of feudal institutions to
the modern situation has become something of a prima facie cause for
condemnation, especially in the landlord-tenant area. 13 And a feudal
institution which smacks of fealty, of innately ascribed status and of
tutelage for adult individuals seems clearly out of place in a time when
pledges of allegiance to private persons (or almost any oaths at all, it
sometimes seems) are regarded as quaint curiosities of a more primitive
era.
To be sure, the efforts of a modern apartment owner to control
tenant conduct could not be justified by arguing that the landlord, as

successor to the feudal lord, is a quasi-representative of the state,
charged with assisting the administration of justice and harmony. In
an egalitarian society, it is generally only the state itself, acting
constitutionally through its legislative, judicial and administrative
organs, which should be allowed to unilaterally impose conduct standards on others. 1 4 As one court has reacted: "A landlord may not

more democratic than seems sometimes to be assumed. See I: W. Holdsworth, A History of
English Law 375-85 (3d ed. 1927).
13. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (D.C Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); 57 E. 54 Realty Corp. v. Gay Nineties Realty Corp., 71 Misc. 2d
353, 355, 335 N.Y.S.2d 872, 873-74 (App. T. 1972); Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act § 1.102, Comment [hereinafter cited as URLTA]; 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 3.47;
Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past with
Guidelines for the Future, 38 Fordham L. Rev. 225 (1969).
Criticizing a legal principle because it has received long-standing recognition seems itself to be
a fairly long-standing tradition of the common law. E.g., the attack on the Rule in Shelley's Case
reported in Van Grutten v. Foxwell [1897] A.C. 658, 669 (H.L.) ("Its feudal origin was a
disgrace. Its antiquity was a reproach. Some judges thought that on those grounds it ought to be
'discountenanced.' '). The mindless adherence to old rules, without their reexamination, is
undoubtedly to be reproached. For even though the old law "is fun for the antiquarian and
profitable for the lawyer ...
society pays a high price for these dubious benefits." Merryman,
Ownership and Estate (Variations on a Theme by Lawson), 48 Tul. L. Rev. 916, 945 (1974). Still,
to reject the old law for its antiquity alone may be less a mark of modernity than a substitute for
thought.
14. Not that the idea of private delegates to enforce state policies is entirely dead. The
"private attorney generals" entitled to recover treble (i.e., "punitive") damages for criminal
violations of the antitrust laws is a well-known instance. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). Under the recent
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970), private
citizens in civil actions may recover liquidated and punitive damages (amounting to a civil fine)
from violators of the Act's criminal prohibitions on wiretapping. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970). It is to
be observed, however, that in both of these instances, the standards of conduct themselves are
precisely prescribed by the state and only the enforcement decision is delegated (and that only in
part).
For a case where private prescription of the standards themselves has been officially
sanctioned, consider the broad power which the national securities exchanges had (until 1975) to
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constitute himself a censor of the personal tastes, choice of friends or
preferences in interior decoration of his tenant . . .,.
But the unilateral imposition of conduct norms by extraconstitutional centers of authority is not exactly what is at issue. To
the extent that a modern landlord does have any power to prescribe or
enforce norms of tenant conduct, the source of that power is ostensibly
the lease by which the legal relationship between landlord and tenant
was established. The detailed rights and duties within a landlordtenant relationship, including the duties and limitations on rights
assumed by the tenant, can only exist (except where implied by law) by
virtue of the parties' mutual agreement to them. It is this mutual
agreement, or more specifically the presence therein of either a provision for the norms or a stipulation of them, that is the basis for the
adopt and enforce rules applicable to their members under section 6(c) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 886. Perhaps this last power is more accurately analogized to the
power of feudal lords to privately exercise public jurisdiction pursuant to special grants from the
King, who once could liberally "franchise" out judicial jurisdiction like Kentucky Fried Chicken
stands. See G. Adams, Council and Courts in Anglo-Norman England 153-54 (1926).
For an insightful discussion on how private unilaterally imposed norms may gain validity, see
Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 Harv. L.
Rev. 529 (1971).
15. Moss v. Hirshtritt, 60 Misc. 2d 402, 405, 303 N.Y.S.2d 447, 450 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct.
1969). The court went on to concede that an exception would exist for cases where the tenant's
tastes or preferences would "result in a willful violation of a substantial obligation of the tenancy
inflicting serious and substantial injury upon the landlord." Id.
A somewhat related set of problems is presented by attempts of employers to fix and enforce
conduct standards to be observed by their employees. For an excellent discussion, see Blades,
Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer
Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Blades]. Even though Professor
Blades concedes that "the employee can never expect to be completely free to do as he pleases"
and that the employer may even be "legitimately concerned with ... the 'off hours' behavior of
the employee" (id. at 1406), the unilateral imposition of conduct, especially lifestyle constraints by
employers seems more difficult to swallow philosophically than similar impositions by landlords.
There are at least two major distinctions.
First, the employer's main interest is in productivity; it is harder to see, at least in the absence
of special circumstances, how employer imposed constraints would be germane to the employer's
legitimate (i.e., understandable) interests in the employment relationship, except only such
restraints, such as sobriety on the job, which directly affect productivity. Landlords, by contrast,
have an important continuing interest in the character of their buildings; that character (physical
or reputational), which is directly affected by tenant conduct, can be protected only by limitations
on such conduct.
Secondly, the employer-employee relationship seldom involves any substantial interest of third
parties (such as other tenants) whose concerns can be efficiently protected only by more or less
centrally sourced constraints. If, as is probably true, tenants cannot as a procedural matter
negotiate for conduct constraints on a mutual basis among themselves, the appropriateness of
some sort of central source may be indicated.
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modem landlord's power to prescribe and enforce.' 6 Thus, the issue
resolves itself not to whether a landlord may validly impose conduct
norms on the tenant unilaterally; rather the question is whether certain
particulars of a consensually assumed arrangement are to be enforced.
As a prelude to considering this question, it may be helpful to make
explicit the legal background against which landlords seek to prescribe
restrictions on tenant conduct. A leasing transaction is a voluntary
legal transaction by which both landlord and tenant deliberately
undertake to modify their respective preexisting endowments of rights
and obligations. The result is a new legal relationship, with new rights
and new obligations created between the parties. 17 Few of the details
of this legal relationship-of the specific rights and duties acquired by
each party respectively-need be expressly agreed to between them.
Once the parties manifest the minimum of agreement which is required
to change their legal positions to those of landlord and tenant,' 8 the
16. The adhesive character of lease forms typically used in routine leasing transactions
appears to be at odds with the assumption that there is any "mutual" agreement with respect to
many, if not most, matters covered in the lease-tenant conduct restrictions included. Admit.
tedly, lease agreements are often not the freely negotiated transactions presupposed by the ideal of
freedom of contract. Moreover, if prospective tenants have no realistic choice but to accept
whatever terms the landlord offers, any conduct standard contained in such a "take-it-or-leave-it"
lease must be considered in a sense to be "unilaterally" imposed (unless, of course, the tenant
would have agreed to the standards even if the transaction were freely negotiated). Under
circumstances where conduct restrictions are "unilaterally" imposed in this sense (and if there is a
housing shortage or if landlords uniformly adhere to standard lease forms, such circumstances
may be typical), the "unilateral" imposition of conduct norms by extra-constitutional centers of
authority is at issue. And the issue goes to the question of the validity of the restrictions as
"privatd legislation." Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev.
629 (1943); Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts, 35 Temp. L.Q. 125, 130 (1962).
However, the question of whether the adhesive nature of leases ought to affect their enforceability
as "consensual" transactions is separate from the question of whether even willingly agreed
conduct restrictions ought to be enforced. Accordingly, for clarity of exposition, the appropriateness of enforcing "adhesive" lease terms will be considered separately. See section 11(D)(1)(a)
infra.
17. In addition, consonant with the theory that the tenant acquires an estate in rem, the legal
posture of both the landlord and the tenant vis-1-vis the rest of the world is modified, the
landlord having conveyed to the tenant the rights and protections which the landlord had
formerly enjoyed as possessor. 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 3.38; 1 H. Tiffany, Real Property
§ 94 (3d ed. 1939) [hereinafter cited as Tiffany]. Since the focus of the present discussion is on the
legal relationship between landlord and tenant, the effect of leasing on the in rem rights of the
parties is only tangentially relevant.
18. Presumably, all that need be actually agreed (expressly or impliedly) between the parties
is that the tenant should take possession of land or space which the landlord possesses and/or over
which the latter exercises appropriate dispositive control. See 1 Tiffany, supra note 17, § 157.
Without an agreement as to duration, a tenancy so created would be "at will." Id.; I Am. L.

232
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law will take care of the rest, supplying necessary specific terms to
round out the new legal relationship. Moreover, where the parties do
agree to specific details (e.g., that rent shall be paid monthly), but fail
to do so completely (e.g., by failing to specify the time or place of
payment), the law fills in the gaps. 19 On the other hand, with the
notable exception of certain statutory protections which the parties are
not free to waive contractually, 20 the law-implied "terms" of a lease
are almost never mandatory and almost always yield to a contrary
agreement of the parties. 2 1 It is to the creation and expression of such
contrary agreements on many particulars, generally to the advantage
of the landlord,
that a substantial part of a routine form lease is
22
devoted.
Among the lease provisions intended to reduce the rights of the
tenant are provisions which impose restrictions on the tenant's conduct
or, more generally, which restrict the tenant in his use of the premises.
In the absence of such conduct or use restrictions, "[t]he right to
exclusive occupation granted by a lease entitles a tenant to use the
2
premises in the same manner that the owner might have used them."
Prop., supra note 3, § 3.29. Whether the tenant must actually take possession before the
relationship comes into existence depends on the local attitude towards the now generally
outmoded concept of "interesse termini." See C. Moynihan, Introduction to the Law of Real
Property 67, 166-67 (1962).
19. For example, law-implied terms would make the place of payment at the demised
premises and would make the rent payable in arrears. See Klinger v. Peterson, 486 P.2d 373, 378
(Alas. 1971); 3A G. Thompson, Real Property § 1297, at 440-41 (J. Grimes ed. 1959) [hereinafter
cited as Thompson]; 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant §§ 555, 562 (1970).
20. An important recent example is the extensive tenant protections proposed by the Uniform
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act which would prohibit any provision in a "rental agreement"
by which the tenant "agrees to waive or forego rights or remedies under this Act." URLTA, supra
note 13, § 1.403. See also, e.g., Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 521-31 (Supp. 1975); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 59.18.230 (Supp. 1976). However, older nonwaivable tenant protective legislation may be cited.
See, e.g., N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 7-103(3) (McKinney Supp. 1975); N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 234
(McKinney Supp. 1975). In addition, courts occasionally have held that judicially created "terms"
which are to be read into leases cannot be waived by contrary stipulation. See, e.g., Javins v.
First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970)
(implied warranty of habitability based on Housing Regulations).
21. See M. Karam & Sons Mercantile Co. v. Serrano, 51 Ariz. 397, 77 P.2d 447 (1938); Bovin
v. Galitzka, 250 N.Y. 228, 165 N.E. 273 (1929) ("absolute right" to insert provisions different
from law-supplied rule); 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 141 (1970).
22. Expressing "agreements to the contrary" is not, of course, the sole function of form leases
in common use. In fact, one commentator has observed that a large part of a typical current form
does no more than restate legal rules (usually those favoring the landlord) which would be
applicable to the parties' relationship even without any recitation of them in the lease. Berger,
Hard Leases Make Bad Law, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 791, 829 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Berger].
23. Lyon v. Bethlehem Eng'r Corp., 253 N.Y. 111, 113, 170 N.E. 512, 513 (1930); accord,
Davidson v. Goldstein, 58 Cal. App. 2d 909, 136 P.2d 665 (Super. Ct. 1943); Turman v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 132 Mont. 273, 317 P.2d 302 (1957); People v. Scott, 26 N.Y.2d 286, 289, 258
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As between the tenant and the landlord specifically, only the require24
ment that the tenant refrain from committing or suffering waste
qualifies the general right of use and enjoyment which the tenant
presumptively acquires at common law as the possessor of the demised
premises. 25 Of course, the doctrine of waste does not represent the only
law-imposed constraint on the tenant's freedom to use and enjoy the
demised premises; with particular reference to conduct which may
affect the persons or property of others in the vicinity of the demised
premises, the law of private nuisance, the duty to exercise ordinary
care and, indeed, the law of torts generally may be thought of as
limiting factors.
Presumably, the law of torts reflects the societally determined desirable balance between protecting activities and protecting others from
the impact of activities. 2 6 As a matter of administrative necessity, the
N.E.2d 206, 208, 309 N.Y.S.2d 919, 923 (1970); Bovin v. Galitzka, 250 N.Y. 228. 165 N.E. 273
(1929); 1 Tiffany, supra note 17, § 94. Even where the lease does contain use restrictions, the
tendency is to construe them strictly against the landlord, freely permitting -incidental uses," in
order not to inhibit any utilization of the premises not dearly prohibited by the lease itself. E g.,
Beck v. Giordano, 144 Colo. 372, 356 P.2d 264 (1960); Delta Wild Life & Forestry, Inc. v Bear
Kelso Plantation, Inc., 281 So. 2d 683 (Miss. 1973); Boyd v. Shell Oil Co., 454 Pa- 374, 311 A.2d
616 (1973); Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp. v. Meadows, 184 Va. 168, 34 S.E.2d 392 (1945). But
see 30-88 Steinway St., Inc. v. Bohack Co., 42 App. Div. 2d 577, 344 NY.S.2d 205 (2d Dep't
1973).
24. Even this inroad on the leasehold tenant's general right of use and enjoyment is of
statutory origin. Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. 1, c. 5 (1278), repealed, Civ. P. Acts. Repeal Act,
42 & 43 Vict., c. 59 (1879); Statute of Marlbridge, 52 Hen. 3, c. 23, § 2 (1927); see 5 R. Powell,
Real Property
637 (1975)- [hereinafter cited as Powell]. In some states, reenactments of these
early statutes (or variations thereof) still supply a basis for relief in cases of waste (see, e.g.,
Crewe Corp. v. Feiler, 28 N.J. 316, 146 A.2d 458 (1958); Powell. supra at 650) but descendants
of the common law action on the case "in the nature of waste" and parallel equitable doctrines
provide additional nonstatutory bases for remedies in waste cases (Powell, supra at
637, 641,
650). For a discussion of the availability of the forfeiture remedy for waste, ,ee note 115 infra.
25. In addition to the waste limitation on the tenant's general right of use and enjoyment,
courts have also recognized an implied obligation on the tenant not to put the premises to a use
which is materially different from that for which they were constructed, or to which they have
been adapted and usually appropriated. See, e.g., Rivera v. LaCrosse, 490 F.2d 1380 (3d Cir.
1974); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Nelson, 204 Ala. 172, 85 So. 449 (1920); Gale v. McCullough, 118
Md. 287, 84 A. 469 (1912); Lyon v. Bethlehem Eng'r Corp., 253 N.Y. 111, 170 N.E. 512 (1930).
However, this sort of implied restriction-which seems a reasonable enough candidate for a
covenant implied in fact under appropriate circumstances-appears to receive more lip service
than it does reliance as an operative basis for actually curtailing tenant freedom. The courts'
reluctance, in the absence of waste, to prohibit any lawful uses against which the lease does not
expressly provide reflects, no doubt, the attitude of hostility towards limitations on the general
possessory right. See Saad v. Hatfield, 258 Ky. 525, 80 S.W.2d 583 (1935); Turman v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 132 Mont. 273, 317 P.2d 302 (1957); Carbon Fuel Co. v. Gregory, 131 W. Va. 494,
48 S.E.2d 338 (1948). See also note 23 supra.
26. Actually, it is not critical to the analysis to make any assumptions about the policy
objectives of tort law, and the assumption made in the text may be considered as only
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balance must be struck on the basis of generalized assumptions concerning the values of "ordinary" persons acting in "normal" factual
contexts and what would constitute "justice" for such persons and
contexts. 27 The conduct standards implied by such generalized assumptions are expressed in terms of generalized duties of conduct,
owed to generalized but limited classes of protected persons, with
remedies of general application for their breach.
Undoubtedly, the generalized societally determined balance between
protecting activities and protecting others from the impacts of activities, and the duties implicit in such balance, will not precisely fit
every particular case. The law's protection may be unsatisfactory
because the law defines the protected class too narrowly (standing 28),
because its remedies are inadequate, 29 because its formulations of the
standards are too subjective to permit easy proof, 30 or because its

behavioral requirements fail to protect "special" concerns not shared
by the "ordinary" person contemplated in making the generalized
assumptions. 31 Thus, the law-imposed duties, remedies, formulations
and behavioral requirements will not, in every particular case, replicate the ones which the parties themselves would have established had
they been free to negotiate the rules governing their prospective
interactions. This is no less true in the landlord-tenant context than in
any other. The landlord may be willing to relinquish some of his
law-conferred protections (e.g., protection from waste) in order to
obtain something in exchange (e.g., a higher rent, a longer lease term
or a tenant-financed improvement). The landlord will presumably be
willing to do so when the benefit received in exchange is worth more to
the landlord than the rights relinquished. The tenant may likewise
prefer to have certain benefits which the law does not confer, and he
may be willing to give up in lieu thereof certain other benefits which
he would normally have as a matter of law. Indeed, since leasing
provisional. As will be developed infra, the important point is that, whatever the objectives of
tort law, it is a dissatisfaction with the protections afforded by law that prompts private
agreements which purport to limit or expand the scope of a person's lawful activities or conduct
and the consequences of transgressions.
27. Just as no assumptions need be made about the policy objectives of tort law, no
assumptions need be made about what constitutes "justice" or the criteria therefor. Clearly, the
question is more complicated than a judgment of what constitutes "fairness" or "Parcto optimality" in particular cases, if for no other reason than that such judgments are almost necessarily
imperfect. For further discussion, see Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1093-110S (1972).
28. See section IHI(A)(2) infra.
29. See section III(B)(1) infra.
30. See section 1II(C) infra.
31. See section III(D)(1) infra.
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transactions are simply devices for allocating the value and potential
benefits of land use, the particular requirements of the participants in
such transactions are likely to be as diverse as the uses to which real
estate may be put. Accordingly, it is most unlikely in the landlordtenant context that the general tort law norms (i.e., the generalized
societally determined balance between protecting activities and protecting from activities) will perfectly parallel the balance which the
parties probably would (if they could) privately negotiate.
It is no reproach to the substantive law of torts that private
agreements are necessary in order to align the rights and duties of
particular persons in accordance with the balance which, for their
particular interactions, is mutually optimal. In the first place, as a
prescription of norms, duties and remedies having general application,
the law of torts could not be otherwise. Moreover, apart from such
administrative concerns, there may be valid policy objectives--e.g.,
wealth distribution, paternalism or concerns about transaction costs
and nontransactionable external "costs"-which may lead to tort rules
that depart deliberately from the rules likely to be established in
private negotiations. 32 For these reasons, the societally determined
balance will almost always be imperfect, often leading parties to seek
desired freedoms or protections in exchange for less valued freedoms or
protections which the law would otherwise provide. It is against this
background that the question is raised whether such exchanges should
be permissible and enforced.

M.

TYPES OF AGREEMENTS WHICH INCREASE THE
LANDLORD'S CONTROL OF TENANT CONDUCT

Out of dissatisfaction with the protections provided by law, landlords may rationally attempt to improve their protection via private
agreements with tenants. As observed in the preceding section, this
dissatisfaction may relate to either the duties, remedies, formulations
or behavior requirements which the law supplies.3 3 Thus, there are at
least four distinct ways in which such private agreements may supply
protections greater than those which the law provides:
1. By conferring standing to complain of conduct (e.g., illegal use
of the premises) which is unlawful, but which is not normally remediable at the instance of the landlord;
2. By prescribing a remedy (e.g., forfeiture) which the law does not
provide;
32.

Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability- One View of

the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1098-1105,

33.

See text accompanying notes 28-31 supra.

1113-15 (1972).
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3. By stipulating objective standards of conduct which are more
susceptible to determinations of noncompliance and hence more readily
enforceable than the vague and relativistic standards of tort law;
4. By protecting "special" concerns which might be described as
idiosyncratic but nonetheless understandable. These may either be
concerns of the landlord in his own right or they may be derivative
concerns, affecting the landlord mainly in that he is interested in
promoting the comfort and convenience of the greatest number of
tenants.
These four ways of increasing available protections are listed in
ascending order of their implications for tenant freedom. Indeed, the
first and second methods (obtaining standing or a remedy) and probably the third (avoidance of tort law vagueness) involve no theoretical
reduction of tenant freedom at all. They are directed rather at supplementing or streamlining the mechanism for enforcing constraints on
tenant freedom which the law would impose anyway. Nevertheless, all
four possibilities are hostile to the general possessory right of free use
and enjoyment which the law favors. 34 The inhibiting effect which
better enforcement possibilities have on conduct means that tenant
freedom is likely, as a practical matter, to be impaired irrespective of
how the increased protections are achieved. And, in any case, the
conduct-related provisions in a given lease are likely to be mixed,
containing elements from all four categories. Still, it is useful analytically to break down and separately treat the four categories of methods
for increasing landlords' control: each offers its own justifications in
support of enforcement -of conduct-related lease provisions and each
has its own implications for the withholding of enforcement.
A.

Standing

1. Reasons for Allowing the Landlord Standing to Complain
Nearly always, when a landlord seeks to control tenant behavior, he
does so in reliance upon lease provisions 35 authorizing the landlord to
move in controversies that are essentially controversies between tenants. The question of standing comes down to whether and with what
the power to intervene
limitations recognition should be accorded
36
which such provisions purport to confer.
34. See notes 23 & 25 supra.
35. For a discussion of possible exceptional situations, where the landlord may move without
the benefit of such lease provisions, see text accompanying notes 61-78, 115-16 infra.
36. This issue is approached as something of an original question even though there is no real
question of law as to whether a landlord may validly acquire standing by contract to enforce use
and enjoyment restrictions against tenants. E.g., Miles v. Lauraine, 99 Ga. 402, 27 S.E. 739
(1896); Bovin v. Galitzka, 250 N.Y. 228, 165 N.E. 273 (1929); see I Am. L. Prop., supra note 3,
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The antagonisms which arise among tenants in close proximity
receive judicial attention, if not as criminal proceedings, then probably
as legal proceedings by the landlord against a tenant who is alleged to
have violated one or another provision of his lease. Controversies
rooted in relations among tenants thus become cases between landlord
37
and tenant.
It would not, of course, have to be so. If an offending tenant's
activities unreasonably interfere with the neighboring tenants' enjoyment of their respective premises, the neighbors could maintain actions
in their own rights for damages or injunction predicated upon the
nuisance. 38 The possibility even exists that tenants may rely on uni§§ 3.40, 3.94. For a discussion and collection of cases, see Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 1148 (1948).
However, the reasons for the rule allowing standing so to be acquired, and the limitations on the
rule which such reasons might suggest, receive little judicial discussion. Furthermore, doubts
about the propriety of "free-enterprise" police powers for landlords may well be an unarticulated
influence in deciding particular cases against the landlord; and being unarticulated, such doubts
may even carry the decision without any consideration, explicit or otherwise, of possible
justifications for such policing. See quotation from Moss v. Hirshtritt, 60 Misc. 2d 402, 303
N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. City Civ. CL 1969), in text accompanying note 15 supra.
When landlords attempt to enforce restrictions on tenant conduct, the interest being asserted by
the landlord is often factually derivative (see note 37 infra), something which may obscure the
real conflict-tenant vs. tenant-which the courts are asked to resolve. The very fact that the
landlord may be held to have waived or estopped himself fr 1 asserting a conduct restriction (see
notes 52-53 infra), indicates that the courts do not always see the other tenants as the most direct
beneficiaries of the protection.
In any event, approaching the issue of standing for the landlord as an original question appears
better suited to revealing the various policy considerations, both those which commend the rule
that allows landlords to contract for standing and those which suggest limitations on the rule.
37. It is not uncommon in reported cases to see specific references by the court to the fact that
it was other tenants' complaints which prompted the landlord to bring proceedings against the
breaching tenant. E.g., Modern Amusements, Inc. v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 183 La898, 165 So. 137 (1935); Bonan v. Sarni Original Dry Cleaners, Inc., 359 Mass. 217, 268 N.E.2d
366 (1971) (commercial lease); 930 Fifth Corp. v. King, 40 App. Div. 2d 140, 338 N.Y.S.2d 773
(1st Dep't 1972); Louisiana Leasing Co. v. Sokolow, 48 Misc. 2d 1014, 266 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y.
City Civ. CL 1966); Valley Courts, Inc. v. Newton, 47 Misc. 2d 1028, 263 N.Y.S.2d 863

(Syracuse City CL 1965).
38. Leasehold tenants, like any holders of possessory interests in land, have standing to
maintain actions based upon alleged nuisances which interfere with the use and enjoyment of
such interests (e.g., Thompson v. Harris, 9 Ariz. App. 341, 452 P.2d 122 (1969); Restatement of
Torts § 823 (1939)), either to recover damages (e.g., Sherman v. Fall River Iron Works Co_. 84
Mass. (2 Allen) 524 (1861); Comes v. Harris, I N.Y. 223 (1848)), or to obtain an injunction (e.g.,
Martin v. Val-Lo-Will Sherman Co., 337 Ill. App. 166, 85 N.E.2d 358 (1949); Fox v. Corbitt,
137 Tenn. 466, 194 S.W. 88 (1917); Grantham v. Gibson, 41 Wash. 125, 83 P. 14 (1905)). For
citations to other cases, see Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1228-30 (1950).
However, the imprecision with which two key elements of private nuisance (substantiality of
harm and unreasonableness of activities) are defined (see note 260 infra) confronts prospective
tenant-plaintiffs with practical problems of proof and advocacy which are, to say the least,
formidable. This can especially be expected when the competing interests to be balanced in
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form use restrictions contained in their leases as a basis for direct
actions against their fellow tenants to enjoin their inconsistent uses of
the premises, by analogy to equitable servitudes created pursuant to a
common scheme or plan.3 9 Yet, when the occupancy of a tenant
becomes objectionable to the neighbors, it is often not (and probably
usually not) the directly offended party who seeks
protection at law;
40
rather it is usually the landlord who moves.
nuisance cases are not even theoretically quantifiable, for example, the interests in personal
comfort or convenience at home or the interest in carrying on an activity at home. Cf. text
accompanying notes 264-75 infra. Considering also that for the residential leasehold tenant (I)
litigation costs may easily exceed the value of the protection being sought, and (ii) it is relatively
easy to leave a short-term leasehold, it is not surprising that nuisance actions, tenant vs. tenant,
brought by residential leasehold tenants are, if reported cases are any indication, practically
nonexistent.
39. The theory has been recognized in England (Newman v. Real Estate Debenture Corp.,
[1940] 1 All E.R. 131 (K.B. 1939); cf. Hudson v. Cripps [1896] 1 Ch. 265 (1895)) but its
acceptability in this country remains at best an open question, and a doubtful one at that (see
Hannan v. Harper, 189 Wis. 588, 208 N.W. 255 (1926). See also Stewart v. Lawson, 199 Mich.
497, 165 N.W.716 (1917); K.G.O. Constr. Co. v. King, 12 N.J. Misc. 291, 171 A. 164 (Dist. Ct.
1934); Sefton v. Juilliard, 46 Misc. 68, 91 N.Y.S. 348 (App. T. 1904); Beebe v. Tyra, 49 Wash.
157, 94 P. 940 (1908)). For an argument that the theory should apply in the case of cooperatives,
see Comment, Restrictions on the Use of Cooperative Apartment Property, 13 Hastings L.J. 357,
364-66 (1962). Interestingly, however, the equitable servitude theory has been applied to lease
covenants restricting competition. See Note, Lessors' Covenants Restricting Competition:
Drafting Problems, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1400, 1408-11 (1950); Note, Restrictive Covenants In
Shopping Center Leases, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 940, 940-44 (1959); cf. White Star Realty Co. v.
Schreiber, 229 So. 2d 300 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); cf. Pekelner v. Park W. Management
Corp. (Sup. Ct.), in 176 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 27, 1976, at 5, col. 3 (upholding damage action by tenant
against landlord based on latter's failure to enforce restriction on piano playing by neighboring
tenant). See generally Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 4, 76-88 (1964).
Form leases often will expressly deny tenants the power to take action against other tenants
based upon lease-contained use restrictions. See Berger, supra note 22, at 825. However, this
denial of enforcement power to tenants does not necessarily mean, as has been argued, that "the
inclusion of rules for tenant conduct must be inspired by something other than an interest in the
peace and comfort of the tenants in the building." Bentley, An Alternative Residential Lease, 74
Colum. L. Rev. 836, 848-49 (1974). It may only mean that the landlord does not, by his conduct
restrictions, want to give tenants still another weapon, legal action, with which they can harass
each other. That is, the landlord, whose perspective in inter-tenant disputes may at least be
more dispassionate, wants to retain control of the sword which he has created.
40. In background research for this Article, by far the majority of use restriction cases
encountered involved proceedings, usually eviction proceedings, brought by landlords. Only
rarely do tenants seem to bring (or at least pursue to a reported decision) legal proceedings to
protect their occupancy against the spill-over effects of a neighbor's activities. Tenant-instituted
proceedings are not, however, unknown. See, e.g., Godard v. Babson-Dow Mfg. Co., 313 Mass.
280, 47 N.E.2d 303 (1943); Sherman v. Fall River Iron Works Co., 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 524 (1861);
Bly v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 172 N.Y. 1, 64 N.E. 745 (1902); Zamzok v. 650 Park Ave.
Corp., 80 Misc. 2d 573, 363 N.Y.S.2d 868 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (co-op tenant); Ryan v. Steele, 6 Misc.
2d 370, 163 N.Y.S.2d 471 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Pool v. Higginson, 8 Daly 113 (N.Y.C.P. 1878), and
for a collection of older cases, see Annot., 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 560 (1911). More often, though, it
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The seeming preponderance of landlord-initiated proceedings in
inter-tenant controversies suggests the presence of practical considerations which discourage tenants from taking action themselves. One
can but speculate what those considerations may be, and quite probably the considerations differ depending upon the use (viz., residential,
commercial, etc.) that the offended tenant makes of his premises.
Nonetheless, at least in the case of a residential tenant, a number of
factors may be fairly confidently cited as contributors to the terldency
to leave to the landlord the job of protecting tenants from each other:
-Resources available to the landlord for maintaining legal jroieedings against offending tenants will usually exceed those available to the
offended complainants. Even if the costs of a proceeding were likely to
be about the same irrespective of who the moving party is, the
landlord would still usually be in a superior position to bear such costs.
-- Convenience of instituting proceedings is far more likely to be bh
the side of the landlord than on the side of the offended tenant; the
landlord probably already has an established relatidnship with an
attorney, and both landlords and landlords' attorneys are presiindbiy
better equipped by experience to bring the types ot proceedings apiropriate for eliminating offensive tenant conduct.
-Effectiveness of the Available Remedies to eliniinate the offensive
conduct is generally greater when the proceeding is brought by the
landlord insofar as the landlord's uliimate (drid usul) recourse will be
to assert his reserved power to terminate the offeidihg tenant's occupancy, a measure virtually certain to bring abob! the desired
result
41
(especially as compared with damages or injunctive relief).
-Expeditiousness of Available Pyocedures also favors the landlord
rather than the offended tenants, again itisofar as the landlord may
terminate the offending tenant's occuahty and utilize a special summary procedure, 42 streamlined to give quick relief, to enforce such
termination. The costs of such special proceedings are almost inevitably less than the costs of the full scale action at law or in equity which
a tenant would have to maintain in order to obtain damages or
injunctive relief.
seems that tenants bring their complaints to the landlord for satisfaction (see, e.g., cases cited at
note 37 supra), sofietiffies attempting to reinforce their complaints through self-help techniques
which the law does iot dtithorize. See, e.g., Thompson v. Harris, 9 Ariz. App. 341, 452 P.2d 122
(1969) (rent withholdihig); Katz v. Duffy, 261 Mfass. 149, 158 N.E. 264 (1927) (abandonment);

Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Sugarman, 264 App. Div. 240, 35 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Ist Dep't
1942) (rescission). But cf. I Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 3.53 for a discussion of limited types of
cases where a tenant may relieve himself of liability for rent on a constructive eviction theory.
41. See section lf-(B)(1) infra.

42.

E.g., N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law Art. 7 (McKinney 1963).
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-Avoidance of Difficult Requirements of Proof is possible when the
landlord proceeds insofar as the landlord may rely on violations of
more or less objective conduct standards, articulated in the lease, as
the basis for relief. A complaining tenant, on the other hand, generally
must rely on relatively subjective tort analysis-e.g., in showing that
his neighbor is committing a nuisance-involving both greater4 3 difficulty (and higher costs) of proof and less certainty of result.
-Interest in Eliminating the Annoyance is primarily the interest of
the tenant; at best the landlord's interest is derivative, at least so long
as the neighbors of the offensive tenant continue to pay their rent.
However, the interest of the tenant in leased premises is always more
transitory than the landlord's, and the tenant's financial stake in the
premises is certainly less. When a tenant is annoyed, he may, far more
realistically than the landlord, simply choose to leave. And given the
cost burden of legal proceedings to abate an annoyance, to say nothing
of the relative cost burden in light of the respective resources of
landlord and tenant, the costs of moving to a new place will very likely
make moving out the more cost-effective, and hence preferred, choice
44
of residential leasehold tenants who are bothered by their neighbors.
43. See note 38 supra.
44. The tendency of residential leasehold tenants to leave it to the landlord to move against
disturbing neighbors may also be a manifestation of the overall attitude and custom concerning
"gross" lease arrangements in general, i.e., that almost all of the usual burdens associated with
deriving benefit from the real estate are, under a gross lease, left to the landlord. (By contrast,
such burdens-including payments for insurance, taxes and repairs-are assumed by the tenant
under a so-called "net" lease.) Certainly, the residential gross lessee customarily expects to have
more things taken care of for him, from minor plumbing repairs to major structural renovations,
than does, say, the owner-occupant of a single family house. And the residential gross lessor
expects to have to take care of these, or most of them, as a matter of custom and goodwill, if not
as a matter of law.
The nature of a multi-tenant structure necessarily reinforces the expectation that the landlord
will bear the burden with respect to major items or common facilities, for example, maintenance
of elevators and supplying of heat. On the other hand, it may be questioned whether there is
anything in physical or social reality which compels centralizing in the landlord much of the
minor in-apartment maintenance responsibility which landlords in fact bear and which they are
expected (often in housing codes) to bear.
If it is decided that landlords should bear these minor burdens which tenants could easily take
care of themselves, it is probably because of the relative transiency of the leasehold tenant's
interest compared with the landlord's "permanent" interest in the premises. In any case, if the
custom-supported (or law-supported) tendency to "leave it to the landlord" becomes a habit, it
can easily be seen how a tenant's first response to a disturbing neighbor will be to go to the
landlord with the complaint, irrespective of the relative degrees of interest of landlord and tenant
in eliminating the annoyance. (Of course, once a "good" tenant complains of discomfort to the
landlord, the landlord's interest in removing the disturbance, whatever that interest may have
been before, is suddenly enhanced.)
Other reasons why tenants might take their complaints to the landlord are that the landlord
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For whatever reasons, the fact is that tenants annoyed by their
neighbors do not generally seem to resort for relief to legal proceedings;
they will more likely seek "relief" by moving away, by informal
pressure, 4 5 or perhaps by simply habituating themselves to the annoyance. But the fact that tenants seldom resort to legal proceedings
for relief does not necessarily mean the perceived annoyances are not
real, or irremediable, or not worth some trouble and expense in order
to secure a remedy. It may mean only that the anticipated costs of
obtaining judicial relief exceed either the value placed on being freed
of the annoyance or the costs of an alternative solution, such as
moving out. It is not hard to imagine that the anticipated burdens of a
judicial remedy would usually exceed both of these; and this is
especially so when one takes into account the magnifying effects which
can result from uncertainty of outcome and lack of information about
what would be involved in a lawsuit.
The annoyance which neighboring tenants cause each other may
thus represent a very considerable body of "submerged" costs which
are almost always simply borne by those upon whom they initially fall
and which are almost never shifted to those who, under applicable
legal principles, ought to bear them. 4 6 Unless there is some policy
may seem more authoritative and that action by the landlord insulates the complainant from the
discomfiture of direct confrontation with the objectionable neighbor.
45. The effectiveness of what one commentator calls "the social force of neighborhood
opinion" should not be entirely discounted. Note, Restrictive Regulations in Wisconsin Summer
Colony Land Conveyances, 1950 Wis. L. Rev. 709, 710; see id. at 710-11. Obiously, though,
in the absence of empirical surveys, we can only make an impressionistic evaluation of the
relative effectiveness and cost-efficiency of this mechanism. No doubt the results will vary with,
among other things, the possible variations in the mode of applying this "social force." In the
Note just cited, there was indication that in dealing with conscious violators it is helpful to have a
"focal point" for the application of the "social force," such as a community association, a common
grantor or, one may assume, a landlord. Id. It was also observed that "many believe" a personal
conference, in which "the nature of the restrictions is fully explained" to a prospective occupant,
is the "best method to insure a minimum of trouble and unpleasantness afterwards." Id. at 711.
Such a conference might serve not only an educative function but, probably even more
significantly, a screening function as well. See Fuerst, Issues and Interpretations, 5 Real Estate
Rev. No. 1, at 10-11 (1975).
46. This statement cannot be made without some assumptions about policy objectives that
underlie or ought to underlie the "applicable legal principles." Several assumptions seem to be
worthy of consideration.
The first of these assumptions is that persons engaged in activities should, in general at least,
be caused to ultimately bear the "external costs" which result from the spill-over effects that such
activities have upon neighboring premises. Accordingly, the occupants of the neighboring
premises, who bear the burden of such spill-over effects in the first instance, should generally be
able to shift such cost-burden back to the person whose activities are the cause of the cost.
Put more specifically into the context of multi-tenant buildings, the assumption is that the
space which is severally possessed by tenants in such buildings is not only allocated as to
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reason for making the "wrong" people bear these costs, the possibility
of indirect modes of shifting these costs, modes having greater costeffectiveness, ought to be considered. Thus, the practical impediments

which discourage tenants from themselves taking action against annoying neighbors may be taken as a prima facie justification for giving

landlords, who may act with great cost-effectiveness,
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standing to

take such action.
entitlements to exclusive physical occupancy, but it is also allocated, in a more complicated way,
as to entitlements to effectuate physical or psychological consequences. Each tenant entitled to
occupy a portion of the building is unqualifiedly privileged (vis-A-vis the other tenants) to
effectuate physical or psychological consequences within his exclusively occupied space. But no
such tenant is unqualifiedly privileged to "use" the portions allocated to the occupancy of other
tenants by engaging in activities that have spill-over effects creating burdens or costs, psychic or
otherwise, which fall ultimately (recourselessly) upon the neighboring tenants. For a discussion
supporting this assumption on economic grounds, see Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property
Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev.: Papers & Proceedings 347 (1967), reprinted in E. Furubotn & S.
Pejovich, The Economics of Property Rights 31 (1974); Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
162 Sci. Digest 1243 (1968). This assumption is a recognition of the fact that the "environment"
constituting a multi-tenant premises is in physical fact a common asset of all tenants. See notes
9-10 supra and accompanying text. The use of this common asset, viz., the environment
consisting of all neighboring premises, must be regulated to prevent its unequal appropriation by
diy particular tenant. Absent such regulation of environment use, any tenant could act to assert
an absolute right of use, placing a burden upon the environment disproportionate to his
undivided, commonly shared, qualified right of use.
This still leaves the problem of deciding which annoying tenant activities to tolerate, i.e.,
which spill-over effects will be permitted. A rational decision of this question, based on a
cost-behefit comparison (costs of annoying activities vs. the benefits thereof), will most likely be
made only if the costs of the activities are ultimately borne by the persons engaging in the
activities.
It is assumed also that people will, if left to their own devices, act (individually or through
transactions with others) to maximize the net benefits of their activities by reducing or shifting to
others the costs, including opportunity costs, which are borne to obtain the benefits. Further, it is
assumed that it is socially desirable to encourage the reduction (though not necessarily the
shifting) of the costs of obtaining such benefits.
However, the avoidance of costs itself involves costs (e.g., information, transaction, or
analogous costs) and these "cost-avoidance" costs may themselves to a greater or lesser extent
impede such cost reduction (and benefit maximization). Hence, the "applicable legal principles"
should be those calculated to minimize the impediment which such "cost-avoidance" costs may
represent. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960). (Presumably, there
is no social goal of shifting wealth from nonannoying tenants to annoying ones; therefore, wealth
distribution goals are irrelevant.) From these assumptions, it is submitted, one may proceed to the
conclusion stated in the next two sentences of the text that, if giving tenants direct rights to relief
is ineffective to achieve desirable cost-reductions, then giving an indirect (derivative) right to seek
relief to landlords may be justified.
47. The assumption that landlords can generally act with greater cost-effectiveness is critical
to a determination that it is rational, and arguably that it is even desirable, to give landlords
standing to act. The observations made in the text just preceding-that landlords may generally
act more cheaply than tenants-is, of course, directed at only one half the question of whether
landlords can act with greater cost-effectiveness. The other half of the question is whether the
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The justification is only prima facie. Its acceptance would have to
be with all of the reservations which might be raised against allowing
standing to persons other than real parties in interest. 4 8 However, in
the context of tenant conduct restrictions, the only pressing reservation
would seem to be that the landlord, if he lacks a direct interest in the
enforcement of the conduct restrictions, may exercise his enforcement
benefits which are expected warrant the costs to the landlord of obtaining relief, and for this
purpose it is only the benefits which are expected by the landlord that are relevant.
The only direct benefits of terminating annoying tenant activities may be the benefits which
accrue to the neighboring tenants. The benefit to the landlord is usually only indirect: contentment among existing tenants and attractiveness of his premises to prospective tenants. A
discussion of whether these indirect benefits can, in themselves, supply a basis for standing
follows in the next two sections.
For present purposes, it is taken that landlords may indeed act with greater cost-effectiveness,
as evidenced by the preponderance of landlord-initiated actions brought to enforce conduct
standards on tenants.
48. The reservations against allowing standing to a person not a real party in interest are
somewhat similar to the policy considerations which underlie refusals to enforce use restrictions
when no substantial benefit can be derived from the enforcement (e.g., Downs v. Kroeger, 200
Cal. 743, 254 P. 1101 (1927); Piper v. Reder, 44 Ill. App. 2d 431, 195 N.E.2d 224 (1963)
(compared relative hardships); N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 1951 (McKinney 1963)), or when
the restrictions are not calculated to benefit anyone (e.g., Mitchell v. Leavitt, 30 Conn. 587, 590
(1862); Kaczynski v. Lindahl, 5 Mich. App. 377, 380, 146 N.W.2d 675, 676 (1966) (liquor
restriction upheld to preserve "aesthetic and saleable value of the remaining property"). See also
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 500.20 (1947); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 700.15 (1975)). However, the latter policy,
though related to the standing issue, is distinguishable insofar as it is rooted in the equitable
notions of relative hardship. See, e.g., Downs v. Kroeger, supra at 745-46, 254 P. at 1102-03.
Relative hardship should have no relevance to the issue of standing per se so long as it can be
assumed that substantial injury has resulted to somebody.
More closely related to the issue of standing per se are cases holding that a developer, having
parted with all lots in a development, may not have enforcement of use restrictions in the deeds
by which his purchasers took title. Bramwell v. Kuhle, 183 Cal. App. 2d 767, 6 Cal. Rptr. 839
(Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Kent v. Koch, 166 Cal. App. 2d 579, 333 P.2d 411 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958);
Forman v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 114 Md. 574, 80 A. 298 (1911). However, in the first place,
the interest of an apartment landlord is considerably less remote than that of such a developer.
Phillipse Towers, Inc. v. Ortega, 61 Misc. 2d 539, 541, 305 N.Y.S.2d 546, 548 (Yonkers City Ct.
1969). Furthermore, it is more understandable (and likely) that apartment tenants will look to
their landlord to enforce lease restrictions than for grantees in fee simple to expect the developer
to come back and enforce the deed restrictions. See note 44 supra and accompanying text. And
this is to say nothing of the fact that the landlord does have a continuing interest in the leased
premises even though possession, for the time being, is in others.
Thus, more to the point perhaps are cases such as Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v.
Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938) and Merrionette Manor Homes
Improvement Ass'n v. Heda, 11 11. App. 2d 186, 136 N.E.2d 556 (1956), where community
associations were held to have "representative" standing to assert deed covenant rights on behalf
of the real parties in interest. See also Van Sant v. Rose, 260 Ill. 401, 103 N.E. 194 (1913) where
the original covenantee was allowed to enforce the restriction, even though not an owner of
protected land, seemingly on the basis that "a contract is a contract."
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powers only unevenly4 9 or even abusively.5 0 Uneven enforcement
would be unfair to the tenant unlucky enough to be singled out for the
landlord's wrath. Abusive motivation is not only "unfair," but it may
undermine unrelated policy objectives as well; i.e., the landlord may
be motivated to assert the restrictions mainly to promote some unrelated unlawful purpose (e.g., racial discrimination) which he could not
promote explicitly.5 I However, the problems both of uneven enforcement and abusive motivation can be handled on other bases, without
49. A past pattern of uneven enforcement of restrictions has sometimes been recognized as
grounds for denying enforcement in a particular case. See, e.g., Kingsview Homes, Inc. v. Jarvis,
48 App. Div. 2d 881, 369 N.Y.S.2d 201 (2d Dep't 1975) (dictum) and cases cited in note 52 infra,
Other times it has been ignored. Taylor v. Parklane Hosiery Co., - App. Div. 2d -, -, 385
N.Y.S.2d 380, 381 (2d Dep't 1976) ("no requirement that a landlord investigate the adherence of
every commercial tenant ...

before seeking to enjoin the continued violation . . . by one of the

tenants"); Brigham Park Cooperative Apts. Section No. 2, Inc. v. Krauss, 28 App. Div. 2d 846,
282 N.Y.S.2d 938 (2d Dep't 1967), aff'd, 21 N.Y.2d 941, 237 N.E.2d 86, 289 N.Y.S.2d 769
(1968); Trump Village Sec. 3, Inc. v. Rothstein, 62 Misc. 2d 742, 309 N.Y.S.2d 388 (N.Y. City
Civ. Ct. 1970), rev'd, 66 Misc. 2d 221, 319 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (App. T. 1971). The presence in the
lease of a provision that there should not be "waiver" because of landlord inaction may affect the
question. Compare Mutual Redev. Houses, Inc. v. Balducci, 37 App. Div. 2d 943, 325 N.Y.S.2d
765 (1st Dep't 1971) (provision effective) with Fritts v. Cloud Oak Flooring Co., 478 S.W.2d 8
(Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (provision ineffective).
50. This usage of the word "abusive" follows the usage in Blades, supra note 15, at 1413.
However, the much broader civilian concept of "abus des droits" may be cited as providing a
more fully developed doctrinal reference for the notion of "abusive motivation." See R.
Schlesinger, Comparative Law 514-34 (3d ed. 1970). For present purposes, a discretionary power
would be considered to be exercised abusively when the motivation either is unlawful or is to
exert duress for a reason unrelated to the ostensible purpose of the discretionary power.
Threatening to terminate a monthly tenancy in order to discourage tenants from asserting their
legal rights, or to compel a tenant to accept an invitation for a date, would be examples of
abusive motivation. A most characteristic instance of abusive motivation in the landlord-tenant
field is retaliatory eviction. The leading case on the subject is Robinson v. Diamond Housing
Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
51. One commentator has observed, undoubtedly correctly, that: "[it is very possible that
violation of a generally-unenforced lease term may be seized upon by a determined lpndlord as a
means of concealing arbitrary action, discrimination, retaliation, or other impermissible motive
for eviction. Naturally, the longer the list of obscure and trivial regulations, the greater the risk of
such disingenuous action becomes." Bentley, An Alternative Residential Lease, 74 Colum. L.
Rev. 836, 849 (1974) (footnotes omitted); cf. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay In
Perspective, 40 Yale L.J. 704, 736 (1931) ("A landlord . . . may never resort to his ironclad
document save when for extraneous reasons the other party proves unworkable.").
At a later point, Bentley underscored this risk citing a case where the landlord apparently had
almost no proof of a substantive basis for eviction but received judicial sympathy, and an eviction
below, because there was a "personality conflict" between landlord and tenant (not a ground for
eviction under the lease). Bentley, supra at 855 n. 115. The case was reversed on appeal. Aelllo v.
Rivera (App. T.), in 171 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 7, 1974, at 21, col. 1.
Evidently, it was a fear that improperly motivated landlords would rely on trivial regulations
to evict rent-control tenants that led to limiting such evictions to cases where the tenant's default
was a nuisance or a violation of "a substantial obligation of his tenancy." See Park E. Land Corp.
v. Finkelstein, 299 N.Y. 70, 74, 85 N.E.2d 869, 871 (1949).
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resort to the imposition of limitations on fundamental standing. Uneven enforcement suggests such defenses as waiver, 52 estoppel, 53 or
laches. 54 Abusive motivation, when there appears to have been potentially improper bases for taking action, is gaining recognition as an
independent basis for withholding the assistance of the courts.3 5
52. See Radcliffe Associates v. Greenstein, 274 App. Div. 277, 82 N.Y.S.2d 680 list Dep't
1948); Sol Apfel, Inc. v. Kocher, 61 N.Y.S.2d 508 (Sup. Ct. 1946), affd mem., 272 App. Div
758, 70 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1st Dep't 1947) (but a tenant's mistake as to what was permitted was not
grounds for reformation) and cases cited in note 49 supra. The theory that a legal right may be
waived by implication, as shown from a course of conduct, presents no difficulty. 5 S. Williston,
Contracts § 740 (3d ed. 1961). And there have been holdings to the effect that a pattern of not
enforcing particular lease restrictions constitutes a waiver or evidence of an intention to waive
such restrictions. See, e.g., Baltimore Butchers Abattoir & Live Stock Co. v. Union Rendering
Co., 179 Md. 117, 17 A.2d 130 (1941); Morrison v. Smith, 90 Md. 76, 44 A. 1031 (1899); cf.
Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 1111, 1140-50 (1949). But cf. Taylor v. Parklane Hosiery Co., App
Div. 2d -,
385 N.Y.S.2d 380 (2d Dep't 1976), 930 Fifth Corp. v. King, 40 App. Div 2d 140,
338 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1st Dep't 1972) (court enforced prohibition on pets despite other dogs in
building).
In the analogous situation of uniform use restrictions in deeds, a pattern of nonenforcement will
bar later enforcement in equity if the past laxity has been accompanied by a change in the
character of the neighborhood rendering later enforcement of little benefit to anyone. Logan v.
Sprinkle, 256 N.C. 41, 123 S.E.2d 209 (1961); Romig v. Modest, 102 Ohio App. 225, 142 N.E2d
555 (1956); cf. Downs v. Kroeger, 200 Cal. 743, 254 P. 1101 (1927). See also N.Y. Real Prop.
Actions Law § 1951 (McKinney 1963) (codifying the principle and making it applicable to relieve
against forfeiture for violation of use restrictions).
It may occur, either by lease provision (see. e.g., Pollack v. J.A. Green Constr. Corp.. 40 AppDiv. 2d 996, 338 N.Y.S.2d 486 (2d Dep't 1972), aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 720, 297 N.E.2d 99, 344
N.Y.S.2d 363 (1973)) or by statute (see, e.g., Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 521-31(a) (Supp. 1975)) that the
landlord cannot, by inaction or perhaps otherwise, waive rights under the lease. What effect such
disempowering has on the issue of standing is problematical, especially since estoppel, laches and
abusive motivation would remain, in any event, as possible (and presumably nonrelinquishable
escape valves for the tenant.
53. See Capital View Realty Co. v. Meigs, 92 A,2d 765 (D.C- Mun. Ct. App. 1952); Weaver
Bros. v. Newlin, 74 A.2d 65 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1950); Vendramis v. Frankfurt, 86 NMY.S 2d
715 (Sup. Ct. 1949), affd, 276 App. Div. 903, 94 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1st Dep't 1950) (tenant paid
higher rent in reliance on freedom from piano playing restriction); 10th & 5th. Inc v.
Arrowsmith, 186 Misc. 639, 59 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. City Mun. CL 1945), aff'd. 186 Misc. 864,
65 N.Y.S.2d 344 (App. T. 1946). But cf. Southbridge Towers, Inc. v. Rovics, 76 Misc. 2d 396,
350 N.Y.S.2d 62 (App. T. 1973) (no estoppel for failing to notify tenant of the prohibition set
forth in the lease). Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right whereas the gist of
estoppel is detrimental reliance, irrespective of intent. See Berger, supra note 22. at 794-96.
However, in the landlord-tenant area, as elsewhere, courts do not always take pains to
distinguish the two. The cases just cited above are examples,
54. An example is Valentine Gardens Cooperative, Inc. v. Oberman, 237 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Sup.
Ct. 1963). The court refused to enforce a prohibition on pets because of the landlord's laches in
enforcing the prohibition. While the landlord delayed, the tenant's family had fallen in love with
the dog, making its removal "harsh, unwarranted, and oppressive." Id. at 538; cf- Annot., 12
A.L.R.2d 394 (1950).
55. As the court in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rubenfeld, 77 Misc. 2d 962. 963, 357 N.Y S.2d 589,
591 (App. T. 1974) (per curiam) stated: "[Plublic policy would militate against enforcing a
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On balance, even if the landlord does not have any direct interest in
the enforcement of tenant conduct standards, and therefore may not be
considered a "real party in interest," there does not appear to be any
overriding objection to lease provisions giving the landlord the power
to enforce such standards. It would thus appear that the landlord
should have such power on pure cost-effectiveness grounds. Moreover,
as will be shown presently, the landlord normally does have a real
interest in the enforcement of tenant conduct restrictions; therefore,
stating the question as though he does not, makes it unrealistically
difficult to reach the conclusion that lease conferred standing should be
upheld. But the point of so stating the question is to make clear that
cost-effectiveness alone can serve as an independent basis for allowing
landlord intervention in controversies between tenants, especially
when the less cost-effective alternatives (viz., direct actions by tenants)
tend, because of their very burdensomeness, to be entirely deterred.
2. The Landlord's Standing as Conferred by Law
Even though the job of moving against a disturbing tenant seems in
practice to be generally left to the landlord, the law has been distinctly
ungenerous in conferring landlords with standing to take effective legal
action against tenant misconduct. Under the traditional view, the
leasing transaction is regarded primarily as a conveyance of an interest
contractual right where it is being exercised in furtherance of an illegal end." The court
accordingly denied the landlord's attempt to exercise a termination option in order to coerce
compliance with landlord's price-fixing scheme, citing Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). Regrettably, it must be reported that on appeal the
court was overruled on this point. 48 App. Div. 2d 428, 370 N.Y.S.2d 943 (2d Dep't 1975). Other
cases recognizing abusive motivation as a basis for withholding enforcement of rights are:
Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (retaliatory eviction);
L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1968) (cancellation of malpractice
insurance in retaliation against testimony by insured); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H.
130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (discharge of employee motivated by bad faith, malice, retaliation).
Other legal bases for protecting against abusive motivations in the employee discharge area are
discussed in Blades, supra note 15, at 1410-19. See also 43 Fordham L. Rev. 300 (1974).
As an alternative basis for withholding relief in cases of abusive motivation the courts might
imply a duty of good faith, akin to Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201(19), into leases. Eg.,
Volpicelli v. Leventhal, 48 App. Div. 2d 660, 367 N.Y.S.2d 541 (2d Dep't 1975); 57 E. 54 Realty
Corp. v. Gay Nineties Realty Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 353, 335 N.Y.S.2d 872 (App. T. 1972); accord,
Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 521-10 (Supp. 1975).
Perhaps the most compelling objection to limiting discretionary powers through a "doctrine" of
abusive motivation is that the key operative fact in each case would be the subjective state of
mind of the person exercising the discretion, a fact which is difficult to ascertain. Approaches to
this problem have varied from requiring the person complaining of abuse to provide "clear and
convincing" evidence (see Blades, supra note 15, at 1429-30) all the way to requiring the
discretionary actor to show a lack of abusive motivation in exercising the discretion (see, e.g.,
Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., supra at 865).
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in realty, and the landlord is considered to have little role in assuring
that the premises will serve any useful purpose of the tenant. 56 The
tenant is seen as an "owner" having the benefit of all the remedies
available to any owner of a possessory estate in realty." The landlord
is traditionally not responsible to his tenant for acts of others even
when those acts deprive the tenant of the very possession for which he
had bargained.5 8 In this state of the law, it may be logical to hold, as
the courts generally have, that the landlord has no responsibilities in
inter-tenant disputes (absent landlord complicity), and that the complaining tenant's recourse is against his fellow tenants, not against the
landlord.5 9 Accordingly, it is perhaps also logical (cost-effectiveness
aside) to deny the landlord standing in such inter-tenant disputes and to
allow an effective remedy only to the offended tenant.
It is perhaps logical, that is, provided that the offended tenant, and
not the landlord, is the only one adversely affected by the offending
tenant's conduct.
But since offensive tenant conduct, which may be illegal or a
nuisance, can reduce the rentability of the landlord's property-and
hence reduce the return-related value of his investment-it would
rarely seem to be the case that the offended tenant would be the only
one adversely affected by the offensive conduct. In the preponderance
of situations, the landlord would probably also sustain injury due to
the offensive conduct; thus, he too would appear to be a real party in
interest with standing to move against such conduct, lease provision or
no.
The harm done by offensive tenant conduct, by reducing rentability,
injures what might be called the landlord's "reputational" interest in
the premises. Thus, insofar as injuries to such reputational interest
palpably impair the value of the landlord's property (as a return
56. See, e.g., Bowles v. Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320, 324 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
935 (1953); Suydam v. Jackson, 54 N.Y. 450 (1873); Smithfield Improvement Co. v. ColeyBardin, 156 N.C. 255, 72 S.E. 312 (1911).
57.
1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 3.53. One case even held that the landlord, having no
right to possession during the term, could not maintain ejectment against a wrongful possessor of

the leased premises. Western N.Y. & Pa. Ry. v. Vulcan Foundry & Mach. Co., 231 Pa. 383,
388-89, 96 A. 830, 832 (1916).
58. See 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 3.53. Of course the landlord could be held liable if he
were in complicity with such dispossessing acts of others (id.) or if the interference with possession
were by a third party holding paramount title (id. at §§ 3.47, 3.48). Furthermore, under one line
of cases, the landlord may be liable to the tenant if the wrongful acts of others prevent the tenant
from ever taking possession. Id. at § 3.37; see the very ample discussion in Hannan v. Dusch, 154
Va. 356, 153 S.E. 824 (1930).

59. E.g., Thompson v. Harris, 9 Ariz. App. 341, 452 P.2d 122 (1969) (tenant urinating on
common wall); Katz v. Duffy, 261 Mass. 149, 158 N.E. 264 (1927); see cases cited in 1 Am. L.
Prop., supra note 3, § 3.53 nn.11 & 12.
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producing investment), such injuries are conceptually little different
from physical waste. 60 Both are acts of a tenant tending to reduce the
value of the reversioner's retained interest. In any case, a direct injury
to the landlord's reputational interest supplies, in addition to costeffectiveness, a second ground for recognizing lease-conferred standing
for landlords to control tenant conduct.
Nonetheless, in the absence of physical waste, the landlord's recourse against a tenant whose conduct is illegal or a nuisance has been
tightly circumscribed.
a.

Illegal Acts

There have been occasional cases stating that the landlord may
cancel the lease of a tenant who uses the premises for an illegal
purpose, 6 1 and statutes sometimes so provide. 62 However, it may not
be said that illegal conduct by the tenant constitutes a general basis for
relief to the landlord, at least not unless he is protected by an
agreement or unless he sustains some sort of "special" injury from
which he is protected by the law of torts.
b.

Nuisances

Although it has been said that the landlord may oust the tenant for
committing a nuisance, 63 in most cases where nuisance is alleged as a
ground for eviction some other basis for asserting the forfeiture has
apparently existed. 64 Even when the landlord is willing to settle for
60. That rental real estate may have a reputational value which, if injured, is compensable
was recognized in Martin v. Medlin, 81 Ga. App. 602, 59 S.E.2d 519 (1950) and Sullivan v.
Waterman, 20 R.I. 372, 39 A. 243 (1898). In Martin v. Medlin, supra, which involved premises
leased allegedly for use "as a one-family domicile," it was held that conversion of the premises to
a house of assignation by the tenant, which "injured the value of the property," gave rise to
liability for "any injury occasioned by [the] breach." 81 Ga. App. at 605, 59 S.E.2d at 521. The
language employed by the court suggested that the court's theory of compensation was akin to the
compensation theory which would apply in cases where waste by the tenant had resulted in
deterioration in the capital value of the premises. Cf. Crewe Corp. v. Feiler, 28 N.J. 316, 146
A.2d 458 (1958), in which the tenant's acts (in improving the premises) increased the property
taxes and thereby caused injury to the landlord's interest in the "rental yield" of the premises.
Analogizing to the law of waste, which is concerned mainly with injuries to the capital value of
the premises, the court held the tenant liable for the loss to his "rental yield" sustained by the
landlord. Id. at 327, 146 A.2d at 463.
61. Schwartz v. McQuaid, 214 Ill. 357, 73 N.E. 582 (1905); Voght v. State, 124 Ind. 358, 24
N.E. 680 (1890); see 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 3.43.
62. E.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 139, § 19 (1972); N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 711.5
(McKinney 1963).
63. 2 Powell, supra note 24, T 247[1], at 372.103-04; see Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 666-3 (1968) for
a statute providing for eviction in cases of nuisance.
64. E.g., Silberman v. Hicks, 231 S.W.2d 283, 285 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950) (waste); Metropoli-
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damages or injunctive65 relief, the existing authorities are not much
more accommodating.
For a landlord seeking damages, the first analytical hurdle to
overcome is establishing that the alleged nuisance is causing or has
caused any compensable injury to the landlord. Although private
nuisances are thought of primarily as invasions of the right to use land,
a right which is incident to possession, it is recognized that damages
may also be recovered by "owners of non-possessory estates in land
which are detrimentally affected by interferences with the usability of
the land."' 66 Thus, there does appear to be some authoritative basis for
allowing a remedy for nuisance to a person in the position of the
landlord, i.e., to a reversioner. However, if the nuisance in question
involves no waste (in the traditional sense) and if the only premises
detrimentally affected are apartments leased to neighbors of the objectionable tenant, the possibilities for the landlord to have relief in
damages for the nuisance are slight.
The difficulty arises as a consequence of the general rule that, where
two or more persons have interests in property injured by a
wrongdoer, their respective entitlements to recoverable damages are to
be commensurate with the injuries to their respective estates. 6 7 Thus,
the landlord may not recover damages for injuries to the tenant's
estate. 68 Those injuries to the landlord's reversionary interest which
tan Life Ins. Co. v. Greenberg, 185 Misc. 122, 55 N.Y.S.2d 494 (App. T. 1945); see Roseman v.
Day, 345 Mass. 93, 95, 185 N.E.2d 650, 651-52 (1962). For a discussion and collection of cases
concerning the meaning of nuisance for purposes of World War II federal rent control regulations
(which authorized eviction 6n the basis of nuisance), see Annot., 174 A.L.R. 989 (1948).
65. It has been said that the tenant has an implied obligation not to injure the landlord by
committing a nuisance on the leased premises. Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co., 52 F.2d 364 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 677 (1931). However, this probably means nothing more than that
tenants, like everyone else, are restricted in the use of their premises to the extent prescribed by
the tort law of private nuisance. As is developed in the text which follows, the law of private
nuisance is distinctly unhelpful to a landlord seeking standing to complain of annoying tenant
activities unless the landlord is a possessor (as opposed to a lessor) of neighboring premises.
66. Restatement of Torts § 823(c) (1934); see Bly v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 172 N.Y.
1, 64 N.E. 745 (1902); Kernochan v. New York Elev. R.R., 128 N.Y. 559, 29 N.E. 65 (1891); 6A
Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 28.31; cf. Sullivan v. Waterman, 20 R.I. 372, 39 A. 243 (1898).
67. Zimmerman v. Shreeve, 59 Md. 357 (1883); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Heikens, 112
Tenn. 378, 79 S.W. 1038 (1904); Jordan v. Benwood, 42 W. Va. 312, 26 S.E. 266 (1896).
68. When title to real estate is divided between the holder of a possessory interest and the
holder of a future interest, it is sometimes held that the holder of the possessory estate may
recover for injuries both on his account and on the account of the future interest owner as well.
Rogers v. Atlantic, Gulf & Pac. Co., 213 N.Y. 246, 107 N.E. 661 (1915); United Traction Co. v.
Ferguson Contracting Co., 117 App. Div. 305, 102 N.Y.S. 190 (3d Dep't 1907). Contra, Jordan
v. Benwood, 42 W. Va. 312, 26 S.E. 266 (1896). However, recoveries by a landlord for injuries to
the tenant's interest seem to be uniformly impermissible. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Heikens,
112 Tenn. 378, 79 S.W. 1038 (1904); Jordan v. Benwood, supra; see 1916A L.R.A. 792, 805-11.
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are compensable typically are described as the "permanent" or "continuing" injuries. 6 9 The tenant's compensable injuries are described,
on the other hand, as those which are temporary or injurious to the
"use and enjoyment. ' 70 That is, in the traditional formulation, the
landlord, as reversioner, may recover for the reduction of so-called sale
value; the tenant's recovery is for the reduction of rental value caused
by the nuisance.
This division of recovery entitlements may at first blush seem
rational. Insofar as the landlord has, for the term of the lease, traded
off his rights of use and enjoyment in exchange for rent, double
compensation would result if the landlord were also to recover for the
loss which the nuisance causes to the "use and enjoyment" value, i.e.,
rental value. It would be likewise unfair to the tenant if no damage
recovery were available to the tenant for interferences with the rights
71
of use and enjoyment which he has bought for the term of the lease.
However, for reasons generally unrelated to the division of recovery
entitlements, most nuisances are classified as temporary rather than
permanent interferences. 72 The effect of this classification is to greatly
narrow the range of situations in which the landlord, as such, may
have a damage recovery based upon a nuisance. To an ordinary fee
owner-occupier, the tendency to classify nuisances as temporary rather
than permanent is a source more of inconvenience than of injustice.
Such an owner-occupier is relegated to multiple lawsuits, periodically
brought, to redress his loss as it accrues. But in the end he may
69. See Spaulding v. Cameron, 38 Cal. 2d 265, 270, 239 P.2d 625, 629 (1952); Cooper v.
Randall, 59 Ill.
317 (1871); Akers v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 139 W. Va. 682, 80 S.E.2d 884
(1954); 6A Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 28.33, at 92; Restatement of Torts § 823, comment d
(1934).
70. Union Cemetery Co. v. Harrison, 20 Ala. App. 291, 101 So. 517 (1924); Cooper v.
Randall, 59 Ill. 317 (1871); Sherman v. Fall River Iron Works Co., 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 524 (1861);
D. Dobbs, Remedies § 5.3, at 332-35 (1973).
71. A corollary concern would be to avoid recovery by both landlord and tenant for the same
injury. See Cooper v. Randall, 59 Il1. 317 (1871); Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1192, 1230-31 (1950).
72. See 6A Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 28.33; D. Dobbs, Remedies § 5.4, at 335-44 (1973);
W. Prosser, Torts § 90, at 602 (4th ed. 1971). A detailed discussion of the basis on which courts
resolve the difficult question of "permanency" would not be apposite. Suffice it to say that the
determination seems to be less influenced by the factual characteristics of the nuisance than by a
policy against legitimizing wrongs committed by persons willing to pay damages, permitting them
to acquire rights by a sort of private eminent domain power. Id. This is not to say, however, that
there are not instances where the factual probabilities or policy considerations lead the court to
regard the invasion as "permanent," permitting (or requiring) claims for present and prospective
injuries to be joined in a single action. Spaulding v. Cameron, 38 Cal. 2d 265, 269, 239 P.2d 625,
628 (1952); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 224, 257 N.E.2d 870, 874, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312, 317-18 (1970); Akers v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 139 W. Va. 682, 80 S.E.2d 884
(1954). See generally D. Dobbs, Remedies § 5.4, at 335-44 (1973). But such instances, as stated In
the text, are the exception rather than the rule.
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theoretically be made whole. However, in the case of a landlord, who
may never contemplate taking direct advantage of use and enjoyment,
i.e., whose expected benefit is to be not possessory but derivative-in
the form of rent which tenants are willing to pay-this classification
preference can mean that recovery would, as a practical matter, be
forever denied.
Undoubtedly, the cases are correct which hold that the tenant in
possession at the time a nuisance commenced should be the only one
entitled to recover for the past injuries caused by the nuisance, if the
nuisance has affected only that tenant's right of enjoyment. 7 3 Since the
landlord has previously shifted to the tenant the risk of obtaining the
benefits of use and enjoyment during the term, it would be illogical
and unjust to compensate the landlord for losses which have already
occurred due to third party interferences with such use and enjoyment.
Furthermore, if there are policy reasons preventing the allowance of
prospective "use and enjoyment" damages for nuisances, even those
likely to be "factually" permanent, 74 these too may be accepted; their
adverse effect on landlord recoveries may be regarded as merely an
incidental application of a "good" general rule.
What is not so understandable is why courts should extend this
principle to deny compensation to the landlord even when the effect of
a nuisance has been to palpably diminish the value of the one benefit
which the landlord seeks to reap from the leased premises-their rental
value. It may be readily seen how rental value might be affected by a
nuisance in cases where the conduct constituting the nuisance had
already been occurring prior to the time the directly offended tenants
commenced occupancy; the offended tenants, as prospective tenants,
may have been dissuaded by the nuisance from paying as high a rent
or even from entering into leases at all. 7" But rental value may also be
impaired because existing tenants may be persuaded to leave, at or
before the normal expiration of their leases, something which equally
contributes to an impairment of the landlord's expected investment
76
return and, hence, the value of his premises.
The loss to the landlord as a result of such tenant reactions may be
perhaps better described as a loss of "profit" rather than of rental value
per se, but the fact remains that the landlord suffers a loss in value of
his property as a return producing asset. The loss of rental value or
73.

E.g., Van Siclen v. New York, 64 App. Div. 437, 72 N.Y.S.

209 (2d Dep't 1901),

modified on other grounds, 172 N.Y. 504, 65 N.E. 257 (1902).
74. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
75. Cf. Sullivan v. Waterman, 20 R.I. 372, 39 A. 243 (1898) (lodging house).
76. The analogy of such losses to physical waste has already been mentioned. See text
accompanying note 60 supra.
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profitability ultimately will reduce the sale or capitalized value of his
property as well. The determination of the amount of loss would
inevitably be complicated by questions of causal connection and conjecture. However, even in situations when the causal connection and
amount of loss are clear, such as where the landlord has been forced to
accept a lower rental because of the nuisance, the courts have typically, but not uniformly, 77 refused to allow a recovery to the landlord. 78
The landlord may well face similar frustrations in obtaining injunctive relief against nuisances by the tenant. Citing nuisance cases which
77. E.g., Kernochan v. New York Elev. R.R., 128 N.Y. 559, 29 N.E. 65 (1891); accord,
Hine v. New York Elev. R.R., 128 N.Y. 571, 29 N.E. 69 (1891); Francis v. Schoellkopf, 53
N.Y. 152 (1873) (damages equal the difference in the rental value free from the stench and subject
to it). See also Adams Constr. Co. v. Bentley, 335 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. 1960), which held, without
discussion, that the landlord can recover loss of rental value.
78. Miller v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 184 N.Y. 17, 76 N.E. 734 (1906); Van Siclen v.
New York, 64 App. Div. 437, 72 N.Y.S. 209 (2d Dep't 1901), modified on other grounds, 172
N.Y. 504, 65 N.E. 257 (1902); cf. Halsey v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 45 N.J.L. 26 (Sup. Ct. 1883).
See also Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1192, 1230-31 (1950) and Annot., 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 560 (1911) for
additional discussion and cases.
For a time, it appears, the New York courts did allow landlords to recover for diminished
rental value resulting from a nuisance. Hine v. New York Elev. R.R., 128 N.Y. 571, 29 N.E. 69
(1891); Francis v. Schoellkopf, 53 N.Y. 152 (1873). In Hine, the court carefully distinguished the
landlord's claim for past damages, in the form of diminished rental value, from actions based on
"any theory of the continuing nature of the trespass" or "predicated upon any anticipation of its
continuance." 128 N.Y. at 573, 29 N.E. at 69. However, the position was reversed in Bly v.
Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 172 N.Y. 1, 64 N.E. 745 (1902), where the court distinguished the
leading case espousing the older view, Kernochan v. New York Elev. R.R., 128 N.Y. 559, 29
N.E. 65 (1891), stating that "Kernochan's case was not intended to be applied to the general law
of nuisances but to a condition created by the construction and operation of the elevated
railroads which has no exact parallel in any other department of our jurisprudence." 172 N.Y. at
16, 64 N.E. at 749. Other New York authority, not involving elevated railroads, was less
satisfactorily distinguished. The court's concern in Bly seemed to be to preserve the right of action
of lessees who "come to the nuisance."
Such tenants "who come to the nuisance" are generally protected, the rationale being that the
cause of action arises not from the tortious act itself but from the injury which is presumed to be
completed only when the tenancy begins. See Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1192, 1230 (1950); cf. Bly v.
Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 172 N.Y. 1, 64 N.E. 745 (1902); Dolata v. Berthelet Fuel &
Supply Co., 254 Wis. 194, 36 N.W.2d 97 (1949) (purchaser). However, in attempting to protect
possessors against injuries from nuisances, this reasoning seems to go too far. It assumes,
probably unjustifiably, that the prior existence of the nuisance caused no reduction in the price
which the possessor paid to acquire the possession. If the prior existing nuisance did cause such a
price reduction, the possessor "who comes to the nuisance" has already been compensated by such
reduction for the detriment which the nuisance involves. To allow a recovery by the possessor
against the person committing the nuisance would be to double the compensation to the
possessor. On the other hand, the landlord (or seller) who parted with possession at a reduced
price, and thus de facto has borne the financial loss resulting from the nuisance, is left
uncompensated for such loss.
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deny damage recoveries to landlords, 7 9 courts have held that the
landlord's entitlement to injunctive relief is likewise limited to injuries
to the reversion, i.e., to permanent injuries. 80 The difficulty is, of
course, that-for independent policy reasons-the tendency is to
classify nuisances as temporary rather than permanent, 8 1 and in any
event a nuisance being committed by a leasehold tenant would seem to
be temporary by definition. The landlord may possibly succeed in
obtaining injunctive relief, even where permanent damages are unavailable, by arguing that the nuisance, though not permanent is at
least "continuing" or "recurring" or continues to be "threatened. ' 1sz But
at bottom, whatever the nuisance's durational characteristics, the
landlord's real task is to convince the court that the nuisance affects his
reversionary interest rather than merely the current (and continuing)
interests of his tenants. Courts have sometimes been convinced of
84
this, 8 3 and sometimes not.
Several conclusions may be garnered from the foregoing discussion.
If the landlord is to have any reasonable assurance of standing to
complain about nuisance-creating (or illegally acting) tenants, he must
contract for that standing in the lease. Furthermore, lease provisions
empowering the landlord to complain are not merely officious arrogations of policing authority, such as would well justify strict construction or judicial avoidance wherever possible. Rather, they serve the
legitimate objectives of (i) providing a more cost-effective alternative to
countermeasures or proceedings initiated by the offended tenants
themselves and (ii) protecting the landlord's genuine interest in the
"reputational" (and hence return producing) character of his property.
As such, lease provisions empowering the landlord to control tenant
conduct supply an important and valuable mechanism for forestalling
disputes between tenants, and for protecting the character of the
buildings in which they reside. Seen in this light, such provisions
deserve sympathetic consideration (though not rubber stamping) by the
courts.
79. E.g., Cooper v. Randall, 59 IM. 317 (1871); Miller v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 184
N.Y. 17, 76 N.E. 734 (1906).
80. E.g., Indianapolis, Bloomington & W. Ry. v. McLaughlin, 77 I1. 275 (1875), Sherman
v. Levingston, 128 N.Y.S. 581 (Sup. Ct. 1910). See also Beir v. Cooke, 37 Hun 38 (N.Y.Sup.
Ct. 1885).

81. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
82. See 58 Am. Jur. 2d Nuisances § 158 (1971).
83. E.g., Weakley v. Page, 102 Tenn. 178, 53 S.W. 551 (1899) (on grounds that rentability
was adversely affected).
84. See cases cited in note 80 supra.
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Standing and the Implied Warranty of Habitability

The discussion of standing might have ended with the preceding
paragraph had the state of landlord-tenant law remained as it was at
the beginning of the present decade. However, the growing acceptance, at an avalanche rate (for property law), of the so-called
"implied warranty of habitability"8 5 adds a new dimension to the issue.
The implications of the implied warranty of habitability appear to
supply a new (and perhaps the most compelling) basis for permitting
landlord control of tenant conduct.
The implied warranty of habitability has resulted from a rethinking
and a reformulation of certain basic assumptions8 6 underlying the
fundamental landlord-tenant relationship.8 7 For better or for worse, it
has resulted in an increased paternalization of that relationship.
No longer is the landlord regarded as having almost no role in
assuring that the premises serve a useful purpose of the tenant. 88
Rather, the implied warranty of habitability subsumes that the thing
bargained for by the modern residential tenant is not just bare space
but "a well known package of goods and services," 8 9 a place which is
"livable." 90 For failing to meet this obligation, the landlord faces,
among other things, loss of all or part of the rent, 91 loss of the tenant,
93
92
who may be excused from the lease, or even punitive damages.
85. Among the landmarks recognizing the implied warranty of habitability are Javins v. First
Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Lemle v.
Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill.
2d 351, 280
N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329,
521 P.2d 304 (1974); Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973);
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970). The warranty is also being established by
statute. E.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 554.139 (Supp. 1976); N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 235-b
(McKinney Supp. 1975); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 59.18.060 (Supp. 1975). See also URLTA,
supra note 13, § 2.104(a)(2).
86. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077-79 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 429-34, 462 P.2d 470, 472-75 (1969); Tonettl
v. Penati, 48 App. Div. 2d 25, 29, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804, 807 (2d Dep't 1975).
87. This is the case at least with respect to residential tenancies, to which the implied
warranty has generally been limited.
88. Compare text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
89. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970).
90. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 144, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970).
91. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925
(1970); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill.
2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972).
92. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Tonett v. Penati, 48 App. Div.
2d 25, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804 (2d Dep't 1975).
93. Kipsborough Realty Corp. v. Goldbetter, 81 Misc. 2d 1054, 367 N.Y.S.2d 916 (N.Y. City
Civ. Ct. 1975).
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There are already indications that the implied warranty of habitability will support holding the landlord responsible to tenants for the
conduct of other tenants. 94 Apparently the first case to tie the implied
warranty of habitability directly to landlord responsibility for tenant
conduct is Cohen v. Werner.95 In this action for rent against an
abandoning tenant, the tenant defended claiming that "noise emanating from another apartment in the building was so great that [the]
defendant could not continue to reside in his apartment. ' 96 The court
found that the noise (of unspecified nature) was "so intense and so
long-lasting as to render the apartment uninhabitable." 97 Further, the
court observed that "[w]hile plaintiff [landlord] did not cause this
noise, he did nothing at all to try to stop it although he had ample time
to do so . . ,,g9 The court correctly stated that, under the traditional
rules relating to constructive eviction, acts of other tenants, without
any complicity on the part of the landlord, would not have justified
the tenant's abandonment. 99 However, said the court
The whole concept of the implied warranty of habitability rests on the undertaking
of the landlord that the premises will be habitable. If it is not, then the tenant is

entitled to relief even if the landlord did not cause the uninhabitablity, at least in
situations where, as here, the landlord could have taken steps
nothing at all. 10 0

. . .

but chose to do

Exactly what steps the landlord could have taken is unclear from the
opinion; but the landlord's failure to take such steps relieved the tenant
from liability under the lease when he quit the premises.
94. Cohen v. Werner, 82 Misc. 2d 295, 368 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct.), affd mem.,
85 Misc. 2d 341, 378 N.Y.S.2d 868 (App. T. 1975); cf. Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439
F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ("implied" obligation of landlord); Zamzok v. 650 Park Ave. Corp., 80
Misc. 2d 573, 363 N.Y.S.2d 868 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (landlord's reserved right to reenter upon
neighboring tenant's premises to effect repairs constitutes "control" and prevents landlord from
disclaiming liability for alleged nuisance on neighboring tenant's premises). See also Samson v.
Saginaw Professional Bldg., Inc., 393 lich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975) (liability for common
area); Tonetti v. Penati, 48 App. Div. 2d 25, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804 (2d Dep't 1975) (condition caused
by previous occupant); Rockrose Associates v. Peters, 81 Misc. 2d 971, 366 N.Y.S.2d 567 (N.Y.
City Civ. Ct. 1975).
95. 82 Misc. 2d 295, 368 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct.), affd mem., 85 Misc. 2d 341,
378 N.Y.S.2d 868 (App. T. 1975). Cohen has already been followed in a case upholding an action
against a landlord for compensatory and punitive damages based upon the conduct of a noisy
neighboring tenant. Pekelner v. Park W. Management Corp. (Sup. Ct.), in 176 N.Y.L.J., Aug.
27, 1976, at 5, col. 3; see Fox, Landlord Sued by Ex-Tenant; Fled From Neighbor's Piano, 176
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 27, 1976, at 1, col. 3.
96. 82 Misc. 2d at 296, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 1005.
97. Id. at 296, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 1006.
98. Id.
99. Id.; see note 58 supra.
100. 82 Misc. 2d at 298, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 1008 (emphasis added).
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Although its holding was not totally unprecedented in New York, 10 '
Cohen definitely represents a departure from prior New York
law in permitting an implied warranty of habitability to support what
is, in traditional terms, a constructive eviction based upon a third
party's acts. The holding is however squarely consistent with other
recent cases, of which Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp. 102 is the landmark, imposing liability on the landlord
for foreseeable injury-producing acts of third persons generally.103
Perhaps even more directly in point is the recent case of Samson v.
Saginaw ProfessionalBuilding, Inc. 104 where the landlord was held
liable for acts of a tenant's psychiatric patient when the latter attacked
another tenant's employee in a common elevator. The most extreme
case of this genre is Uccello v. Laudenslayer0 5 wherein the landlord
was held liable for injuries which a tenant's guest received when
attacked by the same tenant's dog. Although the oral lease (from
month-to-month) did not prohibit the tenant from keeping the dog, the
court pointed out that the landlord could have terminated the tenancy,
getting rid of the dog; thus, the landlord retained a sufficient measure
of control to be held liable.
In neither Kline, Samson nor Uccello did the courts rely explicitly on
an implied warranty of habitability theory. In Kline and Samson, since
the complained of conduct occurred in a common area, there was no
need to. 106 Similarly, in Uccello, the landlord's duty was based upon
his power to "control" the presence of the dog on the demised premis101. See Home Life Ins. Co. v. Breslerman, 168 Misc. 117, 5 N.Y.S.2d 272 (App. T. 1938);
Polk Arms, Inc. v. Kohler, 144 Misc. 326, 258 N.Y.S. 809 (App. T. 1932). There is real doubt
that either of these holdings, predicated on a constructive eviction theory, would have withstood
an appeal. Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Sugarman, 264 App. Div. 240, 35 N.YS.2d 196
(Ist Dep't 1942). A little over a month before the Cohen decision, another New York City Civil
Court held, based on an expressed undertaking to soundproof, that the landlord had precipitated
a constructive eviction when noise from neighboring tenants caused the nonresidential complaining tenant (a psychotherapist) to move out. Rockrose Associates v. Peters, 81 Misc. 2d 971, 366
N.Y.S.2d 567 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1975). See also Neisloss v. Arter (App. T.), in 173 N.Y.L.J.,
March 10, 1975, at 17, col. 3.
102. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970); accord, Sherman v. Concourse Realty Corp., 47 App.
Div. 2d 134, 365 N.Y.S.2d 239 (2d Dep't 1975).
103. The court in Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) held
that the landlord was liable to the tenant for forseeable criminal acts committed by an intruder in
a common hallway of an apartment house. This holding also represented a departure from the
previously generally accepted rule. See cases cited in Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 331 (1972).
104. 393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975).
105. 44 Cal. App. 3d 504, 118 Cal. Rptr. 741 (Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
106. As a matter of common law, the landlord has traditionally had an affirmative obligation
to exercise reasonable care with respect to common areas not in the possession of Individual
tenants. W. Prosser, Torts § 63, at 405-08 (4th ed. 1971).
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es. Moreover, all three cases proceeded basically on a negligence
theory; 10 7 the landlord breached his duty of reasonable care rather
than an implied warranty of habitability. But irrespective of which
legal doctrine the landlord's duty is founded upon, the import of these
cases is the same; there is a judicial expectation that landlords should
act to protect their tenants against the acts of others (including fellow
tenants), and the landlord who fails to do so will be responsible for
losses which may ensue.
In a very recent case following Cohen, it has
107
already been so held. a
It is not unreasonable that the implied warranty of habitability
should be extended to impose landlord responsibility for tenant
misconduct. The whole idea of the implied warranty, as the Cohen
court noted, is to obligate the landlord " 'to maintain the apartment in a condition suitable for decent living.' "108 An apartment is
hardly habitable if surrounded by noisy or raucous neighbors, and it
certainly is not if the neighbors perpetrate criminal acts upon their
fellows. Moreover, it is in line with the assumptions underlying the
implied warranty of habitability to extend its protection to cover acts
of fellow tenants. The fact that the modern tenant is not a "jack-ofall-trades," able alone to keep his apartment livable, has justified
shifting to the landlord the responsibility as to the physical characteristics of the premises. 109 Is the average residential tenant in any better
position to control more subtle, but equally important, environmental
characteristics such as the behavioral pattern of his neighbors? As
already discussed, the relative cost-effectiveness of leaving this task to
the landlord' 1 0 -together with the fact that tenants apparently seldom
sue each other'I'-suggests that the tenant is not.
If the implied warranty of habitability does make the landlord
responsible for offensive tenant conduct-and particularly if it is
desirable that it do so-then seemingly, as a corollary, standing for
landlords to control tenant conduct should be generously and certainly
not grudgingly bestowed. It probably should be bestowed as a matter
107. Even so, the Kline court did refer to the landlord's obligation as being "implied in the
contract between landlord and tenant." 439 F.2d at 485, citing Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp.,
428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970), the landmark implied warranty of
habitability case.
107a. Pekelner v. Park W. Management Corp. (Sup. Ct.), in 176 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 27, 1976, at
5, col. 3; see note 95 supra.
108. 82 Misc. 2d at 297, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 1007, quoting Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73
Misc. 2d 996, 999, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406, 410 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1973).
109. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078-79 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970). See also note 44 supra.
110. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text.
111. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
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of law, giving the landlord a right of action whenever a tenant's
conduct substantially impairs the habitability-the suitability for decent living-of a neighbor's premises. It should in any event be
recognized whenever the landlord, in the lease, has reserved such a
power of control, unless the standards imposed are clearly "unreasonable."' 1 2 Of course, landlords could be held strictly responsible for
tenant conduct and yet still be kept powerless to do anything about it.
But such a draconian course, apart from its "unfairness," would only
tend to frustrate rather than promote the objective of providing livable
13
homes for most tenants.
B. Remedies
The landlord's effort to obtain standing is of course only a step
towards the main legal objective, namely, to obtain a remedy which
affords effective protection against tenant conduct that is perceived to
be offensive. And a lease may be drafted not only to confer the
landlord with standing to complain against such conduct, but also to
give the landlord a remedy, forfeiture, which the law does not provide. 114
Despite its obvious efficacy in providing protection, forfeiture is the
remedy least likely to be available to the landlord as a matter of law.
Except in cases of waste 1' s or of disclaimer by the tenant of his
112. An attempt to identify the criteria to be observed in developing a definition of
"reasonable" is made in section III(D)(2) infra.
113. In Berlin Dev. Corp. v. Vermont Structural Steel Corp., 127 Vt. 367, 250 A. 2d 189 (1968) the
question arose as to whether a landlord could recover damages from a tenant whose breach of the
lease injured other tenants. Recovery by the landlord was denied, and it was said that the
possibility that the landlord could be held liable to other tenants was not contemplated at the time
the lease with the breaching tenant was made. If, however, the possibility of landlord liability
were contemplated when the lease with the breaching tenant was entered into (and an implied
warranty of habitability suggested the appropriateness of imputing such contemplation), then
presumably the landlord ought to be able to recover for the losses arising out of the breaching
tenant's defaults. Whether the landlord's recovery can include potential (but yet unpaid) liabilities
to other tenants remains an open question.
114. 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, §§ 3.89, 3.94; 3A Thompson, supra note 19, § 1324.
115. To be technically accurate, in the case of tenants for years, the common law did not
authorize forfeiture or any other remedy even for waste. Like the cause of action itself the remedy
of forfeiture for waste was originally a statutory creation. The Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. 1,c.
5 (1278), repealed, Civ. P. Acts, Repeal Act, 42 & 43 Vict., c. 59 (1879) first supplied the
forfeiture remedy (together with treble damages). In so doing, it expanded upon the previously
enacted Statute of Marlbridge, 52 Hen. 3, c. 23, § 2 (1267), which provided that tenants making
waste should "yield full damage, and ... be punished by amerciament greviously." Translation
from 5 Powell, supra note 24,
637 n.4. Neither the Statute of Gloucester nor its forfeiture
provision was received as a part of the common law in most states; thus, the remedy of forfeiture
as a matter of law exists, if at all, generally only by local statute. Id.
650. According to
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landlord's title, 1 6 the common law simply did not treat the tenant's
unlawful acts on the premises (e.g., breach of a covenant or committing a nuisance) as an occasion for terminating the lease.1 17 If the
landlord wanted the power to effect a forfeiture, he had to stipulate for
it, either by a condition or a limitation on the lease. 1 18 Thus, a tenant
who annoys his neighbors by committing nuisances or illegal acts on
the premises may be liable for damages (to fellow tenants 1 9 or possibly
the landlord120 ), may be subject to injunction 2 1 or may be subjected
to criminal penalties, but he could be virtually 2 2 assured that his
tenancy was safe, unless the lease provided to the contrary. And except
where the rule has been modified by statute, such as statutes providing
for eviction for illegal use, 123 this is still the law.124 Hence, it is
Professor Powell, nineteen states have such statutes and one state, Maryland, recognizes
forfeiture for waste by reception of the Statute of Gloucester. Id.
116. This obsolescent basis for forfeiting a leasehold is said to have arisen as a consequence of
the feudal idea that tenants owed fealty to their lords on pain of destroying the tenure. R.
Megarry & L Wade, Real Property 654-55 (4th ed. 1975); 3A Thompson, supra note 19, §§
1316-17. The doctrine has been limited in its application (id.), but still receives judicial
recognition (Port Arthur Towing Co. v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 392, 402 (W.D. La.
1972), aff'd, 492 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1974) (recognizing rule and thereby according salvation after
nearly 100 years of "Shepardarian damnation"); McNeill v. McNeill, 456 S.W.2d 800, 804 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1970)). Some courts have at best partially repudiated the doctrine. E.g., McMichael v.
Craig, 105 Ala. 382, 16 So. 883 (1895).
117. 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 3.94. Wholly obsolete bases for forfeiture, e.g., tortious
alienation, are ignored. See 1 Tiffany, supra note 17, § 189.
118. See note 129 infra and accompanying text. A limitation on the lease, like a special
limitation on a freehold, results in an automatic termination of the lessee's estate, whereas a
condition (or condition subsequent) confers only a right of entry (or power of termination) having
no terninal effect on the lessee's estate until exercised by the lessor, either by reentry or
ejectment. Cf. Conger v. Conger, 208 Kan. 823, 828-30, 494 P.2d 1081, 1086-87 (1972); 1 Am. L.
Prop., supra note 3, § 3.89. Both types of provisions operate to forfeit the tenant's right of
possession, although local procedural considerations (such as the availability of summary proceed.
ings) may recommend the selection of one over the other in actual drafting. Burnee Corp. v.
Uneeda Pure Orange Drink Co., 132 Misc. 435, 437-38, 230 N.Y.S. 239, 246 (App. T. 1928). See
generally M. Friedman, Preparation of Leases 43-44 (1962); Niles, Conditional Limitations in
Leases in New York, 11 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 15 (1933).
119. See note 38 supra.
120. See notes 63-78 supra and accompanying text.
121. See notes 38, 79-83 supra and accompanying text.
122. He could not be entirely assured that his tenancy would be safe because of the possibility
that a court might exercise its equitable powers to cancel the lease based upon the illegal use. See
notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text.
123. E.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 139, § 19 (1972); N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law §§ 711(5),
715 (McKinney 1963). Some states also have statutes authorizing eviction for breach of lease
covenants even if the lease does not so stipulate. See note 129 infra.
124. Roseman v. Day, 345 Mass. 93, 94-95, 185 N.E.2d 650, 651-52 (1962); Commonwealth
v. Wentworth, 146 Mass. 36, 37, 15 N.E. 138, 141 (1888); McKenzie v. Carte, 385 S W.2d 520,
529 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). See also 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 1043 (1970).
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customary, if not almost invariable, that the lease will provide that, in
landlord may terminate, effecting a forfeicases of tenant breach, the125
ture of the tenant's term.
1. Remedial Alternatives to Forfeiture
Forfeiture is by no means the only potential recourse available to the
landlord who desires to enforce lease-contained conduct restrictions
1 26
against a recalcitrant tenant. The compensatory relief of damages
125. 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 3.94; M. Friedman, Preparation of Leases 43 (1962 ed.).
126. If a tenant covenants in a lease to refrain from certain uses of the premises (or from
certain conduct on the premises) and if the tenant then violates that covenant, the landlord may
recover damages for the breach. Frederickson v. Cochran, 449 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Clv. App. 1969)
(cultivation restriction in agricultural lease); 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 3.40; Restatement of
Property § 528 (1944); for additional citations see 3A Thompson, supra note 19, § 1325 n.I.
However, the paucity of reported cases in which actual damages have been awarded or even
sought makes it difficult to deduce an authoritative basis for measuring or allowing such
damages.
As a starting point, it may be presumed that the damage measure should be geared to
compensate the landlord for the "net amount of the losses caused and gains prevented" by tile
breach (Restatement of Contracts § 329 (1932)), i.e., to place the landlord in as good a position as
he would have been in had the breach not occurred (Frederickson v. Cochran, 449 S.W.2d 329,
332 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) ("The measure.., is the pecuniary loss shown to have been within the
contemplation of the parties.'); see D. Dobbs, Remedies § 12.1, at 786 (1973); cf. Riess v.
Murchison, 503 F.2d 999, 1011 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 993 (1975) ("Anything less
is inadequate reparation [for breach of contract].")). However, the very fact that there are but few
reported cases in point is no doubt indicative of the relative hopelessness of this aim.
Nevertheless, assuming that the landlord's primary interest is economic, to preserve the net
rental yield of his investment, the basic measure of injury to the landlord's interest can at least be
seen in terms of the impact which the breach has on such rental yield; hence, the damages would
be the amount by which the breach has diminished the rental value of the leased premises and/or
adjacent premises also owned by the landlord. Or, analogizing to the damage measure applicable
in the case of waste or of a nuisance causing permanent diminution in rental yield, the
appropriate measure might be the capitalized value of the reduction in rental value, such
capitalized value being reflected in a lowered sale value for the premises as a whole. See D.
Dobbs, Remedies § 5.4, at 335-44 (1973). See also Smith v. United Crude Oil Co., 50 Cal. App.
466, 469, 195 P. 434, 435 (Dist. Ct. App. 1920), on remand from 179 Cal. 570, 178 P. 141 (1919)
(the damages would "be those which plaintiff would have suffered by reason of his property being
injured by a depreciation in value being produced, or by some other injury which would naturally
occur because of the nonpermitted use"). Under certain circumstances, some measure other than
the "diminution in value" measure may possibly be appropriate. E.g., Sussman Volk Co. v 88
Delicatessen, Inc., 100 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (cost of restoration for breach of prohibition
on alterations). However, it seems clear enough that it is the detriment to the lessor (rather than
any possible benefit to the lessee) which should serve as the basis for measuring the lessor's
recovery for breach of the covenant. See Speck v. Cottonwood Coal Co., 116 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.
1940) (Montana statute); Smith v. Union Crude Oil Co., supra; cf. Welitoff v. Kohl, 105 N.J. Eq.
181, 189, 147 A. 390, 393-94 (Ct. Err. & App. 1929) (deed covenant).
The "diminution in value" measure of damages finds support by analogy in at least three types
of cases, viz., those dealing with damages for breach of use covenants in deeds of fee interests,
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those dealing with lease covenants restricting corfijetition, and those dealing with contractual
obligations which are related to the preservation of a reputational interest (e.g.. goodwill) of the
promisee.
Use Covenants in Deeds of Fee Interests
A number of cases may be found stating that, for violation of a deed covenant restricting use,
the measure of injury is the diminution in the market value of the parcel intended to be benefited
by the covenant. E.g., Welitoff v. Kohl, 105 N.J. Eq. 181, 147 A. 390 (CL Err & App. 1929);
Ackerman v. True, 175 N.Y. 353, 359-61, 67 N.E. 629, 630 (1903); see Womack v. Ward, 186
S.W.2d 619 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1944) (granting nominal damages with suggestion that actual
damages would consist of depression of either rental or sales value of property intended to be
benefited by the covenant). And, in an appropriate case, the "diminution in value" damages may
be measured on a current (rental value) basis rather than upon a capitalized (sale value) basis.
See, e.g., Stauber v. Granger, 495 P.2d 67 (Alas. 1972), a case which involved a deed restriction
prohibiting certain multi-family dwellings. In Stauber, the covenantor violated this restriction by
putting up prohibited structures with the result that the plaintiffs could "not enjoy the surroundings for which they had bargained [and were deprived of,] the privacy and quiet enjoyment which
they would have had" were it not for the breach. Id. at 69. Presuming that the restrictions would,
by their terms probably terminate four years hence, the court assessed damages "based on a
yearly loss of enjoyment." Id. at 70.
On occasion, the actual amount of the award seems to have been arrived at quite arbitrarily.
Stauber v. Granger, supra; Mock v. Shulman, 226 Cal. App. 2d 263, 38 Cal. Rptr. 39 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1964) ($500 damages for violation of covenant not to interfere with light and air). And when
the injury from the breach is too difficult to quantify monetarily, recovery may be denied
altogether. See Sussman Volk Co. v. 88 Delicatessen, Inc., 100 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1950)
(lease covenant forbidding sale on premises of non-Kosher products). But see Binghamton Plaza,
Inc. v. Gilinsky, 32 App. Div. 2d 994, 301 N. Y.S.2d 921 (3d Dep't 1969) (per curiam) (allowing
at least nominal damages for breach of a deed covenant).
In applying the deed covenant cases by analogy in order to establish a damage measure for
lease covenant cases, one potential difficulty might be identifying the parcel intended to be
benefited by the covenant. Unlike the deed covenant cases, where the benefited parcel is usually
obvious enough (generally being neighboring land retained by the grantor or his successors in
interest), in lease covenant cases there exist at least three choices: (1) the benefited parcel may be
the demised premises themselves (especially where the prohibited conduct would be in the nature
of waste), (2) the benefited parcel may be the larger premises of which the demised premises are
part (especially where the prohibited conduct would be in the nature of a nuisance), or (3) there
may be no benefited parcel, i.e., the covenant may be personal (for example, where prohibited
conduct would be an illegal activity, such as prostitution, for which the landlord may have
statutory vicarious liability (see N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law §§ 351-60 (McKinney 1974)) or where the
prohibited activity might expose the landlord to onerous civil liability under the -public use"
doctrine (see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 359 (1965)). In setting forth restrictions on the
tenant's use of the premises, the lease will seldom be explicit about which of the foregoing
interests of the landlord the covenant is supposed to protect. However, when actually applying
the "diminution in value" measure (or other measure), it hardly seems that this inexphcitness
should present any obstacle to recovery;, for presumably, in extracting the use restriction
covenant, the landlord intended to protect a/l of his interests which might foreseeably be
jeopardized by the tenant's breach. The usefulness of breaking down the possibilities is therefore
chiefly to assure exhaustiveness in measuring the damages for breach rather than to suggest any
limitations on recoveries.
Lease Covenants Restricting Competition
Cases involving restrictions on competition are analogous insofar as such restrictions on "use"
by one landowner are aimed at protecting the interests of persons holding nearby parcels. In such
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cases, the diminution in the value (usually rental value) of the benefited parcel is a recognized
measure of recovery for the breach (see 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 3.42; Note, Lessors'
Covenants Restricting Competition: Drafting Problems, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1400, 1411-12 (1930);
Note, Restrictive Covenants in Shopping Center Leases, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 940, 950-51 (1959))
although in some cases a more direct measure of the breach induced injury (such as lost profits)
may be employed to fix damages. Id.
In considering the damage measure in restriction on competition cases as an analogy to use
restrictions imposed on tenants, at least two possible distinguishing factors should be observed.
First, in the competition cases, the courts are dealing with activities depriving the covenantee of a
deliberately conferred economic advantage (having a certain degree of market exclusivity) by a
person trying to shift that same economic advantage, in part, to himself. Thus, the goal of
allowing damages in such cases is arguably concerned more with "restitution" than with
"compensation." In use restriction cases, on the other hand, the concern is with compensating for
a deprivation of an economic advantage (rights in a reversion or in neighboring premises) where
the activities causing such deprivation do not necessarily tend to appropriate any part of that
advantage to the person engaged in the depriving activities. However, since the competition cases
themselves do not recognize the restitutionary or "disgorgement" measure of recovery (see Barr &
Sons, Inc. v. Cherry Hill Center, Inc., 90 N.J. Super. 358, 217 A.2d 631 (App. Div. 1966);
Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 4, 111-19 (1964)), this distinction should not be significant so far as damage
measurement principles are concerned.
Secondly, in the restriction on competition cases, it is often the injured neighboring tenant who
is the complaining covenantee, and the landlord or other lessees of the landlord are the ones
whose activities are complained of as causing injury to the tenant's interests. Although this Is the
exact reverse of the use restriction cases (where the landlord is complaining of breaches of the
covenant by the tenant), the distinction should also not be significant so far as damage
measurement principles are concerned. For in both types of cases, the injury involved is the
adverse effect on one owner of an interest in land resulting from a breach of covenant by persons
interested in neighboring real estate.
Contractual Provisions Designed to Protect Reputation
A last group of cases which may supply some analogy to the breach of use restriction situation
are those cases where a promisee claims damages for injury to his goodwill because of a breach of
contract. The profitability of the landlord's investment is, of course, directly related to the
rentability of the spaces in his premises, i.e., to the continuing attractiveness of such spaces to
existing and potential occupants. Clearly, also, the activities of some occupants can-to the extent
others are uncomfortably aware of such activities-reduce the attractiveness of the landlord's
offerings in the market for rental space, i.e., the activities can "taint" the landlord's building,
reducing its value.
The appropriateness of allowing recovery for injury to goodwill flowing from a breach of a
promise (as to the quality of goods being sold) has been recognized. E.g., Barrett Co. v. Panther
Rubber Mfg. Co., 24 F.2d 329 (1st Cir. 1928); Stott v. Johnston, 36 Cal. 2d 864, 229 P.2d 348
(1951); General Riveters, Inc. v. Morse Chain Co., 15 App. Div. 2d 859, 224 N.Y.S.2d 746 (4th
Dep't 1962). In supporting such recoveries, the relationship of goodwill to expected future returns
has been pointed to. Id. One of the difficulties in allowing recovery for goodwill has, In fact, been
the concern that the alleged loss (of profits) would be too speculative or remote. See Annot., 28
A.L.R.2d 591, 593 (1953). This concern might apply equally to the landlord seeking recovery:
unless it could be shown that there was indeed a proximately caused (and contemplated) decline
in the rents received for his properties-attributable to the tenant's breach of covenant-the
prospects for an award of substantial damages would seem to be slim.
In this connection, there is the related question of whether and to what extent the landlord
should be able to recover loss of profit or other consequential damages from a breaching tenant.
For an indication that they may not be recoverable, see Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian
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and the specific relief of injunction 127 will usually be available as
theoretical alternatives. For in the usual case, the restrictions on tenant
conduct will be found to be framed as both covenants and conditions. 128 It is well settled at common law that damages and injunctive
relief would not be available for breach of a mere condition, just as no
forfeiture can be predicated on the breach of a mere covenant.1 29 But
if the restrictions on tenant conduct are framed as both covenants and
conditions, the choice of which recourse to take for breach-damages,
injunction or forfeiture-will be, theoretically, at least, up to the
landlord.
Sometimes, even though the tenant's default is both a breach of
covenant and of condition, the landlord may prefer to enforce conduct
standards by employing one of the ordinary contract remedies, viz.,
damages or injunction. The case of a basically sound and economically
valuable long-term commercial lease is one example. However, in the
great preponderance of situations, where the tenant's behavioral
shortfall is of more than mere trivial interest to the landlord, removal
of the tenant (via forfeiture of the tenant's possessory right) may
Community v. United States, 467 F.2d 1351, 1355-56 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (involving breach of

undertaking to improve the demised premises in lieu of rent; held, damages were difference
between the value of the unimproved land and the value it would have had if improved as
agreed, but not "lost potential profits."). However, even if loss of profit or other consequential
damages are not recoverable, such types of damages should not be confused with a demonstrable
loss of rental value which might, due to the tenant's breach, be experienced by the owner of the
premises intended to be benefited by the covenant. Loss of rental value, insofar as it affects
capital (sale) value fairly directly, would seem to be more appropriately treated as a "diminution
in value" rather than a "loss of profits" item of damages.
127. E.g., Boh v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 128 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1942); 1 Am. L. Prop.,
supra note 3, § 3.40.
128. 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 3.94. Obviously, as a drafting matter, the landlord is in
a position to provide himself with both contractual remedies (damages and injunction) as well as
the forfeiture remedy, based on a condition or a conditional limitation, for nonobservance of
prescribed conduct standards, subject only to the negotiating strength and acumen of the tenant
and his counselors. The practice in form leases and negotiated written leases is generally to
provide that defaults by the tenant in the performance of covenants will not only be contract
breaches but will also be potential occasions for forfeiture (usually at the landlord's election). Id.
Thus, the case of the landlord with a choice between damages, injunction, or forfeiture, may be
fairly taken, it is submitted, as the usual case.
129. For cases to the effect that breach of a condition will not give rise to an action for
damages or injunction, see, e.g., Palmer v. Fort Plain & Cooperstown Plank-road Co., 11 N.Y.
376, 389 (1854); 3 A. Corbin, Contracts § 633 (1960); cf. New York Cent. R.R. v. City of
Bucyrus, 126 Ohio St. 558, 186 N.E. 450 (1933). For cases to the effect that breach of a covenant
will not in itself support a forfeiture, see, e.g., Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Bokum Corp., 453 F.2d
1067 (10th Cir. 1972) (New Mexico law); Klinger v. Peterson, 486 P.2d 373 (Alas. 1971).
However, the latter rule has been occasionally modified by statute. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
33-361 (1974); Cal. Civ. Code § 1930 (West 1954) (authorizing rescission for breach of a covenant
concerning use).
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constitute the only economically efficient method of enforcing the
prescribed conduct standards. 13 0 Removal of the offending tenant will
be the only effective means of preventing interference with (or destruction of) the values which are sought to be preserved or promoted by
imposing the conduct standards in the first place.
The damage remedy can usually provide only very imperfect compensation in lieu of the performance contracted for, especially where
residential tenancies are involved. There the interests invaded (especially those of the neighboring residents) are usually subjective interests incapable of reduction to monetary equivalents. How much is it
worth to have a good night's sleep, unmolested by the aural overflows
from the neighbors' frolics, or to look forward to an evening of quiet
contemplation at home? True, where the landlord is the moving party
in a damage action, his interest may seem more quantifiable in
monetary terms. After all, the landlord's interest is almost always
purely economic. Nevertheless, even in assessing damages to the
landlord, the measurement of compensation with anything approaching acceptable precision may be all but impossible. Even though the
landlord's injury would be theoretically measurable by the revenue loss
caused by the reduced attractiveness of his building to tenants,' 3 1 in
practice this measure may be insubstantial, especially if the offensive
tenant's conduct has not persisted long enough to drive neighboring
tenants away. 132 The scarcity of cases in which the landlord seeks
compensation in damages for a tenant's breach of conduct or use
133
restrictions is an indication of the inadequacy of this remedy.
In any case, why should the landlord be forced to accept a unilaterally imposed substitute form of revenue from his investment (damages
instead of higher rents), and why should an offensive tenant be
130. This statement is made with particular reference to breaches of conduct or use type
restrictions, and it would not necessarily apply to tenant's breaches consisting of mere failures to
pay money. Such a failure may obviously not be trivial from the landlord's viewpoint, but
nonetheless, forfeiture may be neither necessary nor even conducive to compelling the desired
payment. In any event, the practice has been to treat nonpayment defaults specially, particularly
where mere tardiness of payment and not its omission entirely is the crux of the landlord's
complaint. 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 3.96. The matter is discussed further in text
accompanying notes 200-06 infra.
131. See suggested analogies discussed in note 126 supra.
132. It may also be limited by the requirement of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145
(Ex. 1854), as to the foreseeability of such losses. Shachtman v. Masters-Lake Success, Inc., 14
App. Div. 2d 584, 218 N.Y.S.2d 150 (2d Dep't 1961); Frederickson v. Cochran, 449 S.W.2d 329
(Tex. Civ. App. 1969). See also Koutsourades v. Mericle, 80 Misc. 2d 561, 363 N.Y.S.2d 295
(Dutchess County Ct. 1975) (damages for covenant to insure limited to premium, not loss due to
fire); Berlin Dev. Corp. v. Vermont Structural Steel Corp., 127 Vt. 367, 250 A.2d 189 (1968).
133. See note 126 supra.
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supported in imposing such a substitution? 134 Perhaps more to the
point, the damage remedy can scarcely serve as an effective curative
mechanism from the viewpoint of the neighboring tenants. 135 And it is
the neighbors' interests which are the ones most directly invaded by an
offending tenant's conduct defaults.
Injunctive relief would theoretically avoid the deficiencies of the
damage remedy, but in practical application it too does not seem well
suited to the enforcement of conduct restrictions. In the main, this
unsuitability stems from the fact that, for violation of the court's
directive, little can be done short of incarcerating the offender. The
specter-and, one would hope, the unlikelihood-that a tenant might
be jailed for failure to remove a dog, install a carpet or refrain from
late night piano playing is enough in itself to indicate the shortcomings
of the injunctive remedy.
Thus, on balance, the remedial alternatives to forfeiture are proba-

bly not generally effective in affording the protection, to the landlord
or neighboring tenants, that conduct restrictions are supposed to

achieve. Damages are not effective because they are difficult to assess
accurately and probably do not truly compensate in any event. Injunctive relief can be ultimately effective only if we are willing to put lease
violators in jail. Thus, it is fitting to consider whether some other
remedy, supplied by agreement, would be more effective and appropriate to enforce landlord-prescribed conduct restrictions. Forfeiture is
136
such a remedy.
134. See Dunklee v. Adams, 20 Vt. 415, 421 (1848) ("How can it be said, that any particular
sum of money will be a just compensation for the personal inconvenience and suffering
occasioned by the breach ... ?"). Obviously a person should not be permitted to take anything he
wants simply because he is willing to pay for it. It is hostility to such private "eminent domain"
with respect to "environmental" assets that, among other things, underlies the tendency to classify
nuisances as temporary rather than permanent. See note 72 supra.
135. Courts should not be "controlled exclusively by money value, but may protect a home."
Miles v. Hollingsworth, 44 Cal. App. 539, 549, 187 P. 167, 172 (Dist. CL App. 1920).
136. Conceivably there are agreement-based remedies, other than forfeiture, which a landlord could resort to in order to enforce conduct restrictions on his tenants. Provision could be
made for explicit penalties or for other consequences of default (e.g., acceleration of rent,
forfeitable security deposits) which are penalties in effect. These penalty-type remedies, though
they may tend to induce tenant compliance, differ from forfeiture in an important respect;
penalties may help to keep the landlord-tenant relationship from going sour, but only forfeiture
gives the landlord a true "out" in the event it does go sour. The importance of the distinction is
discussed in section ll(B)(2)(c)(iv) infra.
Of course, the enforceability of penalty-type remedies would be, under present law, extremely
limited at best, subject to all of the objections (discussed infra) raised against forfeiture and
probably then some. See Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 Corell L. Rev.
495 (1962). Because of such objectionability, and because in practice landlords seldom resort to
penalties in leases, they will not be discussed.
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The Forfeiture Remedy and the Limitations on Its Use

Compared with the remedial alternatives of damages or injunction,
the forfeiture remedy provides an annoying tenant's neighbors-and,
derivatively, the landlord-with protection that is very effective indeed. Because forfeiture results in physical removal of the annoying
tenant, it is by far the remedy most likely to achieve the desired result
of eliminating the annoyance. Moreover, if the author's survey of the
reported cases is any indication, forfeiture is clearly the remedy most
sought by landlords disaffected by a tenant's behavior. Yet, forfeiture
is a remedy which the courts have been most reluctant to apply, even
when expressly agreed to in the lease. Due to the unique effectiveness
of the forfeiture remedy, and to what appears to be a (consequent?)
preference for it among landlords, a review of the court-imposed
limitations on the use of forfeiture is justified. For, given its efficiency
and apparent preferability, these court-imposed limitations constitute,
as a practical matter, the most serious restrictions on the landlord's
power to control tenant behavior. 137
a. The Basic Enforceability of Lease Forfeitures
It is an agreement 138 which forms the basis for imposing the
landlord's conduct restrictions on the tenant; therefore, the extent to
which such restrictions are enforceable via the judicial mechanism can
be expected to be limited, inter alia, by the factors limiting the
enforcement of agreements generally. 1 39 On the other hand, in the
137. It has been observed correctly that "where legal sanctions are not adequate, [the] power
of contract [i.e., freedom of contract] is curtailed," except where self-help or agreed remedies are
possible. Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 Cornell L. Rev. 495, 498 (1962).
Thus, to the extent that the agreed remedy of forfeiture is, practically speaking, necessary to give
effective legal sanction to landlord-prescribed tenant conduct restrictions, the limitations on Its
availability may be seen as a de facto limitation on the landlord's power to control tenant
conduct.
138. The word "contract," if used in a very broad sense, might be preferable to the word
"agreement" since "contract" connotes legal enforceability whereas the word "agreement" has a
more neutral connotation. However, in order to prevent confusion and to be strictly accurate
legally (see Acme Mkts., Inc. v. Dawson Enterprises, Inc., 253 Md. 76, 87, 251 A.2d 839, 846
(1969), quoting 1A A. Corbin, Contracts § 265 (1963)), the word "contractual" is avoided here; for
insofar as forfeiture provisions are concerned, it is not narrowly speaking the contractual
significance of such landlord-imposed norms but rather their "conveyance" significance, as
conditions or conditional limitations on the lease, which underlies the landlord's claimed power to
forfeit. See notes 118 & 129 supra and accompanying text.
139. E.g., the presence of fraud, incapacity, mistake, impossibility of performance, waiver,
estoppel, or illegality, to mention some of the more usual ones. An agreement's semantic
effectiveness in communicating the parties' intent to the interpreter is also an important factor
limiting the enforcement of agreements generally. These "interpretive" barriers to enforcement

1976]

LANDLORD CONTROL OF TENANTS

absence of such factors, when a tenant defaults and the lease provides
for forfeiture, the landlord's right to assert the forfeiture might be
expected simply to follow: agreements which are intended to be
binding ought, in general, to be enforced. And sometimes courts have
simply so held. 140 Indeed, if effect is not given to the conditions on the
tenant's rights under a forfeitable lease, the limited estate 41 which was
originally transferred4 2 to the tenant will be enlarged, in effect, at the
1
landlord's expense.

Furthermore, nonenforcement of the forfeiture may also mean that
the offending tenant's limited estate 143 will be enlarged at the
neighboring tenants' expense. For if denial of forfeiture relief means
often get mixed together with (or inappropriately substituted for) substantive grounds for
nonenforcement. See note 190 and text accompanying notes 160-68 infra.
140. E.g., School Dist. RE-2(J) v. Panucci, 30 Colo. App. 184, 490 P.2d 711 (1971); First
Nat'l Stores, Inc. v. Yellowstone Shopping Center, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 630, 638, 237 N.E.2d 86,
871, 290 N.Y.S.2d 721, 725 (1968) (the "[s]tability of contract obligation must not be undermined
by judicial sympathy." (emphasis omitted)); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Burdo, 69 Misc. 2d 153, 159, 329
N.Y.S.2d 742, 750 (Dist. Ct. 1972) (fights . . . may not be based on a consideration of the
equities if... fixed by the plain language"); Caranas v. Morgan Hosts-Harry Hines Boulevard,
Inc., 460 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); see Feist & Feist v. Long Island Studios, Inc.,
29 App. Div. 2d 186, 287 N.Y.S.2d 257 (2d Dep't 1968); Dunklee v. Adams, 20 VL 415, 421
(1848).
Unsurprisingly, the principle that agreements ought to be enforced if intended to be binding
usually seems to find expression in forfeiture cases only where the court is disposed to uphold the
forfeiture being asserted. Query, however, does not the general judicial hostility to forfeiture

indicate that the contrary presumption is more appropriate with respect to forfeiture agreements,
viz., that forfeiture agreements ought not, in general, to be enforced in the absence of special
factors? If such contrary presumption were more appropriate in the case of forfeiture agreements
(and no position on the question is taken here), it is submitted that one special factor supporting
their enforcement would be a purpose of controlling tenant conduct for the benefit of the greater
number of tenants.
141. To the purist, it might be preferable to talk of a "limited interest" rather than a "limited
estate" in this context. For insofar as the forfeiture is predicated upon a condition (subsequent)
rather than a conditional (special) limitation (see note 118 supra), the tenant's estate is not
technically limited by the defeasance provision, though it is subject to being cut off. See
Goldstein, Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land, 54
Harv. L. Rev. 248, 274-75 (1940). Realistically, though, the distinction is "nonsense." Id. at 274.
142. In an analogous context, one court has recently observed that "while equity does
traditionally disfavor forfeitures, it does not license judicial eradication of rights . ..clearly
vested by the contracting parties as part of their bargain." Kama Rippa Music, Inc. v.
Schekeryk, 510 F.2d 837, 843-44 (2d Cir. 1975) (licensing of intellectual property).
Of course, such enlargement of the tenant's estate might, under certain circumstances, be
proper despite the implicit expropriation of one private interest (the landlord's) in favor of another
private party. The presence of some of the factors mentioned in note 139 supra would, for
example, justify such an enlargement with no violence at all to established notions of justice.
Nonetheless, it is important to recognize such enlargement (and expropriation) for what it is when
deciding whether or not, in a particular case, it is to be countenanced as the lesser evil.
143. See note 141 supra.
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that no effective relief is available, 144 then the offending tenant will
succeed in appropriating an excessive share of the common environ14 6
mental asset 145 which was supposed to be shared by all tenants.
Nonetheless, forfeiture agreements have not been enforceable in the
courts to the same extent as other agreements. The reasons why they
have not may be divided into two general categories. First, there are
reasons for nonenforcement which are applicable to agreements generally but which, in the context of forfeiture agreements, seem to receive
stricter application than they do in other contexts. Among these one
might list waiver, strict construction against the draftsman and failure
to perform what is, broadly speaking, a condition precedent to the
agreed remedy. Secondly, there are reasons for nonenforcement of
forfeitures which are somewhat special to the forfeiture remedy even
though they may sometimes apply to other types of agreements as
well. 147 These special reasons for nonenforcement remain (reflecting
their origins) characteristically equitable in their nature. They reflect
equity's early concern with the disproportionate hardship of allowing
the enforcement of certain agreements valid at law, and they include (i)
the adequacy of the tenant's actual performance, or of damages, to
protect the landlord's bargain and (ii) the relative hardship which
would result from a forfeiture compared with the hardship to others as
a result of a substantial noncompensable breach of the particular lease
requirement.
These limitations on the enforceability of the forfeiture remedy will
be discussed in turn below.
b. Limitations on Forfeiture Which Are Applicable to Agreements
Generally
Forfeiture as a remedy for lease violations is frequently described by
the courts as being "harsh" or "drastic,' 148 a subject of judicial
144.

See note 46 supra and accompanying text and section III(B)(1) supra.

145.

See notes 9 & i0 supra and accompanying text.

146. The situation would be little different from one in which a tenant partitioned off a
portion of a common area for his own exclusive use.
147. Sometimes their application to other types of agreements may be under another name,
e.g., "unconscionability," or may be appropriate only for particular remedies, e.g., specific

performance or an injunction.
148. E.g., Fritts v. Cloud Oak Flooring Co., 478 S.W.2d 8, 11-12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); Feist
& Feist v. Long Island Studios, Inc., 29 App. Div. 2d 186, 191, 287 N.Y.S.2d 257, 262 (2d Dep't
1968) (dissenting opinion); Moss v. Hirshtritt, 60 Misc. 2d 402, 406, 303 N.Y.S.2d 447, 451-52
(N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969); Bernstein v. Bernstein, 210 N.Y.S. 539, 540 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other
grounds, 214 App. Div. 790, 210 N.Y.S. 539, 541 (2d Dep't 1925), aff'd per curiam, 243 N.Y.

559, 154 N.E. 604 (1926). But cf. First Nat'l Stores, Inc. v. Yellowstone Shopping Center, Inc.,
21 N.Y.2d 630, 638, 237 N.E.2d 868, 871, 290 N.Y.S.2d 721, 725-26 (1968) ("Should we hold
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"abhorrence." 14 9 Courts do not always articulate their reasons for these
views of forfeiture, often offering vague comments such as " '[t]he
continuation rather than the extinction of grants is favored,' "50 " 'the
right to retain property . . . is . . . sacred,' "151 or "the law provides
other remedies more consonant with justice."' 15 2 Harshness, drasticness
or judicial abhorrence has sometimes appeared to serve ipso facto as a
reason for refusing to enforce a forfeiture, for example in an occasional
recent case decided on grounds of unconscionability. 1 53 But the primary impact of the courts' historical disfavor of forfeitures has been
their resulting willingness to apply the ordinary reasons for nonenforcement of agreements somewhat expansively so as to avoid forfeitures.
For example, the doctrine of waiver would support the nonenforcement of a forfeiture based upon failure to perform an agreement
provided that there has been an intentional relinquishment of a known
right.15 4 However, courts have frequently held that landlords have
waived forfeitures even under circumstances where the intent, as
objectively manifested, was rather obviously to enforce rather than
relinquish the right to declare a forfeiture.1-s The general rule that any
that the termination of this lease is harsh and inequitable, then the same conclusion can be
reached in every instance where a landlord exercises his contractual rights, and, in that event, the
right of termination or any other right specified in a lease would be rendered meaningless and
ineffectual.").
149. E.g., Tollius v. Dutch Inns of America, Inc., 244 So. 2d 467, 472 (Fla. Dist, Ct. App.
1970); 614 Co. v. D.H. Overmyer Co., 297 Minn. 395, 398, 211 N.W.2d 891, 894 (1973); Fly Hi
Music Corp. v. 645 Restaurant Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 302, 304, 314 N.Y.S.2d 735, 737 (N.Y. City
Civ. Ct. 1970), aff'd mem., 71 Misc. 2d 302, 335 N.Y.S.2d 822 (App. T. 1972). In a similar vein,
one commentator has said, "As restrictions for the benefit of other property, they [conditions] are
crude weapons of the early law; their survival indicates a cultural lag." Goldstein. Rights of
Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land, 54 Harv. L. Rev, 248,
250 (1940). However the focus of that Article was on conditions imposed on fees. Cf text
accompanying note 175 infra.
150. 220 W. 42 Associates v. Cohen, 60 Misc. 2d 983, 985, 302 N.V.S.2d 494, 496 (App T.
1969), paraphrasing 57th St. Luce Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 182 Misc, 164, 168, 46
N.Y.S.2d 730, 733 (Sup. Ct), aff'd mem., 267 App. Div. 978, 48 N.Y.S.2d 557 (Ist Dep't, aff'd
without opinion, 293 N.Y. 717, 56 N.E.2d 732 (1944).
151. Mihans v. Municipal Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d 479, 484, 87 Cal. Rptr 17, 20 (Dist- Ct.
App. 1970), quoting Coal Co. v. Rosser, 53 Ohio SL 12, 24, 41 N.E. 263, 265 (1895).
152. Miller v. Reidy, 85 Cal. App. 757, 761, 260 P. 358, 360 (Dist. Ct. App. 19271.
153. 57 E. 54 Realty Corp. v. Gay Nineties Realty Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 353, 335 N.Y.S.2d 872
(App. T. 1972); Seabrook v. Commuter Housing Co., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (N.Y City
Civ. Ct. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 79 Misc. 2d 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d 566 (App. T 1973)- cf.
Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 328, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Rockland County Ct- 1975).
154. 5 S. Williston, Contracts § 678 (3d ed. 1961); cf. Sessions, Inc. v. Morton, 491 F.2d 854
(9th Cir. 1974); In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, Inc., 95 F.2d 306, 309 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 LUS.
567 (1938); 3A A. Corbin, Contracts § 757 (1960).
155. E.g., Miller v. Reidy, 85 Cal. App. 757, 260 P. 358 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927); Woollard v
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act recognizing continuation of the tenancy constitutes a waiver,15 6
and its specific application to acceptance of rent which
accrues after
the breach, 15 7 clearly evidence a judicial approach which
exalts
ance of forfeitures over determinations based on actual intent. avoidAdmittedly, this anti-forfeiture approach to waivers has not been
uniformly
followed,15 8 and one may only impressionistically attribute
proach to the courts' "characteristic reluctance to enforce the apforfeitures. ' 159 However, it appears fair to conclude, on balance,
that the
courts have at least sometimes stretched the doctrine of waiver
in order
to avoid forfeitures which they did not wish to enforce.
Similarly, courts frequently avoid forfeitures by strictly
construing
the lease in order to hold either that there was no condition
intended at
160
all,
or that the condition was not breached. 161 Sometimes a
court
may go so far as to " 'construe' language into patently
not meaning
what the language is patently trying to say.' 162 Although
struction against the landlord is sometimes justified on strict conthe grounds
that it was the landlord who was responsible for drafting the
lease and,
hence, for any ambiguities it contains, 163 it has likewise been
suggested
Schaffer Stores, Co., 272 N.Y. 304, 5 N.E.2d 829 (1936);
Fairchild Realty Co. v. Spiegel, Inc.,
246 N.C. 458, 98 S.E.2d 871 (1957).
156. 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 3.95; 3A Thompson,
supra note 19, §§ 1328-29.
157. See 3A Thompson, supra note 19, § 1329 ("[Alcceptance
by the lessor of rent accruing
subsequent to the breach of condition with knowledge of the
existence of a cause for forfeiture Is a
waiver thereof.'); id. § 1329 n.88 and cases cited therein;
Woollard v. Schaffer Stores, Co., 272
N.Y. 304, 5 N.E.2d 829 (1936).
158. See, e.g., cases cited in note 154 supra. See generally
I Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, §
3.95; 3A Thompson, supra note 19, §§ 1325-29.
159. 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 3.95, at 383. Sometimes
the court makes it clear that the
abhorrence of forfeiture is the motivation for resort to the
doctrine of waiver. See Duncan v.
Malcomb, 234 Ark. 146, 351 S.W.2d 419 (1961); Miller v.
Reidy, 85 Cal. App. 757, 260 P. 358
(Dist. Ct. App. 1927).
160. See H. Tiffany, Real Property § 96 (3d abr. ed. 1940);
cf. Oldfield v. Stoeco Homes,
Inc., 26 N.J. 246, 139 A.2d 291 (1958).
161. E.g., Miller v. Reidy, 85 Cal. App. 757, 260 P. 358
(Dist. Ct. App. 1927); Hughes v.
Pallas, 84 Colo. 14, 267 P. 608 (1928); Branmar Theatre
Co. v. Branmar, Inc., 264 A.2d 526
(Del. Ch. 1970); Grassham v. Robertson, 277 Ky. 605,
126 S.W.2d 1063 (1939); Wenger v.
Wenger, 58 Lancaster L. Rev. 111, 114 (Pa. C.P. 1962)
(One pair of s!;ppers does not a
permanent place of abode make.). A careful draftsman
can effectively prevent avoidance of
forfeiture on the theory that a covenant and not a condition
was intended. See text accompanying
note 160 supra. It is somewhat harder, however, to draft
a lease in a way which prevents a court
from interpreting it to find that there was no breach of condition.
For a further discussion, see
note 190 infra.
162. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 700,
702 (1939). Apparent examples are
Boyd v. Shell Oil Co., 454 Pa. 374, 311 A.2d 616 (1973) and
Murphy v. Traynor, 110 Colo. 466,
135 P.2d 230 (1943). See also discussion in Maginnis v.
Knickerbocker Ice Co., 112 Wis. 385,
394, 88 N.W. 300, 302-03 (1901).
163. Branmar Theatre Co. v. Branmar, Inc., 264 A.2d 526
(Del. Ch. 1970); Charles E. Burt,
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that the lease should be strictly construed against the landlord even
when drafted by the tenant. 164 Judicial dislike of the forfeiture remedy
seems clearly to be the more likely explanation for
strict constructions
165
against forfeiture, and courts often so concede.
In a similar vein, courts will strive to avoid forfeitures on the
grounds that the procedural requisites and/or the conditions precedent
16 6
to the remedy have not been met.

Thus, owing to its bad reputation in the courts, the remedy of
forfeiture encounters pitfalls in the course of enforcement that most
agreements, though ostensibly subject to the same rules, usually do not
encounter. This differential application of generalized doctrines to the
enforcement of forfeiture agreements is criticizable if only because it
tends to disguise the norms which the courts are using in deciding
whether to enforce a particular forfeiture or not. 167 Worse, the overresort to doctrines such as waiver in order to avoid forfeiture may be a
cover for the fact that there are no articulable norms being utilized at
all. The courts may simply be refusing to enforce agreements they do
not like. 168 Even apart from this criticism, however, the question may
be asked whether the remedy of forfeiture is, in the leasehold context,
truly the harsh or drastic one that it is assumed to be.
Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass. 124, 127, 163 N.E.2d 4, 6 (1959); Bevy's Dry Cleaners &
Shirt Laundry, Inc. v. Streble, 2 Ohio St. 2d 250, 256, 208 N.E.2d 528, 533 (1965).
164. Acme Mkts., Inc. v. Dawson Enterprises, Inc., 253 Md. 76, 89, 251 A.2d 839, 847
(1969); cf. Woodall v. Pharr, 119 Ga. App. 692, 693, 168 S.E.2d 645, 647 (1969), aff'd, 226 Ga.
1, 172 S.E.2d 404 (1970).
165. E.g., Miller v. Reidy, 85 Cal. App. 757, 761, 260 P. 358, 360 (Dist. Ct App. 1927)
("courts avoid enforcing covenants for forfeiture wherever possible"); Branmar Theatre Co. v.
Branmar, Inc., 264 A.2d 526, 529 (Del. Ch. 1970) ("The disfavor in which forfeitures are viewed
gives a special reason for invoking this general rule of construction against the [draftsman].");
Woodall v. Pharr, 119 Ga. App. 692, 168 S.E.2d 645 (1969), aff'd, 226 Ga. 1, 172 S.E.2d 404
(1970); cf. Riverton Country Club v. Thomas, 141 N.J.Eq. 435, 440, 58 A.2d 89, 93 (Ch.), aff'd,
1 N.J. 508, 64 A.2d 347 (1948), quoting Woodruff v. Woodruff, 44 N.J.Eq. 349, 353, 16 A. 4, 6
(Ch. 1888) C''Conditions subsequent, especially when relied upon to work a forfeiture . . are
strictly construed.' '.
By interesting contrast, in a case where the lease was a "gift lease" (to a school district), the
court rejected the rule of strict construction and held that "the plain meaning of the words... in
the ordinary sense" should control. School Dist. RE-2(J) v. Panucci, 30 Colo. App. 184, 188-89,
490 P.2d 711, 713 (1971).
166. E.g., Woodall v. Pharr, 119 Ga. App. 692, 168 S.E.2d 645 (1969), aff'd, 226 Ga. 1, 172
S.E.2d 404 (1970); Giannini v. Stuart, 6 App. Div. 2d 418, 178 N.Y.S.2d 709 (lst Dep't 1958);
see 3A Thompson, supra note 19, § 1326. The common law requirement of a demand for rent, in
cases of forfeiture for nonpayment, is a typical example. 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 3.94.
167. "Covert tools are never reliable tools," said Karl Llewellyn in criticizing the "intentional
and creative misconstruction" of contracts. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 700, 703
(1939). See also the discussion at note 190 infra.
168. Berger, supra note 22, at 792.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

Actually, when all relevant interests are considered, forfeiture may
often, perhaps even typically, be the least drastic remedy available in
offensive tenant cases. It neither threatens the offending tenant with
jail (as would injunctive relief) nor, more importantly, does it let the
tenant impose his idiosyncracies on his neighbors or the landlord. Nor
do forfeitures of leaseholds necessarily involve the harsh deprivations
of value which are associated with other kinds of forfeitures.' 69 After
all, the usual tenant pays rent only on a current basis, and what is
inevitably lost by forfeiture-the tenant's benefit of bargain-will
usually not be of substantial worth, especially in the case of residential
tenancies. 170 The objectionable tenant will, of course, have to bear the
costs and inconvenience of the move. But these losses can hardly be
seen as an unjustified imposition once the alternatives are perceived:
either the objectionable tenant must move and bear these losses or his
neighbors must move-or suffer. Because in such cases there are
substantial but irreconcilable interests on the part not only of the
landlord and the objectionable tenant, but on the part of neighboring
tenants as well, there may be no solution which permits the avoidance
of all inconvenience for all concerned. Consequently, a mechanism
such as forfeiture, which at least minimizes the potential for inconvenience, may be the best solution under the circumstances.1 7 1
169. Forfeitures may, of course, dependent upon the facts, vary in the degree of harshness
which they involve, and there may be cases, e.g., where the tenant has a very valuable lease, in
which "the harsh operation of the law" would call very strongly for equitable intervention against
forfeiture. Dunklee v. Adams, 20 Vt. 415, 425 (1848).
170. The tenant's aggregate loss may also depend on the iandlord's success in reletting the
forfeited premises. If, by virtue of a "survival clause" in the lease or local law, the forfeiting
tenant remains liable on a promise to pay rent or damages (e.g., Hermitage Co. v. Levine, 248
N.Y. 333, 162 N.E. 97 (1928)), the losses involved in a forfeiture could become substantial, even
for a residential tenant whose lease calls only for a "market" rental. The costs of substitute
premises, when added to the "survival" obligations under the forfeited lease, could result In a
total burden which is substantial indeed, especially if the landlord did not relet the forfeited
premises fairly quickly. However, as noted in the text, the alternative to imposing these losses on
the offending tenant may merely be to force them upon his neighbors who, discontented because
of the disturbance, may be constrained to abandon their own premises in violation of their own
leases. The "implied warranty of habitability" might come to the neighbors' rescue--as suggested
in section III(A)(3) supra. But this rescue still cannot, in the present state of the law, be
guaranteed.
The loss to the forfeiting tenant may also be great if the tenant has a long-term lease at a
favorable rental and/or has made substantial improvements in reliance upon a long-term tenancy.
Neither of these is likely to be the case with residential tenants; however, a rent-control tenant
whose possession is protected by law, and whose rent is kept below market by regulation,
arguably stands to lose by forfeiture in the same way that a long-term commercial lessee stands to
lose. For a discussion of "survival clauses," or the so-called "lessee's covenant of indemnity," see 1
Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 3.97.
171. See section III(B)(2)(c)(iv) infra for a discussion of the relationship of relative hardship
notions to these issues.
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Even on this basis, the forfeiture remedy can be criticized in that it
does not solve the problem but only moves the problem to another
location. 17 2 Everybody has to live next to somebody. At least this is
true in an urban setting. And unless we are to banish certain people
from our cities altogether, 173 merely enforcing evictions now and again
is arguably a solution to nothing. Perhaps one answer to this argument
is that the threat of forfeiture, or a past eviction, will possibly have
deterrent potential against offensive conduct; but on this basis forfeiture could be more effective than damages or injunction only in that its
threat may seem more real. Perhaps a better answer is that, given the
varying sensitivities of people and their varying levels of tolerance, it is
not generally realistic to assume that an evicted tenant cannot make a
satisfactory substitute arrangement. Of course, it may be said that the
neighbors too could probably make satisfactory substitute arrangements. But they could usually do so only at a greater aggregate cost.
Moreover, since any judicial hostility toward forfeitures would apply
equally to the neighbors' new premises, the refugees from one annoying circumstance would be unprotected against encountering the same
problems in their new place as well. Accordingly, even if forfeitures
only move the problem around, this is probably more effective and less
costly (to say nothing of more "fair") than it is to move around the
people who have suffered as a result.
Of course, it is true that the use of forfeiture as a solution implies
that some people, whose conduct is considered objectionable by others,
will be prevented from living in the environment of their choice-not,
one must admit, a very libertarian prospect. But unfortunately, when
consideration is given also to the neighboring tenants' interests in living
in the environment of their choice, this illiberal implication appears to
be in either event unavoidable. Therefore, opting in favor of permitting a certain degree of self-segregation, 74 and permitting the enforcement thereof through lease forfeiture provisions, may be the only
rational alternative to the random injustice of utter laissez-faire.
What the foregoing seems to suggest, in terms of policy, is that
instead of the judicial abhorrence of forfeiture (at least in leasehold
172. However, no case has been found where the court refused to enforce a forfeiture on these
grounds. Indeed, in one proceeding to evict a tenant who harbored roomers allegedly guilty of
"narcotics addiction, prostitution, attempted rape, homicide and other disreputable occurrences,the court disregarded such arguments saying that they were not an "exculpatory shield against
landlord's and the community's efforts to rid the area of this blight." Remedco Corp. v. Bryn
Mawr Hotel Corp., 45 Misc. 2d 586, 587-88, 257 N.Y.S.2d 525, 527-28 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct.
1965).
173. A worry expressed by the dissenting judge in Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg.,
Inc., 393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975), who questioned whether former mental patients,
stigmatized by their pasts, could ever find places to live.
174. See text accompanying notes 282-88 infra.
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situations where behavioral standards are involved), forfeiture may
indeed be the remedy of choice. Furthermore, despite judicial intimations to the contrary, 17" the forfeiture of leaseholds is not properly
comparable to the drastic business of, e.g., a condition subsequent on a
fee. Leasehold forfeiture can be seen rather as merely a prearranged
procedure for the cancellation of a mutual arrangement which has
turned out to be bad. When the consequences to the neighbors of
nonenforcement are considered, the harshness of lease forfeiture for
76
breach of conduct or use restrictions is relative at worst.1
c.

Limitations on Forfeiture Which Apply Somewhat "Specially" to
Forfeiture Agreements.

The harshness of lease forfeiture for conduct or use violations may at
worst be relative, but the hardship to the tenant may still be, in many
cases, entirely out of proportion to the benefit which the forfeiture is
ostensibly asserted to protect. 177 And in many cases, courts have
expressly relied on this ground of disproportionate hardship in relieving
8
against forfeiture. 17

175. Branmar Theatre Co. v. Branmar, Inc., 264 A.2d 526, 528-29 (Del. Ch. 1970).
176. For a further discussion, see section HI(B)(2)(c)(iv) infra.
177. Of course, a landlord might be tempted to assert a forfeiture even though the benefit
which the power of forfeiture was supposed to protect is of no interest to the landlord. That is,
the landlord may be simply motivated by a desire to resume control of the premises for reasons
unrelated to the tenant's violations such as when the tenant's lease is at a below-market rental or
when an opportunity arises which the landlord believes would be more profitable than continuing
with the existing tenant. Apparent examples of this are Bernstein v. Bernstein, 214 App. Div.
790, 210 N.Y.S. 539 (2d Dep't 1925), aff'd per curiam, 243 N.Y. 559, 154 N.E. 604 (1926) (see
lower court's opinion at 210 N.Y.S. 539) and Norman S. Riesenfeld, Inc. v. R-W Realty Co.,
223 App. Div. 140, 148, 228 N.Y.S. 145, 153 (1st Dep't 1928); Llewellyn, What Price
Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale L.J. 704, 736-37 (1931). Obviously, this does not
mean that the relative hardship question is resolved by balancing the value of the tenant's
possession against the value which possession would have to the landlord. Similarly, even if the
tenant's lease violations are the landlord's motivation in evicting, the value to the landlord of
resuming possession per se is irrelevant to the question of relative hardship.
Incidentally, if the landlord is motivated to seek eviction by factors other than preservation of
the benefit which the forfeiture was supposed to protect, the case would be one of "abusive
motivation." See notes 50 & 55 supra and accompanying text.
178. E.g., Beck v. Giordano, 144 Colo. 372, 356 P.2d 264 (1960); Tollius v. Dutch Inns of
America, Inc., 244 So. 2d 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); H.K.H. Dev. Corp. v. Metropolitan
Sanitary Dist., 97 111. App. 2d 225, 247, 240 N.E.2d 214, 225 (1968); Streeter v. Middlemas, 240
Md. 169, 213 A.2d 471 (1965). The relative hardship rationale for relief against forfeiture is
discussed in section III(B)(2)(c)(iv) infra and inferentially in the text accompanying notes 170-75
supra.
However, it was early held that the fact that forfeiture would cost the tenant nothing of
economic value did not, in itself, prevent the court from relieving against the forfeiture. Taylor v.
Knight, 22 Eng. Rep. 208 (Ch. 1725). The tenant was obligated to pay a so-called "rack-rent,"
i.e., a rent equal to the full (rental) value of the land, and therefore no net economic benefit
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Thoughts of disproportionate hardship seem to have weighed heavily in the courts' thinking when, in England, equity began dispensing
relief to tenants from forfeitures which their defaults had triggered. 179
Equity granted such relief freely when the tenant's breach occasioned
180
no damage or when full compensation in damages could be made.

Similarly, in cases of "little Damage"'181 or a "trifling deficiency"' 1 2 in
performance, equitable relief from forfeiture would be granted. 183 In

all of these types of situations, of course, the hardship to the tenant of
enforcing the forfeiture would appear to be disproportionate, either

because the breach has caused little or no hardship to the landlord (in
the case of little or no damages) or because any hardship to the
landlord was merely transitory (in the case of a compensable loss).
Disproportionate hardship to the tenant does indeed appear to be a

very logical basis for equitable intervention to prevent forfeitures,
echoing as it does the broader equitable principles that "equity seeks to
do justice" 184 and that equity will not assist in the enforcement of an
obviously unbalanced bargain 8 S or a penalty.18 6 Moreover, compared
with "harshness," "drasticness" or "abhorrence," disproportionate
hardship is a somewhat more refined basis for relieving against forfeiture, taking into account as it properly does the hardship to others as
well as the hardship to the breaching tenant. Nonetheless, the question
remains whether disproportionate hardship to the tenant is itself a

sufficiently refined test for determining the appropriateness of relief
from forfeiture. The presence of a potential for disproportionate hardaccrued for the tenant under his lease. However, the court held that relief against forfeitures was
not limited to cases where beneficial leases were involved.
179. Law courts may have long granted relief from forfeitures covertly under the guise of
interpretation (see text accompanying notes 160-65 supra), or of finding waivers by the landlord
even where not actually intended (see text accompanying notes 154-59 supra). However, it was
apparently the equity courts which were the first to openly relieve tenants from forfeitures.
180. E.g., Sanders v. Pope, 33 Eng. Rep. 108 (Ch. 1806); Northcote v. Duke, 27 Eng. Rep.
330 (Ch. 1765); Hack v. Leonard, 88 Eng. Rep. 335 (Ch. 1724); cf. Wafer v. Mocato, 88 Eng.
Rep. 348 (Ch. 1724).
181. Lovat v. Renelagh, 35 Eng. Rep. 388, 390 (Ch. 1814).
182. Sanders v. Pope, 33 Eng. Rep. 108, 112 (Ch. 1806); accord Dowell v. Dew, 62 Eng.
Rep. 918, 926 (Vice Chancellor 1842) (if "a tenant was to be ejected for a foul turnip-field, an
unhinged gate, a broken shutter or small matters of that description.... there would scarcely be
a lease in existence throughout the kingdom.").
183. Sometimes, a similar effect is achieved by statute. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3275 (Vest
1970), as interpreted in Atkins v. Anderson, 139 Cal. App. 2d 918, 294 P.2d 727 (Dist. Ct. App.
1956); N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 1951 (McKinney 1963).
184. Maxim quoted from Ballentine's Law Dictionary 413 (3d ed. 1969).
185. H. McClintock, Equity § 71, at 195-96 (2d ed. 1948).
186. Id. § 32, at 81-82. See also 1, 2 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §§ 72, 433 (5th ed.
1941).
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ship appears to be inadequate as a general test for relief because, as a
general criterion, it does not differentiate sufficiently among the apparent disproportionate hardship cases which are and are not deserving of
relief.
The hardship of enforcing a forfeiture may appear to be disproportionate for several reasons:
-The hardship may appear disproportionate because the tenant has
substantially performed his obligation and, though a technical default
has occurred, it (and its adverse effect on the landlord or others) is
trivial;
-The hardship may appear disproportionate where, despite a major
default by the tenant, there has been no real injury occasioned by the
breach;
-The hardship may appear disproportionate where, even though
the tenant has committed a major default, causing substantial injury
or loss to the landlord or others, the payment of money damages will
fully compensate such injury or loss;
-Finally, the hardship may appear disproportionate even where
money damages either cannot or will not, as a practical matter, supply
adequate compensation for the substantial injury or loss to the landlord
or others caused by a major default. In this fourth type of case (which
is probably most typical of the cases where neighbors are seriously
annoyed by conduct restriction breaches), the potential for disproportionate hardship exists because the annoyance caused by the breach,
may still be less than the relative hardship of
though substantial,
87
eviction. 1
Even though the hardship to the tenant may be disproportionate in
each of these four types of cases, the four types differ radically in terms
of the protection which is afforded to benefits bargained for by the
landlord. In the first three types of cases, the intended benefits of the
breached agreement would be, we may assume, sufficiently, even if
not fully, protected. In the fourth type of case, however, relief against
forfeiture would mean no protection at all for the benefits that the
tenant's compliance was intended to provide. This loss of protection,
though certainly an important factor in deciding whether to relieve
against a forfeiture,188 cannot be allowed alone to control the determination of whether to grant such relief in a particular case. For even if
187. Notice that the comparison here is between the hardship of eviction as against the
burden which the violator's breach causes to others. The relative hardship of eviction should be
carefully distinguished from the relative hardship of compliance, the latter being (arguably)
relevant to the reasonableness and validity of the restrictions themselves as well as to the
appropriateness of the forfeiture remedy. See note 315 infra.
188. See I Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 3.96; Note, Equitable Relief from Forfeiture of a
Lease Incurred by Breach of Covenant, 20 Harv. L. Rev. 640 (1907).
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enforcement of a forfeiture may be necessary to provide the landlord or
others with a substantial benefit for which the landlord has bargained,
the possibility remains that the cost of assuring that benefit (i.e., an
eviction) is unjustifiably high given the value of the benefit protected.
Other differences between the four types of cases, and their respective
appropriateness for relief from forfeiture, are discussed below.
i. Substantial Performance: The case of substantial performance
by the tenant should be an easy one for granting relief from forfeiture,
and it is generally held that relief is proper in such cases.' 8 9 Since the
tenant's substantial performance will, by definition, provide virtually
all that has been bargained for, it would be senselessly oppressive to
extinguish the tenant's bargained-for benefits based upon a trivial
performance shortfall. This is true even if the terms of the lease appear
to require exact performance by the tenant as a condition to his
continued possession. 190 To the extent that the lease gives such a
drastic effect to a trivial performance shortfall, without regard to the
substantial performance already provided, it is an obviously unbalanced bargain suitable for equitable type intervention. 1 9 1
189. E.g., Hughes v. Pallas, 84 Colo. 14, 267 P. 608 (1928); Grassham v. Robertson, 277 Ky.
605, 126 S.W.2d 1063 (1939); Intertherm, Inc. v. Structural Sys., Inc., 504 S.W.2d 64 (Mo.
1974); Ogden v. Hamer, 268 App. Div. 751, 48 N.Y.S.2d 500 (1st Dep't 1944); Norman S.
Riesenfeld, Inc. v. R-W Realty Co., 223 App. Div. 140, 228 N.Y.S. 145 (1st Dep't 1928).
190. Note that even where the lease appears to prescribe forfeiture for even trivial defaults, it
may be fairly debated whether such an interpretation truly reflects what the parties really
intended. Cf. Atkin's Waste Materials, Inc. v. May, 34 N.Y.2d 422, 314 N.E.2d 871, 358
N.Y.S.2d 129 (1974). The rule that use restrictions are strictly construed against the landlord (see
notes 23 & 25 supra and accompanying text) provides an appropriate basis for avoiding forfeitures
in such cases.
Sometimes, when a court refuses to enforce a forfeiture for an alleged tenant breach, it is
difficult to tell whether the decision was reached on a "substantial performance" theory or by a
strict construction of the lease provision allegedly in default. E.g., Beck v. Giordano, 144 Colo.
372, 356 P.2d 264 (1960); Grasshan v. Robertson, 277 Ky. 605, 126 S.W.2d 1063 (1939); Phillipse
Towers, Inc. v. Ortega, 61 Misc. 2d 539, 305 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Yonkers City Ct. 1969); Carbon
Fuel Co. v. Gregory, 131 W. Va- 494, 48 S.E.2d 338 (1948). That is, it is unclear whether the
court relieved against the forfeiture despite a technical default by the tenant or whether, by its
interpretation of the lease, the court concluded that there was no default at all.
Ideally, the question of whether to enforce a forfeiture in cases of actual (albeit trivial) defaults
ought to be kept analytically separate from the quite different question of whether or not there %s
a default at all. In the case of actual (though nonsubstantial) defaut., the lanulo-! might still
theoretically enforce the tenant's obligation by damage reco% .r.r,possibly, by injunction. He
should not, of course, be entitled to any relief if there was no default at all. However, because of the
difficulties in using damages or injunctive relief as enforcement techniques (see discussion in section
III(B)(1) supra), it is often not significant, as a practical matter, that courts sometimes may strictly
construe a lease contrary to actual intention where the avoidance of forfeiture might be more
appropriately justified on a substantial performance theory.
191. See discussion of the analogous problem of overly strict conduct restrictions in section
III(D)(2)(c) infra.
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ii. Absence of Real Injury: Not so simple is the second type of
apparent disproportionate hardship case, where the tenant's performance falls substantially short of the promise, but no real injury is
suffered by the landlord or others. 192 An example might be the case of
a tenant who plays an electronic piano with earphones in violation of
a lease prohibition on playing musical instruments after 9:00 p.m.
Obviously, if no one is truly damaged by the tenant's breach, there
is little merit in imposing any hardship on the tenant for committing
it. 193 The case is effectively indistinguishable from one of substantial
performance even though, literally, the tenant may have committed a
total default with respect to the restriction in question.
However, unless the landlord or other beneficiaries of the restriction
are truly indifferent as to whether the tenant performs the particular
obligation in default, it cannot be said that the breach has caused no
injury. 94 For, absent such indifference, the tenant's default would by
definition disappoint the landlord's expectation that the bargained-for
benefit of the tenant's performance would be forthcoming. This dis-.ppointed expectation may not be damage in the legal (i.e., tort) sense:
i.e., it may be damnum absque injuria. But the fact that the tenant
may not have been under a law-imposed duty to supply the defaulted
performance might be precisely the reason the landlord bargained for it
by agreement. For example, the landlord may have sought by agreeAnother analogy, albeit imperfect, may be drawn to the rule of substantial performance with
respect to conditions in contracts. There, a material breach of a condition is ordinarily required
before the breaching party forfeits the quid pro quo for which he has bargained. However, in
contract law, strict performance of an express condition is generally required, meaning that strict
performance of lease conditions would be the rule if leases were treated as ordinary contracts.
Another distinction between lease law and contract law is that contract conditions are usually
conditions precedent whereas conditions in leases, being limitations on a conveyance of property,
are, of course, conditions subsequent. See generally J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts §§ 138-40
(1970).
192. See, e.g., Cooley v. Bettigole, 301 N.E.2d 872 (Mass. App. 1973) (forfeiture allowed for
breach of covenant not to use premises for any purpose reasonably objectionable to landlord;
tenant had placed cardboard sign in apartment window); River Dev. Co. v. Ellsworth, 44 App.
Div. 2d 902, 356 N.Y.S.2d 150 (4th Dep't 1974) (forfeiture allowed for breach of restriction on a
particular type of commercial use).
193. However, if the breach is willful or deliberate, the court may enforce the forfeiture even
if the damage to the landlord was insignificant. See Bernstein v. Bernstein, 214 App. Div. 790,
210 N.Y.S. 539 (2d Dep't 1925), aff'd per curiam, 243 N.Y. 559, 154 N.E. 604 (1926).
194. Even if the landlord is less than totally indifferent he may still be virtually indifferent so
that the injury is negligible. This sort of situation is probably indistinguishable from the no Injury
case.

However, as the degree of inditterence declines, and the injury resulting from tenant defaults
correspondingly grows, the case becomes one in which substantial hardship will potentially exist
on both the landlord's side and the tenant's, depending on whether forfeiture is granted or not.
The case becomes, therefore, one of relative hardship, discussed in section III(B)(2)(c)(iv) infra.
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ment (e.g., prohibiting dogs-or snakes) to protect special or idiosyncratic concerns, of himself or of the greater number of his tenants,
which the general law (e.g., of private nuisance) would not protect. 19s
Or he may have sought to protect himself from injuries (e.g., to the
rental yield of his building) which the law considers either too conjectural to compensate, or too remote to permit the recovery of damages
by the landlord.1 96 If this is so, it would hardly do to say that the
tenant had no obligation under his agreement just because he would
have had no obligation in the absence of an agreement. Accordingly, in
determining whether the tenant's default has resulted in no injury the
notion of injury should not be limited to injuries ordinarily cognizable
as a matter of law. 197 Any performance as to which the landlord or
other intended beneficiaries are not truly indifferent will, if defaulted
upon, result in injury. 198 If so, the case cannot be one appropriate for
195. See section I1(D) infra.
196. A prohibition on signs in the windows is an example. See Cooley v. Bettigole, 301
N.E.2d 872 (Mass. App. 1973) and text accompanying note 132 supra.
197. Courts sometimes express this by saying that, even in the absence of compensable
monetary loss, damages will be presumed for purposes of equity. Jos. Guidone's Food Palace,
Inc. v. Gardner & Guidone, Inc., 153 Ind. App. 9, 285 N.E.2d 834 (1972).
198. Of course, this is not to say that whenever a particular performance is called for by the
lease any default in that performance will cause damage to the landlord. The lease may impose
many requirements on the tenant as to which the landlord is totally indifferent. This may occur
because the parties do not bother to tailor a form lease to their specific situation, with the result
that restrictive provisions are left in the form even though neither party cares to have them. In
the case of residential tenancies, it is probable that the use of form leases almost always results in
superfluities of no concern to the landlord. See Bentley, An Alternative Residential Lease, 74
Colum. L. Rev. 836, 847 (1974). Less commonly, tenant obligations under a lease may become
immaterial to the landlord due to a change of circumstances. Cf. Downs v. Kroeger, 200 Cal.
743, 254 P. 1101 (1927).
Because the lease may well impose obligations on the tenant as to which the landlord is
indifferent, if a landlord desires to cut short a tenant's estate for "improper" reasons, he may be
tempted to avail himself of one of these superfluous provisions as a technical grounds for eviction.
See note 177 supra. Analytically, such attempts may be considered to be cases of abusive
motivation (see notes S0 & 55 supra and accompanying text); the absence of express language
allowing termination without cause (see note 231 infra) justifies the presumption that none was
intended.
The possibility of abusive motivation means that, absent damage cognizable as a matter of
law, the court cannot simply take the landlord's word for the fact that he was injured by the
tenant's breach. Neither can the court reliably utilize some sort of reasonable man test to
ascertain the existence of damage (or lack of indifference); to do so would destroy one of the most
useful functions of private agreements limiting use, i.e., the protection of special or idiosyncratic
concerns which the general law cannot take into account. See text accompanying notes 339-41
infra. However, because the proof to corroborate the landlord's claims of damage ill often be
evidence of prior course of practice, the doctrine of waiver and the technique of strict (or
practical) construction will also often be available as bases for avoiding the asserted forfeiture in
cases of no injury.
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relief from forfeiture on a "substantial performance" type of theory. If
relief from forfeiture is to be available nonetheless, for example on
relative hardship grounds, it must be despite the substantial hardship
to others which will result. 199
iii. Substantial But Compensable Breaches: The third type of case
of apparent disproportionate hardship is where the tenant's default
causes a substantial injury or loss but one which is fully and realistically 20 0 compensable. In this type of case, the landlord (or others) can
have substantially the benefit bargained for (or its value) without the
necessity of enforcing a forfeiture, provided only that the tenant is
solvent and that the relief from forfeiture is conditioned upon the
tenant's paying the full compensation due. 20 1 When the tenant does
make full payment, the case becomes, in effect, a case of substantial
performance, appropriate for relief from forfeiture, as previously discussed.
However, two assumptions must be made in order to convert this
third type of case into essentially a substantial performance case. First,
it must be assumed that the forfeiture power is intended as security
and not as primary value bargained for under the lease. 20 2 Second, it
must be assumed that the bargained-for benefit can be effectively
rendered by the payment thus secured. 20 3 Where these assumptions are
appropriate, forfeitures may be properly relieved against, on essentially a substantial performance theory, whenever the power of forfeiture has served its purpose by inducing the payment due. 20 4 In fact,
these two assumptions probably do apply in the greatest number of
199. See discussion in section III(B)(2)(c)(iv) infra.
200. The word "realistically" is inserted here to take account of the fact that neighboring
tenants may have no rights of compensation at all in relation to the violative conduct (see notes
38-39 supra), or that any rights they do have may be, as a practical matter, not enforceable (see
text following note 40 supra). Incidentally, just because the leases in question preclude tenants
from suing each other for breach of their provisions, it does not follow that tenants should not be
regarded as beneficiaries of those provisions and entitled to their protection, for the purposes here
under discussion. See note 39 supra.
201. Of course, prior to the time that the tenant pays the full compensation, the landlord (or
other beneficiaries) is deprived by the tenant's default of a substantial benefit for which the
landlord has bargained. Meanwhile, however, the power of forfeiture is held by the landlord as a
powerful incentive to the tenant to perform and as an "out" in case the tenant does not. Cf.
section III(B)(2)(c)(iv) infra.
202. See Maginnis v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 112 Wis. 385, 396, 88 N.W. 300, 303 (1901).
203. See Cesar v. Virgin, 207 Ala. 148, 92 So. 406 (1921); Hill v. Barclay, 33 Eng. Rep. 1037
(Ch. 1810). See generally 3 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence §§ 1732-37 (14th ed.
1918); Annot., 69 L.R.A. 833 (1906).
204. "[Tjhe theory . . . all the way through [is] that there has been no real violation of the
contractual intent of the parties." Maginnis v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 112 Wis. 385, 394, 88
N.W. 300, 302-03 (1901).
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landlord-tenant forfeiture cases, mostly involving the failure to make a
payment (typically rent) as the event of default. It was apparently on
the basis of these two assumptions, and by easy analogy to the rules
applicable to mortgages (where they most clearly applied), that equity
2 And
began relieving against forfeitures triggered by tenant defaults.Os
it remains practically universally true that, for nonpayment of rent,
relief from forfeiture will be granted provided only that the tenant
make good on the arrearages. 20 6 However, these assumptions do not
apply in many situations of tenant default, notably including defaults
in the observance of conduct restrictions or of use restrictions generally. The failure to distinguish those cases where they do not apply led to
a generosity in relieving against forfeiture
that, even at an early date,
'20 7
"became in some degree alarming.
The reason that the assumptions do not apply to conduct restriction
cases is that monetary damages are simply unsuitable to compensate
208
for conduct restriction breaches, at least in the residential context.
Indeed, it is rare to find a case of this genre which even mentions the
possibility of monetary recompense for past breaches in relieving
against forfeiture. 20 9 And in no known American case has a court even
considered giving compensation to neighboring tenants who are damaged by a defaulting tenant's violation of a use or conduct restriction. 2 10 The fact that the benefit sought by conduct restrictions is
monetarily noncompensable means that denial of forfeiture for violation of such restrictions will usually (subject to the effectiveness of
205.
206.

See cases cited at note 180 supra.
"The covenant for forfeiture.. . was intended 'as a mere security'. ."

Cedrom Coal

Co. v. Moss, 230 Ala. 32, 34, 159 So. 225, 227 (1935). See also Thompson v. Coe, 96 Conn. 644,

115 A. 219 (1921); Famous Permanent Wave Shops, Inc. v. Smith, 302 IMI.App. 178, 23 N.E.2d
767 (1939); Farmer v. Pitts, 108 Neb. 9, 187 N.W. 95 (1922); 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, §

3.96.
207. Eaton v. Lyon, 30 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1224 (Ch. 1798). "They got into the habit of
construing terms and conditions of covenants as being only in trorem... ," i.e., as a penalty to
induce performance. Id. However, the English equity courts would withhold relief from forfeiture
when compensation via damages did not appear possible. E.g., Wafer v. Mocato, 88 Eng. Rep.
348 (Ch. 1724); see 3 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence § 1737 (14th ed. 1918).
208. See section IIf(B)(1) supra.
209. One example is Sussman Volk Co. v. 88 Delicatessen, Inc., 100 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct.
1950). The court considered the possibility of damages, but denied recovery (while enjoining the
complained of use) because the damages were too difficult to quantify monetarily. See also
Woollard v. Schaffer Stores Co., 272 N.Y. 304, S N.E.2d 829 (1936); Brooklyn Properties, Inc.
v. Cargo Packers, Inc., 1 App. Div. 2d 1040, 152 N.Y.S.2d 359 (2d Dep't 1956) (alterations of
premises in violation of lease; damages allowed in lieu of forfeiture). In most use restriction cases
where relief from forfeiture is given, there is simply no mention of compensation to the landlord
for the prior breaches.
210. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
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possible injunctive relief) frustrate the obtaining of the benefits, to
himself and to others, bargained for by the landlord. 2 11 This belies one
of the two above assumptions which are required in order to justify
relief from forfeiture on a "substantial performance" type of theory,
namely that the bargained-for benefit can be effectively protected by a
payment.
Moreover, since the breach of conduct restrictions is generally
noncompensable monetarily, it is highly doubtful whether there is any
justification for the other of the two assumptions, namely that forfeiture powers are intended to give the landlord merely a security. The
unsuitability of the damage remedy makes it pointless to provide
security for the monetary payment which it contemplates. Of course,
when applied to the obligation to pay rent, or to perform other acts
which have quantifiable monetary significance to the landlord, a
power to forfeit can indeed operate like a security, much as a
mortgage. If the payment required is not forthcoming, the landlord
(like a mortgagee) has recourse to a valuable asset (possession for the
remainder of the lease) in order to get something that is at least
comparable to what he had originally bargained for. However, when
applied to conduct restrictions, the power of forfeiture cannot serve
even a similar purpose. 2 12 Hence, the other of the two above assumptions is belied. The power of forfeiture cannot be assumed to be
intended as security, at least as applied to breaches of conduct restrictions.
Thus, in conduct restriction cases, it is doubtful that we can accept
either of the assumptions necessary to convert a "compensable breach"
case into a "substantial performance" type case. Accordingly, where a
forfeiture is asserted for a breach of conduct restriction, it is unlikely
that the theoretical possibility of compensation by money damages
would in itself ever justify relief from forfeiture.
iv. Substantial Noncompensable Breaches: If, as just asserted,
forfeiture powers
are not useful (and probably not intended) to serve as
"security, '2 13 i.e., a secondary right to secure some other, primary
211. In effect, this may mean that the power to prescribe use restrictions is itself limited, since
the absence of an effective remedy to enforce use restrictions means that the "rights" or benefits
which they purport to confer are more apparent than real. See Macneil, Power of Contract and
Agreed Remedies, 47 Cornell L. Rev. 495, 516 (1962).
212. The realization that a power of forfeiture cannot serve as a security in such cases seems
to have been behind the eventual English rule which was generally to deny relief from forfeitures
when the tenant's breach was of a "collateral covenant," e.g., a covenant to repair, to insure, or
to use for a particular purpose. See Hill v. Barclay, 33 Eng. Rep. 1037 (Ch. 1810); 3 J. Story,
Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence §§ 1734-35 (14th ed. 1918). However, American courts
have been considerably less rigid in refusing relief from forfeiture in "collateral covenant" cases.
See 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 3.96; Annot., 69 L.R.A. 833, 853-58 (1906).
213. In the conduct restriction context.
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value bargained for under the lease, the question may then be asked:
What purpose are such powers to serve? An obvious possibility is that
forfeiture powers are created to work as penalties, operating in terrorem against a tenant contemplating a default.
Although courts relieve against forfeitures both because they are
considered to be "merely security 21 4 and to be penalties, 21 s and
although the two functions often overlap, they are different. As
security (e.g., for rent), forfeiture gives the landlord a collateral backup
in case the agreed performance fails; a penalty gives him only a
weapon to coerce the agreed performance itself. And whereas a
security is generally enforceable whenever necessary to protect the
interest secured, the enforcement of a penalty would raise rather
dramatically the issue of relative hardship. For a penalty, by definition, imposes a burden which is disproportionate to the loss from the
breach which is penalized. 216 Indeed the whole idea that relative
hardship 2 17 should justify relief from forfeiture is at bottom a reflection
of the penalty nature of forfeitures. And courts have tended, for at
least three centuries, to view a landlord's forfeiture powers as being in
2 18
the nature of a penalty.
Most people, based on introspection and perhaps "common knowledge," would probably agree that the threat of eviction exerts a
deterrent effect on tenants who would violate their leases. Furthermore, it is probably fair to assume that landlords, when they think
about it, consider that their powers of forfeiture exert such a deterrent
effect. Indeed, if one may talk about the purpose of landlords in
inserting forfeiture provisions in leases, the purpose may probably be
said to be more to promote compliance than to supply a basis for
evicting violators. After all, a landlord gets no return from empty
apartments.
It may be speculated that the coercive effect of forfeitures, in
214.

See discussion in section lfl(B)(2)(c)(iii) supra.

215. See following discussion in this section.
216. H. McClintock, Equity § 32, at 81-82 (2d ed. 1948).
217. The reference here is to relative hardship of the remedy compared with the hardship to
others resulting from noncompliance. As is elsewhere pointed out, the relative hardship of
compliance (compared with the hardship resulting from noncompliance) presents an entirely
different set of questions. See note 315 infra.
218. See note 207 supra. More recent expressions of this tendency include Fly Hi Music Corp.
v. 645 Restaurant Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 302, 304-05, 314 N.Y.S.2d 735, 738 (N.Y. City Civ. CL
1970), aff'd mem., 71 Misc. 2d 302, 335 N.Y.S.2d 822 (App. T. 1972); SIC C.J.S. Landlord and
Tenant § 102 (1968); 2 J. Pomeroy, Equity § 459 (5th ed. 1941); 3 J. Story, Commentaries on
Equity Jurisprudence § 1732 (14th ed. 1918); Bentley, An Alternative Residential Lease, 74
Colum. L. Rev. 836, 847 (1974). For the observation that courts often fail to distinguish between
penalties and forfeitures, see Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 Cornell L.
Rev. 495, 515 (1962).
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addition to disproportionate hardship, accounts for a good deal of the
judicial indisposition towards enforcing them, even though damages or
injunctive relief may be by and large ineffective remedies. But on a
policy basis it would seem that it is not so much the coercion itself
which is objectionable but rather the disproportionate hardship involved in the coercion. 21 9 That is, deterring people from breaching
their agreements is not per se objectionable, but it becomes so if
accomplished through sanctions which are disproportionate to the
value of the agreement to be kept. 220 Thus, both law and equity will
allow compensation but both have long refused to aid in the enforcement of private penalties which overcompensate a promisee at the
expense of the promisor. 22 1 Powers of forfeiture, which can be easily
seen as being essentially overcompensation, would thus seem to be
appropriately subject to the same refusal even if they had no coercive
effect at all.
However, consistent with the penalty-as-coercion view, relief from
forfeiture may be denied despite disproportionate hardship where the
"willful," 22 2 in "bad faith , 2 23 or the result of
tenant's breach has'2been
"gross negligence. 24 In England, in reaction to early generosity in

relieving against forfeiture, 225 it became established that, except in
nonpayment cases, relief could be granted to the tenant only in cases of
breach due to "fraud, accident, surprise, or mistake, '22 6 a rule which
also acquired a following in some American jurisdictions. 227 The result
219. After all, an important function of agreements, and perhaps the most important, Is to
serve as a lever for interparty adjustments. See Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in
Perspective, 40 Yale L.J. 704, 706, 716-26 (1931).
220. Implicit in this statement is the assumption that the objects of the agreement to be
performed do not make the agreement itself one which, from a policy viewpoint, the courts are
reluctant to enforce. See section III(D)(2) infra. Traditionally, agreements restricting the use of
land are viewed with considerable disfavor by the courts. See notes 23 & 25 supra. Thus, disfavor
of conduct restrictions themselves, together with a distaste for the mechanism selected to induce
performance, has in itself provided a double reason for refusing enforcement via forfeiture in the
usual case.
221. Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 Cornell L. Rev. 495, 499-514
(1962).
222. E.g., Bonfils v. Ledoux, 266 F. 507, 511 (8th Cir. 1920); Dreisonstok v. Dworman Bldg.
Corp., 264 Md. 50, 284 A.2d 400 (1971); Darvirris v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 235
Mass. 76, 126 N.E. 382 (1920); Bernstein v. Bernstein, 214 App. Div. 790, 210 N.Y.S. 539, 541
(2d Dep't 1925), aff'd per curiam, 243 N.Y. 559, 154 N.E. 604 (1926).
223. E.g., Blue Ridge Metal Mfg. Co. v. Proctor, 327 Pa. 424, 194 A. 559 (1937).
224. E.g., Kann v. King, 204 U.S. 43, 58-61 (1907).
225. See note 207 supra.
1150, at 621 n.(e) (3d ed. 1956).
226. 14 Halsbury's Laws of England
227. E.g., Thomas v. Given, 75 Ariz. 68, 251 P.2d 887 (1952); Finkovitch v. Cline, 236
Mass. 196, 128 N.E. 12 (1920); Baxter v. Lansing, 7 Palge 350 (N.Y. Ch. 1838); Henry v.
Tupper, 29 Vt. 358 (1857).
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is a policy which, by its exceptions, implicitly recognizes the deterrence
flavor of forfeiture but which permits a very free imposition of the
"penalty" nonetheless.
Given the definite penal aspect of lease forfeitures, it may be asked
why courts enforce them at all.
One reason may be historical. By the time equity began relieving
against forfeitures (beginning with mortgages), the concept of defeasible estates may simply have been too well entrenched 28 to permit a
general prohibition on them.
There are, however, important policy reasons for enforcing forfeitures as well. Defeasance for certain acts, e.g., committing waste, may
be the only practical way to protect a future interest holder from the
acts' adverse consequences. The same may be said of defeasance
conditioned on activities which many may find objectionable but
against which the ordinary remedies of law and equity do not effectively protect.2 29 In eliminating such objectionable conduct, forfeiture
may operate penally, both in terms of its coercive effect and of the
disproportionate burden which it imposes on the evicted violator. But
the only alternative to permitting the use of the forfeiture mechanism
for protection may be to license the objectionable conduct uncondi230
tionally.
Finally, though, the question may be appropriately asked whether in
the conduct or use restriction context it is proper to treat forfeitures as
penalties at all.
Like security, a private penalty is a secondary right which is
bargained for, not for its own sake, but in order to help assure
protection of some other primary value. In the case of conduct
restrictions, the primary value so protected would be the tenants'
conformity to conduct standards designed to promote a desired intrabuilding environmental condition or character. By deterring noncompliance, a penalty (or more precisely, its threat) can promote the
achievement of this primary value.
However, it does not follow that a power of forfeiture is merely a
penalty in the sense of a secondary right bargained for only to help
assure some other value which is primary. The power of forfeiture may
be viewed as being itself a primary value, bargained for as an
alternative, similar to a commercial-lease termination clause. 2 3 1
228. Conditions on the continuation of estates apparently date back to the year 1250 and
before. See Bordwell, The Common Law Scheme of Estates, 18 Iowa L. Rev. 425, 441 (1933).
229. See section III(B)(1) supra.
230. Assuming that neither damages nor injunctive relief offers effective or appropriate
recourse. See id.
231. For example, a dause calling for termination on sixty days notice, if the landlord should

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

Commercial-lease termination clauses take account of the fact that,
at the beginning of a long-term arrangement, it is sometimes impossible to predict accurately the future course of events. Accordingly, it is
logical to make a sort of prearrangement for rescission in case certain
events, anticipated but not necessarily expected, should arise, making
continuation of the basic arrangement undesirable to the party who
bargained for the right to rescind. This prearrangement for rescission
may be seen as precisely the function which forfeiture powers, tied to
conduct restrictions, serve. They are a solution to an otherwise insoluable problem of proximity.
The author has found no case which purports to treat commerciallease termination clauses as penal, probably because their operation is
usually triggered by events outside the tenant's control. 23 2 It is only
when the tenant's own acts can trigger the termination that the
resulting loss of possession can logically be considered a deterrent or

"penal.) 233

However, the possible deterrent effect of lease forfeiture powers tied
to conduct restrictions should not cause one to lose sight of the fact
that, like commercial-lease termination provisions, they also represent
a bargained-for alternative right. The alternatives are (i) continuation
of the landlord-tenant relationship so long as it is mutually satisfactory
as defined in the lease and (ii) termination of that relationship if, as
events develop, it turns out not to have been propitiously entered into
234
in the first place.

decide to sell the premises or if some other unanticipated commercial contingency should occur. It
has been said that such a clause creates "a tenancy for years with a special limitation" (Indian
Ref. Co. v. Roberts, 97 Ind. App. 615, 634, 181 N.E. 283, 290 (1932)) and such clauses seem to
receive routine enforcement (2 R. Powell, Real Property 245[l] (Supp. 1975). See also Cleveland
Wrecking Co. v. Aetna Oil Co., 287 Ky. 542, 154 S.W.2d 31 (1941); Acme Mkts., Inc. v.
Dawson Enterprises, Inc., 253 Md. 76, 251 A.2d 839 (1969); IA A. Corbin, Contracts § 265
(1963); 1 Tiffany, supra note 17, § 149).
232. See Sabinson v. Jelin Prods., Inc., 55 N.Y.S.2d 851, 853 (Sup. Ct. 1945) ("The
[termination] agreement did not provide fora forfeiture.'). But cf. Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 120
N.J. Super. 357, 294 A.2d 253 (Super. Ct. 1972), modified, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974) (termination of gas station franchise); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Lione,
66 Misc. 2d 599, 322 N.Y.S.2d 82 (Dist. Ct. 1971).
233. In the commercial-lease termination situation, it does not make sense to say that the
tenant is being "punished" (although he may be greatly inconvenienced) for the external events
triggering termination; it is only in the conduct related forfeiture case that the tenant is in a sense
punished by the forfeiture-in the sense that it at least may have once been in the tenant's power
to avoid the forfeiture triggering conduct. But the fact that the tenant could have avoided the loss
of possession by simply doing what he said he would do (as one of the inducing factors to the
lease), seems if anything to give even more reason for routine enforcement of conduct related lease
forfeitures, in the manner of commercial-lease terminations. At least it would not follow that the
enforcement of such forfeitures should, in the manner of ordinary penalties, be limited to cases
where the degree of harm done or guilt justifies the punishment.
234. It may be objected that, in the typical residential form lease, only the landlord has the
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In any event, to deny effective enforcement of landlord-imposed
conduct restrictions prevents the landlord from giving his tenants legal
protection for the environmental benefits which, among other things,
may have induced the tenants to enter into their leases. The landlord
can offer the tenant legal protection against wrongdoers' interferences
with the physical benefits offered in exchange for the rent, including
benefits (e.g., air conditioning) which the tenant is not entitled to as a
matter of law. There appears to be no reason in principle why the
landlord should not likewise be able to offer effective protection for
psychic benefits (e.g., a tasteful setting or freedom from neighboring
23
piano players) which the law does not obligate the landlord to give. "
Moreover the fact that the lease may not legally require the landlord to
supply the particular benefit or protection does not suggest in any way
that he should not be permitted to supply both the benefit and the
protection if he so desires. However, whenever conduct restrictions are
not effectively enforced, the result may be to prevent the landlord from
assuring his tenants important benefits which attracted them to the
building in the first place.
The only practical alternative for tenants denied such benefits (but
who desire to have them) may be to move to another building, one
having conditions or character better suited to their needs. Again,
though, absent legal protection of such benefits, the new building may
itself become unsuitable, requiring another move, ad inzfinitum. And to
the extent that tenant conduct restrictions cannot be effectively enforced, it is entirely likely that any new building which appears at first
to be suitable will, eventually, become unsuitable, since there would
be little legal deterrence to prevent prospective tenants, who plan to
violate the conduct restrictions, from moving in.
If a competition between irreconcilable interests cannot be resolved
without hardship to somebody, and if forfeiture resolves that competition with the least overall hardship, then the hardship which forfeiture
does cause should be disregarded. To do otherwise 23 6 would be to
deprive others (neighboring tenants and derivatively the landlord) of
power to terminate the relationship when it turns out not to have been propitiously entered into.
But this is beside the point. Whether or not a bargain is fair is not measured solely by the degree
of identity (or content reciprocity) of its terms. Beyond this, it may be added that the applicability
of the implied warranty of habitability may well make the power of termination "mutual,"
whether the lease says so or not. See section MI(A)(3) supra.
235. Courts have occasionally recognized that a landlord should be permitted to impose

restrictions which protect only psychic benefits, and to have enforcement by forfeiture. Finkovitch v. Cline, 236 Mass. 196, 128 N.E. 12 (1920). See also Cooley v. Bettigole, 301 N.E.2d
872 (Mass. App. 1973) (signs); Triangle Management Corp. v. Inniss, 62 Misc 2d 1095, 312
N.Y.S.2d 745 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1970).
236. In the absence of adequate substitute remedies. See section IU(B)(l) supra.
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benefits which the landlord bargained for in the lease-benefits which
the breaching tenant agreed to provide. Instead of having the intended
benefit of being either free of or rid of objectionable neighbors, the
beneficiaries of the conduct restrictions would be required either to
suffer the annoyance or move out themselves. 237 Thus, in refusing to
enforce a forfeiture on grounds resembling disproportionate hardship,
that "the punishment [should] fit the crime," 238 the court would be
virtually licensing the nonperformance of both parts of a two-part
promise, viz., that the defaulting tenant comply with certain restrictions and that his possession should terminate in the event of noncompliance. If neighbors feel compelled to move away from a violator's annoyances, the persons to be protected by the first part of the
promise would, in effect, end up suffering the punishment prescribed
by the second. In any event, the neighbors would suffer some punishment due to the breach.
Due to the fact that, given a substantial noncompensable breach, the
neighbors would almost inevitably suffer some punishment in any
event, there are good reasons for disregarding the hardship which
forfeiture does cause, even if it may be disproportionate. This is
because, as will be developed more fully in a later section, 2 39 there is
simply no way of measuring whether the relative hardship to the
tenant facing eviction exceeds the burdens of his noncompliance on the
neighbors whom he has annoyed. Certainly, in determining relative
hardship, the interests of all affected parties should be taken into
account, and the hardships should be weighed not only in terms of
their individual burdens but also in terms of the numbers of people on
whom the burdens fall. This suggests in itself that on balance the
relative hardship will probably be greater in aggregate for the
neighboring tenants (if only because of their usually greater number)
thus favoring enforcement of the forfeiture. But there is no way to be
sure. In this relativistic morass of multilateral comparative hardships,
the only island of certainty is the offending tenant's two-part
agreement-to comply or to leave. The enforcement of this agreement
according to its terms would be, it is submitted, the only way to assure
"just" results in the usual case, where the burdens of noncompliance
fall on many. And this is so even though, in extraordinary cases, such
enforcement may work injustice to a tenant whose substantial noncompensable breach did not bother the neighbors enough
to make them
24 0
wish that they did not have to put up with it.
237.
238.

Or, in the landlord's case, sell out.
Fly Hi Music Corp. v. 645 Restaurant Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 302, 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d 735,

738 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1970), aff'd mer., 71 Misc. 2d 302, 335 N.Y.S.2d 822 (App. T. 1972).

239.
240.

See section III(D) infra.
It may also be argued that relative hardship is an inappropriate basis for relieving
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Thus, it is suggested that the irony of punishing the protected may
be avoided only by frankly recognizing forfeiture provisions not as
being penalties, or relative hardship cases, but rather as being
bargained-for alternatives-analogous to commercial-lease termination
clauses. Despite the deterrent effect of such powers, they also serve as
an important bargained-for alternative right to get out of an arrangement gone sour.
d.

Conditional Stays to Mitigate the Harshness of Forfeiture

Although forfeiture may be the least harsh remedy when all of the
relevant interests, including the neighbors', are taken into account,
forfeiture remains a harsh remedy nonetheless. It may not involve the
futility (and consequent unfairness to the protected parties) of the
damage remedy or of the injunction-without-contempt remedy; nor
does it involve the potentially extreme harshness of civil contempt, if
that were to follow a violation of an injunction. But even though
forfeiture may be the best solution to a difficult problem of incompatibility, it is still a bad solution.
However, much of the harshness of forfeiture could be eliminated,
while preserving most of its benefits, if court-ordered evictions were
not absolute in their terms but rather were conditional upon the
tenant's future failure to comply with the lease. Courts have frequently
used this technique to avoid forfeitures, typically by staying the order
of eviction for, say, thirty days and providing for dismissal of the
landlord's dispossess, action if the tenant ceases within that time to be
in default.24 1 Of course, such conditional stays can be effective only to
forfeitures because a full quid pro quo for the potential inconvenience of a forfeiture is implicit in
the rental level (or some other landlord-provided consideration) prescribed in the lease. Undoubtedly, in intelligently negotiated commercial leases, the landlord's retention of a termination
right is a factor bearing on the rent which he can require. In the case of residential leases,
particularly in a tight housing market, the presence of consideration in this form may be seen as
being far more problematical. But even in a tight housing market, a tenant could undoubtedly
find a landlord who would forego his forfeiture powers provided that the tenant agreed to a high
enough rental. In this sense, paying only the market rental for the standard market lease (i.e., one
which provides for forfeiture) can be said to be a way of receiving consideration in exchange for
the forfeiture power.
241. E.g., Interstate Restaurants, Inc. v. Halsa Corp., 309 A.2d 108 (D.C. CL App. 1973);
930 Fifth Corp. v. King, 40 App. Div. 2d 140, 338 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1st Dep't 1972); Southbridge
Towers, Inc. v. Rovics, 76 Misc. 2d 396, 350 N.Y.S.2d 62 (App. T. 1973); Lavanant v. Lovelace, 71 Misc. 2d 974, 337 N.Y.S.2d 962 (App. T. 1972), aff'd mem., 41 App. Div. 2d 905, 343
N.Y.S.2d 559 (1st Dep't 1973); 30-88 Steinway St., Inc. v. H.C. Bohack Co., 65 Misc. 2d 1076,
319 N.Y.S.2d 679 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1971), aff'd mem., 42 App. Div. 2d 577, 344 N.Y.S.2d
205 (2d Dep't 1973); Triangle Management Corp. v. Inniss, 62 Aisc. 2d 1095, 312 N.Y.S.2d 745
(N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1970); Trump Village Sec. 4, Inc. v. Cooper, 61 Mfisc. 2d 757, 306 N.Y.S.2d
759 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969), aff'd mem., 66 Misc. 2d 220, 319 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (App. T. 1971);
Mideast Holding Corp. v. Tow, 60 Misc. 2d 422, 302 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969).
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protect the landlord or others from the consequences of the tenant's
prospective defaults; there is no way the tenant can cure past conduct
defaults, and no remedy (except possibly damages) can do much about
those. However, as to future defaults, such conditional stays on
eviction can be enormously effective (if forfeiture is as harsh as
everyone says) and, after all, the incentive to assert a forfeiture can
only be to prevent the prospective consequences of default in any
event. 242

Under some circumstances (e.g., tenant is simply unable to comply), it
may not be appropriate to subject the forfeiture to a conditional stay.
But if the tenant's violation is of a conduct or activities restriction, and
if the tenant is not unable or unwilling to correct the violation as to the
future, then the ordering of an eviction subject to a conditional stay
would seem usually to be both appropriate and useful.
Nearly all of the cases which I have found using the conditional stay
technique have arisen in New York. Perhaps this is because, in other
jurisdictions, opinions are not so frequently reported in the trial level
cases in which such stays would be granted. Curiously, though, the
New York cases 243 appear to be directly contrary to a 1968 holding of

that state's highest court. 24 4 The Court of Appeals then held that once
24 5 it
the lease had terminated by operation of a conditional limitation,
could not be "revived" by the courts. Hence, said the court, the lower
court's attempted twenty day conditional stay of eviction was beyond
the courts' powers "absent a showing of fraud, mutual mistake or other
acceptable basis of reformation. '24 6 While this may now be New York
law 24 7 (albeit a rule which is largely ignored by the subordinate
courts2 4 8), it certainly is not a rule which traditional precedent would

have required.
The alleged difficulty with relieving against forfeitures framed as
conditional limitations (as opposed to those framed as conditions) is
242. Arguably, asserting forfeitures can also be motivated by a desire to deter pre-forfeiture
defaults on the part of other tenants. However, the routine granting of forfeiture subject to stays
would probably not undercut any such deterrent purpose, and such a purpose Is therefore an
irrelevant consideration here.
243. See examples cited in note 241 supra.
244. See First Nat'l Stores, Inc. v. Yellowstone Shopping Center, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 630, 237
N.E.2d 868, 290 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1968).
245. For the distinction between conditions and conditional limitations, see note 118 supra.
246. 21 N.Y.2d at 637, 237 N.E.2d at 870-71, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
247. The rule was recognized but distinguished unconvincingly in Lewis v. Clothes Shack,
Inc., 67 Misc. 2d 621, 322 N.Y.S.2d 738 (App. T. 1971) and Fly Hi Music Corp. v. 645
Restaurant Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 302, 314 N.Y.S.2d 735 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1970), aff'd mem., 71
Misc. 2d 302, 335 N.Y.S.2d 822 (App. T. 1972), and it was sidestepped in 57 E. 54 Realty Corp.
v. Gay Nineties Realty Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 353, 335 N.Y.S.2d 872 (App. T. 1972).

248.

See cases cited in note 241 supra.
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that, by operation of the conditional limitation, the lease will always
have already been terminated "automatically" before the case even
comes to court. 24 9 There is nothing left for equity to save. However,
courts exercising equitable jurisdiction have historically relieved
against forfeitures despite the fact that the lease and the tenant's
interest had been quite terminated before reaching the court.25s To
prevent the forfeiture effect, the landlord was simply required to grant
a new lease for the remainder of the old term.2 s I And in relieving
against forfeiture, equity could of course impose equitable conditions
on its relief,2 52 hence the validity of conditional stays on eviction. In
sum, there appears to be no historical or theoretical objection (outside
of states like New York) to conditional stays of eviction in order to
give the tenant a chance to cease his default and return to good
standing under his lease.
Moreover, the granting of such conditional stays on eviction seems
eminently sensible. It gives both the landlord and the tenant (to say
nothing of the neighbors) an opportunity to establish a satisfactory
mutual arrangement such as was presumably contemplated in the first
place. It avoids unnecessary dislocations of tenants who may have
been objectionable but are willing to try to get along, and it still
permits the landlord and the neighbors to be free of a tenant who
simply refuses to conduct himself in a non-bothersome manner.
Moreover, despite the fact that courts sometimes say they prefer
injunction as a less harsh alternative than forfeiture, 25 3 the fact is that
the granting of forfeiture subject to a conditional stay is actually better
suited than injunctive relief to attaining the agreed protection objectives with minimum hardship. All that the landlord or neighbors
presumably want from a noncomplying tenant is either for him to
comply in the future or to leave. Nobody wants him to be held in civil
contempt or, worse, in jail (assuming it could come to that 2S4). Thus,
249. See note 118 supra; Beach v. Nixon, 9 N.Y. 35, 36 (1853); Burnee Corp. v. Uneeda Pure
Orange Drink Co., 132 Misc. 435, 230 N.Y.S. 239 (App. T. 1928). See also Jabbour Bros. v.
Hartsook, 131 Va. 176, 185, 108 S.E. 684, 686-87 (1921); Niles, Conditional Limitations in
Leases in New York, 11 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 15 (1933).
250. E.g., Taylor v. Knight, 22 Eng. Rep. 208 (Ch. 1725); cf. Dendy v. Evans, [1910] 1 K.B.
263, 266-67. See also 3 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence § 1736 (lAth ed. 1918);
16 Halsbury's Laws of England
1447 (4th ed. 1976).
251. Id.
252. See Howard D. Johnson Co. v. Madigan, 361 Mass. 454, 280 N.E.2d 689 (1972). See
also 930 Fifth Corp. v. King, 40 App. Div. 2d 140, 338 N.Y.S.2d 773 (lst Dep't 1972).
253. Cf. note 315 infra.
254. Of course, it is almost unimaginable that, for default under a lease, even in violation of
an injunction, a tenant would be sent to civil jail like a common alimony dodger. This is precisely
the problem with injunctive relief: the threat is so drastic that it does not seem (and, hopefully, is
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forfeiture subject to a conditional stay is not only logical (in that it
gives the aggrieved parties the alternatives they really want) but it is
far more "reasonable" than the injunctive relief alternative as a remedy
for disturbing tenant conduct.
In conclusion, where the possibility exists for enforcing an asserted
forfeiture subject to a conditional stay to cure (and the possibility
would almost always exist in cases of conduct or activities defaults),
forfeiture would seem to be the best of possible remedies for a situation
where no remedy is perfect. But, it should be added, even if it is not
possible or appropriate to grant forfeiture subject to such a conditional
stay, 255 forfeiture may still, as previously argued, be the remedy of
choice.
C.

Objective Standards

In the absence of an agreement imposing limitations upon tenant
conduct, the only applicable limitations would of course be those
imposed by law. As has already been observed, 2 6 such limitations
include those imposed by the doctrines of waste, nuisance and negligence, and by the substantive law of torts generally; to these might be
added limitations imposed by the statutory law, especially the criminal
law.
However, if the landlord is to enforce any of these limitations, he
must generally do so in reliance upon special lease provisions conferring him with standing to complain. 25 7 Furthermore, if he is to enforce
these limitations effectively, he must probably have a power of forfeiture, which must also be provided for in the lease. 258 Yet, even with
standing to complain and a power of forfeiture at his disposal, the
landlord may still find it difficult to efficiently enforce even the
law-imposed limitations on tenant conduct. This difficulty will arise
because the law-imposed standards-especially those based on waste,
nuisance or negligence doctrines-are too imprecise in their formulation and too unpredictable in their application to permit anything like
efficient, low cost enforcement. 25 9 The subjectivity of these standards
may mean that no enforcement at all is feasible where, as is characnot) real. Incidentally, no cases reporting the incarceration of recalcitrant tenants have been
found.
255. Perhaps particularly so if the objectionable tenant's recalcitrance is the cause of the
inappropriateness.
256.

See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.

257. Except, of course, the landlord always has standing to sue for waste, and he would have
standing to sue for negligence whenever the duty of care was owed to him.
258. See section III(B) supra. See generally section 111(A) supra.
259. See notes 38 supra, 260-62 infra and text accompanying notes 264-75 infra.
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teristic in the residential landlord-tenant context, dollar amounts are
relatively small and the relevant factual backgrounds of the cases are
not, as an evidentiary matter, always so clear-cut or easy to elucidate.
Consequently, lease provisions concerning tenant conduct can increase
protection in a third important way: by providing objective standards
of conduct, susceptible to easier proof of noncompliance, in place of (or
in addition to) the subjective and relativistic standards of tort law.
The formulations of the substantive tort norms, such as those
regarding nuisance and waste, are unsuitably vague to serve as standards for most specific landlord-tenant relationships precisely because
they are designed rather to serve the broad generality of cases. Since
the many particular fact-situations cannot be predicted, the law of
torts must be flexible, for it could not possibly prescribe the precise
behavioral requirements which are to be applicable in particular cases.
Thus, the conduct which constitutes a nuisance,2 60 negligence2 6 1 or
260. As used here and throughout this Article, the word nuisance refers to those wrongs
consisting of substantial invasions of another's property interest in the private use and enjoyment
of his land. See Restatement of Torts § 822 (1939). Although it is probably impossible to arrive at
any precise definition of nuisance, or even of so-called private nuisance (see W. Prosser, Torts
§§ 86-87, 89 (4th ed. 1971); 1 F. Harper & F. James, Torts § 1.23 (1956)), the sort of wrongs here
under discussion may be broadly described as "a condition.., maintained on one property which
is an illegal burden or servitude upon another." Zamzok v. 650 Park Ave. Corp., 80 Misc. 2d
573, 576, 363 N.Y.S.2d 868, 873 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
In order for the complained of activities to constitute actionable nuisance, there must be a
"substantial" interference with the quiet enjoyment of the complainant's interest as a consequence
of such acts. Restatement of Torts § 822 (1939); 6A Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, §§ 28.22, 28.25.
Furthermore, even if the invasion of the interest in question is intentional, to be actionable it
must also be "unreasonable." Restatement of Torts §§ 826-31 (1939); 6A Am. L. Prop., supra note
3, §§ 28.25-.28.
The two key prerequisites of nuisance (substantial interference and unreasonableness) are
deliberately imprecise in their content; whether or not there is a nuisance in a particular instance
"must be determined by reference to all the conditions of the parties, the circumstances of the
situation, and the balancing of advantages and disadvantages incident to the defendant's conduct
for all concerned." 1 F. Harper & F. James, supra, § 1.24, at 71. Thus, activities otherwise
lawful may be a nuisance if performed in an inappropriate location or if the resultant harm could
have been more effectively avoided (6A Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 28.26); and even intentional invasions of another's use and enjoyment may be privileged if the utility of the harmful activity
outweighs the gravity of the harm done. Restatement of Torts § 826 (1939).
The precise behavioral requirements of the norms of nuisance are in fact probably the least
predictable of all the subdivisions of torts; for not only are the defendant's conduct, situation, and
knowledge taken into account, but also unknown (and unknowable) factors concerning the
plaintiff and the public at large can weigh heavily or decisively in the relativistic analysis. The
relevance of so many factors in the balancing process can make convincing proof of nuisance a
somewhat difficult and tedious process.
261. The formulaic definition of negligence, designed to account for the "infinite variety of
situations which may arise," is hardly unique in its application to the property context and need
not be recounted here. See W. Prosser, Torts § 32, at 150 (4th ed. 1971). Assuming damages are
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waste 26 2 is necessarily relative and circumstantially determined. The
relativism of circumstances lies at the heart of the fundamental question of whether or not the defendant breached or even owed a duty to
the plaintiff. The words which define the standards themselves provide only the roughest sort of guidance.
However, for a landlord seeking to protect his own genuine interests
and those of neighboring tenants, reliance on relativistic tort standards
is neither desirable nor necessary. The prospective relation between a
given landlord and a given tenant does not present the wide variety of
possible circumstances that indicates the need for a flexible standard.
Rather, the kinds of problems likely to arise in a given landlord-tenant
relationship may be predicted with a fair degree of accuracy, and the
behavioral norms appropriate to deal with (or forestall) those problems
may be readily prescribed in the lease. The uncertainty of the standards which results under relativistic tort analysis, an uncertainty
which invites litigation, may thus be replaced by lease-prescribed
objective standards of greater specificity and susceptible to easier
determinations of compliance or noncompliance. It263is indeed a function
of written agreements to supply such certainty.

The need for objective standards is particularly acute in the case of
conduct of a nuisance-like nature. Reference has already been made to
the difficulties involved in proving actionable nuisance, resulting from
the fact that the definition of nuisance is couched in necessarily
proven, the three key elements of negligence liability-that the defendant had a duty, that the
duty was breached (failure to use reasonable care) and that the breach was the proximate cause of
the injury-are all, of course, circumstantially determined. And how much care is "reasonable
care" is relative, depending on the degree of risk involved, gravity of possible harm, etc. The
precise behavioral norms of negligence law are perhaps more predictable than those of nuisance,
but they too are often unpredictable, and the results of the circumstantial and relativistic analysis
are often open to controversy. Compare majority with dissenting opinion in Samson v. Saginaw
Professional Bldg., Inc., 393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975).
262. Although it is generally true that any destructive acts of a tenant are actionable as waste,
at least if the damage is substantial, in the case of ameliorative waste-modifications which
arguably improve the value of the premises-the analysis in modern cases is becoming more and
more relativistic and circumstance-oriented. See Crewe Corp. v. Feiler, 28 N.J. 316, 146 A.2d
458 (1958); 5 Powell, supra note 24,
640; 5 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 20.11;
Niehuss, Alteration or Replacement of Buildings by the Long-Term Lessee, 30 Mich. L. Rev, 386
(1932). The length of the lease, the materiality of the modification, the anticipation of obsolescence and the probable intent of the parties all may enter into the determination of whether
particular "improvements" do or do not constitute waste. Id. Thus, with waste, as with nuisance
and negligence, the precise norms are circumstantially determined and it may often be impossible
to reliably predict whether any particular effect on the premises is or is not waste.
263. Trump Village Sec. 4, Inc. v. Cooper, 61 Misc. 2d 757, 759-60, 306 N.Y.S.2d 759,
762-63 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969), aff'd mem., 66 Misc. 2d 220, 319 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (App. T.
1971). See also Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
Colum. L. Rev. 629, 631-32 (1943).
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imprecise terms. 264 However, in the offensive tenant context, where
the injuries are more likely to be psychic than monetary, the most
formidable problem may be showing that the persons affected by the
nuisance are not simply hypersensitive or idiosyncratic. For the law of
nuisance does not protect against every discomfort caused by a
neighbor's acts, but only against those which would cause annoyance,
inconvenience or offense to a person having "ordinary sensibilities"
265
and tastes.
There is, as might be expected, no little difficulty in determining
from the cases exactly what is unbearable to an ordinarily sensitive
person and what, on the other hand, would be objectionable only to
the hypersensitive. For example, music produced by highly skilled
26 6
musicians may be sufficiently objectionable to constitute a nuisance.
At the same time, the apprehension of immolation, caused by sparking
trains passing a nearby fuel dump, apparently is not. 267 Still, conduct
inducing an unfounded fear may be a nuisance. 2 68 Obnoxious odors
may 2 6 9 or may not 2 70 be sufficiently disturbing to constitute a nuisance. Proving noise as a nuisance seems to involve particular difficulties, probably because almost all human activities produce some noise
and must, to a degree, be tolerated. However, for a residential tenant,
a tinsmith next door may be adequate cause for complaint, though an
all-night rumbling from above, 2 7 1 a whirring sewing machine or "the
discord of ill-played music" is not adequate cause 2 7 2 -even if the
"music" is played twelve hours per day27 3 or is the work of an amateur
drummer. 274 It has been suggested that, to constitute a nuisance, the
264. See note 260 supra.
265. See Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 488-89, 104 N.E. 371, 373 (1914),
quoted in 1 F. Harper & F. James, Torts § 1.25, at 75 (1956). See also Rogers v. Elliott, 146
Mass. 349, 15 N.E. 768 (1888); Krocker v. Westmoreland Planing Mill Co., 274 Pa. 143, 117 A.
669 (1922); 6A Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 28.25; J. & H. Joyce, Nuisances § 20 (1906); W.

Prosser, Torts § 87, at 577-78 (4th ed. 1971).
266. Meadowbrook Swimming Club, Inc. v. Albert, 173 Md. 641, 197 A. 146 (1938).
267. Harper v. Standard Oil Co., 78 Mo. App. 338 (1899). But see Hendrickson v. Standard
Oil Co., 126 Md. 577, 95 A. 153 (1915).
268. Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 111 P. 879 (1910).

269. Washington Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Albrecht, 157 Md. 389, 146 A. 233 (1929); Taylor
v. Mayor & Council, 130 Md. 133, 99 A. 900 (1917) (distinguishes nuisance from takings in

eminent domain).
270.

Wade v. Miller, 188 Mass. 6, 73 N.E. 849 (1905).

271. See Pool v. Higginson, 8 Daly 113 (N.Y.C.P. 1878).
272. Id. at 117-18. But recall that well played music may be a nuisance. See text accompanying note 266 supra.

273. Twin Elm Management Corp. v. Banks, 181 Misc. 96, 46 N.Y.S.2d 952 (N.Y. City
Mun. Ct. 1943). The court admitted that hearing the practicing may have been "nerve racking."
Id. at 97, 46 N.Y.S.2d at 953.

274.

Douglas L. Elliman & Co. v. Karlsen, 59 Misc. 2d 243, 298 N.Y.S.2d 594 (N.Y. City
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noise must be of such a character as to produce actual physical
discomfort to persons of ordinary sensibilities. 2 7 What that may
mean, short of convulsions or worse, is left (like most of the law of
nuisance) to judicial discretion.
As may be deduced from the foregoing, the inherent practical
problems of proof and advocacy must substantially diminish the
likelihood that anyone would bring a nuisance action, much less win
it. This alone would motivate landlords to provide for restrictions on
nuisance-like conduct which are better defined than the relativistic
rules which the law supplies. But it is the facilitation of out-of-court
resolutions of tenant conduct disputes which is probably the greatest
contribution made by objectively worded, lease-contained supplements
to the law of nuisance.
By having in the lease a set of clearly delineated standards, which
can be pointed to in the event of controversy, many or most tenant
conduct disputes can probably be resolved simply by negotiation with
the offending tenant. 2 76 This may be especially true where the viola-

tion occurs as a result of a mistake or a misunderstanding. Moreover,
if the objective wording of a restriction on nuisance-like conduct
makes obtaining judicial enforcement easier and more certain, the
mere prospect of judicial enforcement may well exert a back-pressure
on the compliance negotiations with the offending tenant, and it may
thereby make actual resort to the courts unnecessary. By contrast, a
flexible conduct standard (e.g., nuisance), offers the offending tenant
greater promise of opportunities to delay or frustrate enforcement, or
to escape it entirely. The harder and more uncertain the judicial
enforcement, the less credible is its threat. On the other hand, if it is
easy to show (to the tenant or, eventually, to the court) that the tenant
has not complied with a specifically worded rule, the offending tenant
should have little incentive to actually force a showdown in the court
before agreeing to comply.
Civ. Ct. 1969) (wall-piercing drum beats). For a further discussion and a more complete catalogue
of cases, see 1 F. Harper & F. James, Torts § 1.25, at 74-77 (1956).
275. Meadowbrook Swimming Club, Inc. v. Albert, 173 Md. 641, 197 A. 146 (1938). As a
more objective test of whether the conduct complained of affects persons of ordinary sensibilities,
one might suppose that the effect of the conduct on the market value of the premises might
control: the predilections of the fastidious few should hardly have a significant market impact,
whereas a substantial depressive effect on value would signify that, in objective contemplation,
the conduct oversteps the bounds of what is bearable. Some courts have indicated the relevance
of impact on market value (Tortorella v. H. Traiser & Co., 284 Mass. 497, 188 N.E. 254 (1933);
Weakley v. Page, 102 Tenn. 178, 53 S.W. 551 (1899)) but it has also been said that the
diminution of market value of adjacent property does not itself make objectionable conduct a
nuisance (Stotler v. Rochelle, 83 Kan. 86, 89, 109 P. 788, 789 (1910)).
276. See Note, Restrictive Regulations in Wisconsin Summer Colony Land Conveyances,
1950 Wis. L. Rev. 709.

1976]

LANDLORD CONTROL OF TENANTS

Thus, even if lease-contained conduct restrictions do nothing more
than supply objective content to the norms of nuisance, they may be
valuable or even practically indispensable to administrative efficiency
in controlling offensive tenant conduct.
D.

Protection of "Special" Concers

The discussion thus far has focused on improving upon the protections supplied by law through agreements that provide for standing,
remedies and better defined conduct norms but without (theoretically
at least) imposing any greater restrictions on tenant activities than are
already implicit in the law. However, the activity restrictions already
implicit in tort law may themselves be inadequate to serve the landlord's purpose of protecting himself and his tenants from possible
objectionable conduct on the part of other tenants. 2 77 People may wish
to live in a building where no one practices musical instruments, or
where no one operates a television or stereo so it is audible by others,
or where there are no dogs, or no children or no residents less than
forty years of age. Indeed, every case in nuisance which is lost on the
grounds that there was no nuisance may be considered to represent a
case of "special" concern.
Merely because such concerns are not protected by law, it does not
follow that they are not real, and are not sought after. Thus, for his
particularcase, the landlord may seek to improve upon the generalized
balance and protections of tort law by obtaining agreements from
tenants to observe even stricter standards, involving even greater
restrictions on activities, than the law would otherwise impose. That
is, the landlord may seek to protect special concerns of his own or of
the greater number of his tenants, for which the law of torts, with its
generalized assumptions concerning "normal" factual contexts and
values, provides no protection. It is a normal function of contracts to
provide a legal basis for such additional protections.2 7 8 And it is a
normal function of leases2 7 9 to serve as the vehicle for gaining special
277. As previously observed (see text accompanying notes 26-33 supra), tort law may leave
special concerns unprotected because (i) tort rules necessarily can reflect only a generalized
balance between protecting activities on one hand and protecting others from the impact of
activities on the other, and (ii) the balance subsumed in tort law as desirable is a societally
determined function of the relative values placed by society, not by specific individuals, on the
interests (freedom, protection from activities) which are involved.
278. As one court has said: "Sensitive persons who would shield themselves from contact with
disagreeable neighbors should either move out, or protect themselves by covenant." Miles v.
Lauraine, 99 Ga. 402, 405, 27 S.E. 739, 740 (1896); accord, Lyon v. Bethlehem Eng'r Corp., 253
N.Y. ill, 170 N.E. 512 (1930).

279. In addition to provisions for stricter conduct standards contained in leases themselves,
landlords often adopt "rules and regulations" for tenants, dehors the lease, but pursuant to a
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protections desired by a landlord for himself and for the greater
number of his tenants.
Attempts by landlords to impose conduct (or similar) standards
which are stricter than the law raises a potential for emotionally felt
objection and controversy not present where the landlord has merely
bargained for standing, remedies or better defined conduct standards.
Stricter-than-law standards imposed in a lease will expand the scope of
what is wrongful and thereby diminish legal freedom; such standards
do not, unlike standing, remedies and better definitions, merely increase the chances or consequences of the "come-uppances" which may
traditionally recognized lawaccrue to the tenant for transgressing
28 0
imposed freedom limitations.

Moreover, stricter-than-law conduct norms in a lease are suspect as
a sort of private legislation. If freely consented to by all concerned,
private lawmaking for private relations should usually be unobjectionable; 28 1 but if behavioral norms are de facto unilaterally imposed-by
landlord on tenant-the effect is antagonistic to the aims and assumptions of an egalitarian society. When personal freedom to act is
curtailed by adhesion contracts, the call for intensive scrutiny seems
even more compelling.
In considering whether the law should lend its support to landlords'
attempts to improve on the protections which the law itself provides,
two questions must be faced squarely. Why should landlords be
permitted at all to prescribe tenant conduct standards which are
stricter than those imposed by the law itself? Secondly, assuming that
landlords should be afforded some power to prescribe tenant conduct
standards, what limitations should be placed on that power; that is,
what kinds of conduct standards should be legally impermissible and
hence invalid?
provision therein. See Luna Park Housing Corp. v. Besser, 38 App. Div. 2d 713, 329 N.Y.S.2d
332 (2d Dep't 1972); Bentley, An Alternative Residential Lease, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 836, 846-51
(1974); Berger, supra note 22, at 833. The former Article is especially critical of such rules.
280. Perhaps the chief virtue of making this distinction is to make clear that the concern of
protecting freedoms which may weigh against recognition of stricter standards should have no
relevance to the question of whether recognition should be accorded to contract-provided
standing, remedies or better defined standards. Admittedly, by making for more effective
enforcement, these tend to cause a diminution of freedom just as realistically as stricter standards
do. But contractions of actual freedom due to more efficient enforcement of existing legal
limitations should hardly be a cause for complaint-unless the non-redress of wrongs because of
administrative inefficiency is a value to be preserved.
281. "Les conventions 16galement formes tiennent lieu de loi h ceux qui les ont faites." C.
Civ. art. 1134(1) (75e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1975).
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1. Justifications for Norm Prescription by Landlords

In justifying stricter-than-law norm prescription by the landlord, it
is the starting assumption that most people would like to live in an
agreeable surrounding. 28 2 At the same time, the precise characteristics
and prerequisites which make living surroundings agreeable will, to
different people, vary as widely as the variations in the tastes, habits
and tolerance of the people themselves. Also to be taken into account is
the fact that perfection, in leasehold premises or anything else, is
seldom achievable or really expected. But incompatible factors can
coexist with overall agreeableness only to a limited (and, unfortunately, subjectively defined) extent. To what extent they can so coexist
is a function, in part, of the nature of the incompatible factors
themselves and, in part, of the sensitivity of the people in question.
People tend, in their day-to-day lives, to separate themselves from
disagreeable things and, one must assume, to separate themselves from
disagreeable people. 28 3 Thus, in renting an apartment, most people
will probably try to find a residential setting which they hope to be as
282. The focus of this Article is on residential leasehold tenancies; hence the following
discussion will be in terms of "living" in an agreeable surrounding. However, there is apparently
no authoritative basis for concluding that courts purport (for purposes presently discussed) to
apply any different set of standards when the tenant's contemplated purpose in leasing is
commercial rather than residential. Cf. Note, Commercial Versus Residential Leases: A New
Double Standard?, 35 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 901 (1974). The purpose of the tenancy seems to be at
most one of a number of relevant factors, and for this reason cases involving commercial
tenancies have been freely cited in this Article wherever believed to be relevant.
However, two factors present in commercial tenancies probably make the resolution of the
issues under discussion less difficult in the case of such tenancies than in the case of residential
tenancies.
First of all, when entering a commercial lease, the parties are probably more likely to
consciously try to anticipate how the intended use of the premises may affect the legitimate
interests of others. Thus, the terms of the lease (and, indeed, the decision to enter into it in the
first place) can reflect and forestall later controversies arising out of the tenant's activities on the
premises. Moreover, the greater likelihood that the commettidl lease will be preceded by real
give-and-take negotiations between the parties not only helps tb assure against the possibility of
surprise, it also justifies a more rigorous application of the standards of conduct finally agreed to.
Secondly, to a far greater extent than with commercial leaseholds, the imposition of conduct
standards in residential leases involves an impairment of personal freedom as distinguished from
commercial freedom. The burden of restrictions on a residential tenant does not lead to merely a
moderation of profit or a business inconvenience. Rather, it may impinge on the tenant's very
freedom in expressing and acting out his own personality. Since the impact of the burden is
personal and not merely monetary-since the tenant's personal freedom is at stake-it is perhaps
more difficult, psychologically if not logically, to countenance the imposition of the burden, even
when the competing interests (which also may be "personal') are clear.
283. It is not anticipated that anyone will contend that people generally seek out unpleasantness in preference to agreeableness, or that indifference is generally shown in this regard.
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compatible as possible with their psychic needs. In any event, it does
not seem farfetched to assume such tendencies exist as people deliberately avoid what they do not like, whether it be dogs, swinging singles,
the elderly, children or piano players. Moreover, it is probably likewise
true that people whose activities will have unavoidable spill-over
effects will tend to seek settings for their activities where the neighbors
will be more tolerant and less likely to cause trouble for them. The
result is a sort of self-segregation in which people having different
characteristics, activity objectives, sensibilities and tolerances adjust
their patterns of mutual proximity to maximize the environmental
28 4
agreeableness (or minimize the disagreeableness) to all.
Assuming that such a tendency to self-segregate does exist generally,
a heavy burden should lie on the person who would contend that the
values being sought in such self-segregation are not legitimate, or that
seeking these values should be condemned. 285 For example, some
people like dogs and some do not. Some people who have no dog do
not mind that their neighbors do have one. But it does not follow that
every apartment building should permit dogs. 286 Similarly, some
284. In a recent report financed by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, housing
shared by tenants of various ages and lifestyles was blamed for much of the increased vandalism,
muggings and burglaries in apartment complexes. N.Y. Times, July 19, 1976, at 42, col. 7. As a
partial solution to the crime problems, the author of the report, Oscar Newman, advocates that
multi-tenant buildings should be occupied by families that are as alike as possible. Furthermore,
"buildings should be designed to meet the needs of the particular types of occupants," (id.)
and presumably selection and control of the type of occupant should be legally permissible.
See generally 0. Newman, De~ign Guidelines for Creative Defensible Space (1975).
285. At the outset it should be emphasized, lest the thrust be misunderstood, that particular
types of self-segregation (e.g., based upon race or religion) must not and presumably will not be
condoned or supported. See section III(D)(2)(d) infra. To suggest that there are legitimate and
commonly sought after values in self-segregation is obviously not to suggest that these are the
only values to be sought or protected. It is not even to suggest that such values, relative to some
others, rank particularly high. See note 374 infra. On the other hand, just because the interest In
self-segregation may at times clash with other important policies, even the most paramount
policies (e.g., preservation of human dignity irrespective of race), it does not follow that seeking
the values inherent in self-segregation should be condemned even when no such clash is involved.
At the same time, only the utterly oblivious could ignore the potential of self-segregation, if not
subject to proper constraints, to defeat quite directly the national policy of promoting certain
types of integration (particularly racial), as developed during the last two decades. The matter is
reconsidered in greater detail in section III(D)(2)(d) infra. Suffice it to say for now, that (1)
whatever may be the heuristic function and effectiveness of law, the law must also deal with and
regulate existing behavioral patterns or else abandon some areas of human interchange to
self-help and random injustice pending the prospective utopia, and (2) supporting some types of
self-segregation while prohibiting and even punishing others should be no more difficult than,
say, limiting recoveries for mental distress to those who are entitled to such recoveries.
286. Blakely v. Housing Authority, 8 Wash. App. 204, 505 P.2d 151 (1973). See also Triangle
Management Corp. v. Inniss, 62 Misc. 2d 1095, 312 N.Y.S.2d 745 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1970).
Nor, most emphatically, does it follow that dog-owners who dislike other people's dogs ought to
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people like big parties, children, or hard rock music occasionally
played loudly; others do not. And some (perhaps most) who do not like
these things can nonetheless tolerate them. But even if these things are
not legal nuisances, it does not follow that they should be permissible
in every apartment building; it does not follow that those who find
these things intolerable should be permitted no escape.
Essentially, the protection of special concerns is the protection of
those who have particular sensitivities which others, in general, may
not share. It is, if you will, providing a home for the hypersensitive, a
place of resort for those who are ignored by the law of nuisance. 28 7 In
permitting and enforcing stricter-than-law conduct restrictions, we are
allowing even the hypersensitive to get away from what they do not
like. And because there are probably few who are not hypersensitive to
at least some acts of others, and given that attitudes as to what is
ordinarily

tolerable

changes

with the

times, 28 8

we

cannot un-

derestimate the importance of the values sought in self-segregation
simply because we do not always share the sensitivity of those seeking
escape from particular annoyances.
Although the values sought in self-segregation may be very important to those who seek them, the ease of protecting those values may
vary radically depending upon the circumstances. Compared with
patterns of residential housing, the seating arrangement on, say, a bus is
trivial and uninteresting. The physical mobility of all concerned
(coupled with the transitory nature of the whole affair) permits readjustment without much constraint on freedom or dislocation to any.
And so it is with most instances where the characteristics and conduct
of those in physical proximity play a role in an individual's internal
tranquility. But translated to congested rental housing or other more or
less permanent neighbor relationships, the interest in avoiding freedom
constraints or dislocation becomes so large as to offer serious competition to the interest in agreeable surroundings. In resolving this competition, there may inevitably have to be losers who lose much.
In the absence of prior agreements to resolve the competition, it will
have claim to a special privilege of keeping a dog. Still, it may be quite rational for an individual
to wish that such double-standards could apply for his own benefit; hence, it seems not
unreasonably cynical to assume that in many objectionable tenant cases, even the objectionable

tenant would desire the protection of the restriction were he on the receiving end of the annoying
activities.
287. As had been noted earlier, the law of nuisance seeks to protect only the interests of
persons having ordinary sensitivities (see text accompanying notes 265-75 supra) and does not
protect the hypersensitive or idiosyncratic.
288. The tolerability of smoking is a notable recent example of changing attitudes toward
what is ordinarily tolerable. The once prevalent attitude that smokers had to be tolerated seems
rapidly giving way to exactly the opposite view.
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probably be resolved according to the law of private nuisance. The
inability of nuisance law, geared to the generality of cases, 28 9 to
respond satisfactorily to many specific situations, coupled with the
pressure to accommodate the environmental concerns of all land users,
form the core of justification for land use restrictions ranging from
zoning to rules and regulations in leases. The legality and enforceability of the freedom constraints which all of these involve are based
either upon the police power, in the case of publicly imposed restrictions, 290 or upon individually created property or contract rights in the
case of private restrictions.
Since the privately created restrictions are based on contract or
property rights, and since such rights are normally enforced, cases only
rarely mention whether a landlord should have the power to prescribe
special conduct norms for tenants. 2 9 1 If the restrictions are not simply
enforced, 292 the grounds for nonenforcement are at least consistent
with (though perhaps hostile to) the landlord's basic power to prescribe. 293 However, as was true in the case of standing, 2 94 there may
easily be doubt as to whether landlords should have such power;
therefore, it may be useful to review some of the justifications for
conceding such power to them.
Assuming that stricter-than-law conduct standards are necessary to
protect special concerns, perhaps the most compelling reason for
allowing the landlord to prescribe such standards is that, compared
with the tenants themselves, the landlord is in the better position to do
so. First of all, the landlord, on the basis of his (or his attorney's)
experience, is more likely to be able to anticipate the sorts of restrictions which may be desirable given his building's other characteristics,
location, intended quality, and so forth. Furthermore, assuming that
the landlord enters into a formal lease agreement with every tenant
anyway, it is logical and convenient to make conduct restrictions a
part of that agreement. But perhaps most importantly, the landlord is
in a uniquely favorable position to obtain agreement to the conduct
restrictions from every tenant by making such agreement a precondition to getting an apartment in the building. In a way, this last
289. See note 260 and text accompanying notes 259-75 supra.
290. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
291. One case which did mention the issue was Moss v. Hirshtritt, 60 Misc. 2d 402, 405, 303
N.Y.S.2d 447, 450 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969). See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
292. See note 140 supra and accompanying text.
293. Such grounds for nonenforcement include strict construction against restrictions on
property use (see notes 23 & 25 supra), interpretation so as to avoid forfeiture results (see notes
148-68 supra and accompanying text) and relative hardship or harshness of enforcement (see text
accompanying notes 177-240 supra and section III(D)(2)(a) infra).
294. See note 36 supra.
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argument cuts two ways, for it concedes that the landlord has de facto
a heavy power to prescribe and one might well worry that such power
can be abused to create unreasonable restrictions. However, the problem of unreasonable rules can be handled directly, without questioning
the general power of the landlord to prescribe any rules at all. 2 95 On

the other hand, as a practical matter, it is only through the landlord
that a pattern of uniform buildingwide conduct restrictions can be
achieved. Because a single tenant's objectionable activities can cause
substantial unpleasantness for many, uniformity of restrictions (and
hence of protection) may be necessary to achieve the protection which
stricter-than-law freedom constraints are intended to provide. Therefore, permitting the landlord to require tenants to agree to conduct
restrictions as a precondition to entry may be the only way to make
stricter-than-law conduct restrictions serve their desired purposes.
Another reason for recognizing a power to prescribe in the landlord
is that such a power is consistent with the usual pattern of "gross"
leasing arrangements, 2 96 and it is therefore probably consonant with
the expectations of most tenants. When leasing an apartment in a
building of a given character, most tenants probably expect that the
landlord and not the tenants themselves will be responsible for maintaining that character, not only as it is affected by the building's
physital attributes, but as it is affected by the nonphysical attributes as
well. Such expectations may only recently be receiving the reinforcement of law, 29 7 but they are real nonetheless. Tenants neither desire
nor expect that they must negotiate among themselves to create an
environment suitable for their special concerns which the law may not
otherwise protect. If the building seems "right" in the beginning, they
assume that it will stay that way, and that the landlord will see to it
298
that it does.

Lastly, the landlord himself has an interest in the character of his
building and tenant conduct can affect that interest. 2 99 The landlord
may wish to establish a building catering to the elderly, or to singles,
or he may wish to assure his tenants that no neighboring apartments
will be used for the practice of musical instruments. The protection of
this interest from injury-even injury which may be damnurn sine
injuria at law-is a further justification for giving the landlord the
295.
296.

See section Ifl(D)(2).
See note 44 supra.

297.

See section If(A)(3) supra.

298.

See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,

400 U.S. 925 (1970) ("Since the lessees continue to pay the same rent, they were entitled to expect
that the landlord would continue to keep the premises in their beginning condition during the
lease term.').
299. See text accompanying notes 60, 73-78 supra.
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power to prescribe conduct standards which prospective tenants must
agree to observe as a precondition to leasing. The landlord-tenant
relation is (outside of marriage) the most enduring legal relationship
that most people are likely to enter, and it is one involving a valuable
asset of the landlord. Should not the law allow the landlord the power
to prescribe reasonable ground rules for the protection of that asset,
even if the protection sought may be more than the law itself would
otherwise provide?
It has already been observed 300 that denying effective enforcement
of conduct restrictions will prevent the landlord from giving his
tenants legal protection for environmental benefits which were among
the factors which induced them to enter into their leases. The same
may be said, with perhaps even greater force, of denying the validity
of the restrictions entirely. Denying such validity will not prevent
prospective tenants from selecting residences in buildings appearing to
have environmental conditions and character appropriate to their
psychic needs. Such denial will only prevent the landlord from assuring that such conditions or character will continue throughout the term
and renewals of the tenant's lease. 30 1 Unless the law forces noncomplying tenants to keep their promises, it will likewise prevent the landlord
from keeping his promises, implicit or otherwise, to the majority of his
tenants. 2The losers, ultimately, will be the complying tenants them30
selves.
a. The Contract of Adhesion Problem
Whatever the benefits derivable from landlord prescription of conduct standards, allowing such a power to prescribe to landlords may
nonetheless be objected to because of the adhesive character of the
leases which give the standards their legal force. The difficulty is that
the basic enforceability of the landlord's prescriptions is grounded in
contract, and to the extent that the tenant has not undertaken to
accept their burden "willingly," the very rationale for enforcing the
standards is undermined.
It is true that residential tenants usually have at best only a limited
300.
301.

See text following note 234 supra.
See note 298 supra. Even if the landlord has made no explicit, legally enforceable

promises to the other tenants concerning the tenant-affected environmental conditions or character of the building, the impact of the implied warranty of habitability may force such promises on
him nonetheless. See section III(A)(3) supra. If the objectives of this implied warranty are not to
be frustrated, it may be indispensable to concede to the landlord the power to prescribe and
enforce conduct restrictions applicable to his tenants.
302. "To have removed the pet clause would have been as unfair to tenants who were
opposed to pets as the retention of the pet clause is claimed to be to tenants who favor pets."
Blakely v. Housing Authority, 8 Wash. App. 204, 212, 505 P.2d 151,

156 (1973).
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opportunity to negotiate the conduct or use restrictions to be contained
in their leases. The tenant may have no choice but to either accept all
of the freedom curtailments which the lease prescribes or to reject the
lease entirely. And if the housing market is tight, or if most landlords
use more or less standardized forms, the latter choice may be unrealistic. Hence, the conduct restrictions which the landlord prescribes may
well seem to have more the character of unilaterally imposed obligations rather than the freely undertaken
duties presupposed in the
30 3
ordinary enforcement of contracts.
However, even though the conduct or use restrictions in the usual
residential lease are largely nonnegotiable, it is probably also true that
any reasonable restrictions would be agreeable to most tenants anyway. At least, most tenants would like to have their neighbors bound
by such restrictions, and it is hard to sympathize with anyone who
would seek exemption only for himself. 30 4 Indeed, if most tenants were
not willing to comply with the usually enforced restrictions on tenant
conduct, one would expect that attempts to evict tenants for objectionable activities would be more frequent than the unusual occurrences
which they are.
In order to denominate lease-contained conduct restrictions as adhesive, it is necessary of course to assume that, due to the widespread use
of standardized forms or whatever, the prospective tenant has no
realistic choice but to accept them as part of his lease. On the other
hand, if the usually enforced conduct restrictions are so pervasively
required as to deprive the tenant of any realistic choice, this very
pervasiveness tends to underline the restrictions' desirability and general acceptability. For example, if no landlords permitted nighttime
piano practice, and if this restriction were unacceptable to many, it
would likely be in the interest of some landlords to break the
pattern-for no better reason than to obtain the higher rent which
insistent home practicers would pay for the freedom. If no landlord
were willing to relent and permit a particular activity, the indication
would be that the activity is so intolerable (to other tenants, or perhaps
to the landlord directly) that no one wants to put up with it in
exchange for the available trade-offs. 30 5 Of course, a local housing
shortage, especially if coupled with rent controls, may reduce or
303. Cf. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Kessler,
Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629
(1943); Shuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts, 35 Temp. L.Q. 125, 130 (1962).
304. See note 286 supra.
305. In the landlord's case, the most likely available trade-off would be a higher rent which
would be paid in exchange for deletion of the restriction. In the case of neighboring tenants, the
most likely available trade-off would be the reduction in rents which would be required in order
to induce them to endure the annoying activity.
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eliminate landlords' incentive to "bid" for tenants through offers of
relaxed conduct restrictions. At the same time though, the presence of
a housing shortage makes it all the more oppressive to arbitrarily
subject the hapless neighboring tenants to the annoying activities from
which most in the building are willing to refrain. Thus, "adhesive"
conduct restrictions may be the only way to protect the preponderance
of tenants from the random discomforts caused by the nonconforming
few. However, even if a particular tenant were unwilling to accept
certain conduct restrictions, there are still other good reasons to
enforce them if he nonetheless signed the lease which contains them.
First of all, there is the argument of convenience which, in the
economic context, boils down to one of cost. The tenant knows (or
should realize) that when entering a lease he is getting a unified
package of benefits and detriments. It is much as the buyer of a car
knows that the car is put together as a package, some aspects being
desirable (e.g., a motor size he likes), others, perhaps, undesirable
(e.g., wrong color seats). Of course, the package constituting the lease
theoretically can be taken apart by negotiation, with benefits and
detriments added or removed, tailoring it to the tenant's exact desires.
So can the car; e.g., by taking out the wrong color seats and installing
others. However, the landlord (like the automobile dealer) may quite
reasonably have only a limited willingness to rearrange the basic
package which is offered. The costs, in time and perhaps also legal
services, may militate against such rearrangement, especially in the
case of residential leases. And a landlord who has paid for a carefully
thought out, lawyer-drawn lease would be understandably reluctant to
tinker with a document Whose significance he does not fully comprehend. Hence, a landlord may allow minor modifications of the form
(e.g., to permit limited subletting), but it should not be surprising that
even an understanding landlord would insist that all leases either be on
his basic routinized form or not at all.
In any event, it begs the question to say that a tenant is unwilling to
accept certain lease provisions just because, in the abstract, he would
prefer not to agree to them. The tenant faced with the landlord's usual
package has the choice of accepting or rejecting it. If he accepts,
despite undesired provisions, there is no reason to assume that he did
so for any reason other than that he perceived the benefits to outweigh
the detriments. Having made this determination, and having contracted on this basis, it is hard to see what claim the tenant has to
relief from certain of the detriments, especially insofar as the detriments were accepted as part of the quid pro quo for the benefits. Thus,
though the tenant may have been unwilling in some abstract sense to
accept certain conduct restrictions, if the tenant was willing on balance
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to accept them as part of a package which he deemed to be desirable
30 6
overall, the restrictions are not properly considered nonconsensual.
In fact, to relieve the tenant of the restrictions, while holding the
landlord otherwise to the lease, would be to force the landlord to
contract on terms which the landlord found unacceptable. 30 7 Thus, to
refuse to enforce restrictions on grounds of unwillingness will not avoid
the enforcement of a nonconsensual contract; it will merely shift
the
308
unwilling adherence from the tenant's side to the landlord's.
Finally, though, so far as conduct restrictions are concerned, there is
an even more important reason for the landlord to refuse to negotiate.
Differences in restriction patterns would defeat the buildingwide uniformity of protection and the value of self-segregation that the conduct
restrictions are supposed to provide. Hence, unless the law is to
withdraw from protecting special concerns which people strive to
preserve, there may be no alternative to allowing landlords the power
to prescribe stricter-than-law conduct standards and to enforce the
306. It should be observed that, in the real world, all benefits have costs, if only opportunity
costs. Thus, in order to maximize benefit, people are forced to make trade-offs, accepting certain
detriments in order to get associated benefits. However, it makes no sense at all (absent
circumstances of duress or the like) to say that such acceptance of detriment is nonconsensual.
Likewise, it makes no sense to say the tenant's agreement to observe conduct restrictions or, for
that matter, to pay rent is nonconsensual-and hence adhesive-just because he could not have
gotten possession unless he made such agreements.
307. The result would be, in effect, a form of duress against the landlord. Epstein,
Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. Law & Econ. 293, 297 (1975).
308. It is assumed in the foregoing discussion that the tenant, in entering the lease, is aware
of at least the general tenor of the conduct restrictions contained therein. This awareness may be
the result of reading the lease or, it would reasonably seem, by observing the character of the
building which is affected by or consistent with the observance of the restrictions. Cf. Sanborn v.
McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925). It would appear to be a weak excuse that the
tenant was unaware of the restrictions if such unawareness was due to a refusal to read the lease
(unless, of course, the landlord encouraged him to sign without reading). Yet, the question arises,
should the tenant's lack of notice (actual or constructive) of the restrictions relieve him of their
burden?
Indicating that lack of notice is not a ground for relief, one court has held that the landlord has
no duty to call the restrictions to the tenant's attention. Southbridge Towers, Inc. v. Rovics, 76
Misc. 2d 396, 350 N.Y.S.2d 62 (App. T. 1973). However, the landlord who falls to do so would
seem to be opening himself to claims of mistake, implied agreement, estoppel or even fraud in the
inducement. On the other hand, it does not very well serve the purpose of the restrictions if
tenants do not know their content. Hence, there is some incentive to landlords .to encourage
tenants to read their leases. Whether anyone very often acts on this incentive is, however,
problematical.
The question of lease provisions empowering the landlord to promulgate rules and regulations
outside the lease (see note 279 supra) presents a different problem. Courts sometimes have said
that, to be valid, such restrictions must be "reasonable." See text accompanying notes 310-11
infra. What reasonable may or should mean in this context will be described infra. However, for
present purposes, the question arises whether this limitation on extra-lease restrictions is sufficient
to save such restrictions from invalidity due to their overly "private legislative" character.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

standards prescribed even against tenants who would not find the
standards agreeable.
For the law to withdraw from protecting these special concerns
would simply be bad policy. The necessary inadequacy of generalized
law prescribed norms has already been described, and it is doubtful
that the law could ever offer standards which are sufficiently finely
tuned to particular cases to replace the functioning of privately agreed
norms. If the law refuses to enforce the privately agreed norms, the
result will not be the elimination of special concerns themselves or the
values perceived in protecting them. It will mean merely that this
entire area of human interchange and potential conflict will be left to
the pressures and self-help of laissez-faire. As a consequence, the
protection will be arbitrarily uneven, depending upon how well these
extra-legal protection mechanisms work in particular cases. Worse, the
extra-legal attempts at protections will be unscrutinized for abusive
motivation, unreasonableness of regulation and other grounds for
protection of the regulated party.
It is hard to see how a limited amount of private legislative authority
(if that is what it is) could be more detrimental to the general welfare
than the law's abdication which the complete rejection thereof entails.
Especially, this is true where the "private legislation" is agreed toalbeit perhaps as the "bad part" of an overall good deal-by all who
are subject to it.
Thus, the prescription by landlords of stricter-than-law conduct
standards performs an important, perhaps irreplaceable, social function. And the law's enforcement of such standards is, broadly speaking, justified even though the contractual basis for the enforcement is
to a degree undermined by the adhesive character of the leases which
give them their force. This is not to say, however, that the law should
not place some limits on the de facto norm-creating authority which is
conceded to landlords. It is only that the general welfare may be best
served if such limits are not applied with a presumption of invalidity
where stricter-than-law norms are prescribed.
2.

Appropriate Legal Limitations on the Conduct Standards Which
Landlords May Prescribe

Assuming that landlords are to have the power to prescribe conduct
standards to be agreed to and observed by tenants, the question arises
as to what limitations should be placed on that power. That is, what
kinds of landlord-prescribed conduct standards should be legally impermissible and hence invalid?
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It may be helpful to note that lease-contained conduct restrictions
are, like zoning laws, a response to the inability of nuisance law,
geared to the generality of cases, to adequately protect special concerns
which may exist in many specific situations. However, the substantial
body of judicial expression delineating the permissible types and extent
of regulation via zoning has not been reproduced in the area of private
land use restrictions. Although litigation has produced a rather well
developed body of rules concerning the possible mechanisns and
procedures for effecting private land use restrictions (viz., negative
easements, implied reciprocal equitable servitudes, covenants and the
like), little judicial attention has been drawn (explicitly at least) to the
appropriate limits on the permissible character of private restrictions.
In the landlord-tenant context, courts have traditionally been content
to observe that a landlord "has a legal right to control the uses to
which his building may be put and may do so by appropriate provisions in a lease. ' 30 9 Use restrictions, if contained in the lease, as
opposed to collateral regulations made pursuant to the lease, 310 may
not even have to be reasonable, 31 1 and in any event specific guidance
as to possible criteria for reasonableness seems virtually nonexistent.
About all that may be concluded from the existing case law is that (i)
lease-imposed restrictions do not necessarily lose their validity simply
because they limit freedom more strictly than the substantive norms of
tort (especially nuisance) law,3 1 2 and (ii) regulations made pursuant to
a lease for purposes of restraining trade or violating some other
3 13
recognized public policy may be impermissible.
What is needed is to develop a somewhat more concrete definition of
reasonableness, to suggest those considerations which ought (and ought
not) to be taken into account in applying a reasonableness test of
validity. Perhaps the term reasonable is itself an unfortunate one,
echoing as it does the relativistic analysis of nuisance determinations. 3 14 Clearly, it would not be desirable to test lease-prescribed
309. Lyon v. Bethlehem Eng'r Corp., 253 N.Y. 111, 113-14, 170 N.E. 512, 513 (1930); see
Luna Park Housing Corp. v. Besser, 38 App. Div. 2d 713, 329 N.Y.S.2d 332 (2d Dep't 1972)
(rules and regulations); 30-88 Steinway St., Inc. v. H.C. Bohack Co., 65 Misc. 2d 1076, 319
N.Y.S.2d 679 (N.Y. City Civ. CL 1971), aff'd, 42 App. Div. 2d 577, 344 N.Y.S.2d 205 rZd Dep't
1973); 1 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, § 3.40; M. Friedman, Preparation of Leases 105-07 (1962
ed.).
310.

See note 279 supra; Southland Dev. Corp. v. Ehrler's Dairy. Inc., 463 S.W.2d 284 (Ky.

1971);
(1935);
311.
3 N.J.
(1946);

Modern Amusements, Inc., v. New Orleans Pub. Serv.. Inc., 183 La. 898, 165 So. 137
Thousand Island Park Ass'n v. Tucker, 173 N.Y. 203, 211-12, 65 N.E. 975, 977 (1903).
Irving Inv. Corp. v. Gordon, 3 N.J. Super. 385, 401, 66 A.2d 54, 61 (Super. Ct.), aff'd.
217, 69 A.2d 725 (1949); Lamont Bldg. Co. v. Court, 147 Ohio St. 183, 70 N.E.2d 447
American Legion Holding Corp. v. Hurowitz, 72 S.D. 89, 30 N.W.2d 9 (1947).

312.

See notes 26-32 supra and accompanying text.

313.
314.

See 20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions §§ 182-84 (1965)
See note 260 supra and text accompanying notes 264-75 supra.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

conduct restrictions by the same objective balancing that applies in
private nuisance litigation; to do so would render it legally impossible
to protect special concerns and needs of the hypersensitive which the
general law itself does not protect.
However, even given the legitimacy of protecting special concerns, it
is obvious that some stricter-than-law conduct restrictions will be
appropriate for judicial enforcement while others will not. The problem is to find a principled basis for distinguishing one from the other.
The following is a discussion of several possible bases.
a. Relative Hardship
Among the factors possibly relevant to the reasonableness of a
conduct restriction, one might suggest relative hardship, in this case,
the relative hardship of observing the conduct restriction compared
with the benefits which accrue to others as a result of its being
observed. 31 5 The equitable methodology of "balancing the equities,"
taking into account the relative hardships involved in granting or
denying relief, 31 6 is commonly employed in cases involving use restrictions on fees. 3 17 The relatively greater hardship involved in enforcing a
restriction has likewise been relied upon by courts in cases involving
3 18
leaseholds.
315. The relative hardship discussed here must be carefully distinguished from the comparison of relative hardship discussed earlier in section III(B)(2)(c)(iv). The focus here is upon relative
hardship as it bears on the "reasonableness" of the restriction per se. Accordingly, the appropriate
comparison is between the hardship of compliance versus the hardship to othiers resulting from
noncompliance. The relative hardship of enforcing a forfeiture for noncompliance (which was
discussed earlier) is a wholly different matter, and it involves a wholly different balancing (the
hardship to others resulting from noncompliance vs. the hardship of eviction).
It is quite conceivable that, in a particular case, noncompliance with a restriction will result in
hardship to others which is sufficiently great to justify enforcement of the restriction (e.g., by
injunction) but which is insufficient to justify a forfeiture. See, e.g., Howard D. Johnson Co. v.
Madigan, 361 Mass. 454, 280 N.E.2d 689 (1972); Feist & Feist v. Long Island Studios, Inc., 29
App. Div. 2d 186, 190, 287 N.Y.S.2d 257, 261 (2d Dep't 1968) (dissenting opinion); 930 Fifth
Corp. v. King, 71 Misc. 2d 359, 336 N.Y.S.2d 22 (App. T.), rev'd, 40 App. Div. 2d 140, 338
N.Y.S.2d 773 (1st Dep't 1972); Fly Hi Music Corp. v. 645 Restaurant Corp., 64 Misc. 2d 302,
314 N.Y.S.2d 735 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1970), aff'd mem., 71 Misc. 2d 302, 335 N.Y.S.2d 822
(App. T. 1972); Madison 52nd Corp. v. Ogust, 49 Misc. 2d 663, 268 N.Y.S.2d 126 (N.Y. City
Civ. Ct.), aff'd, 52 Misc. 2d 935, 277 N.Y.S.2d 42 (App. T. 1966). It is only when the relative
hardship to the violator justifies neither forfeiture nor any other form of redress that the
restriction can be said to be itself unreasonable and hence, invalid, on the grounds of relative
hardship.
316. H. McClintock, Equity §§ 144-45 (2d ed. 1948).
317. Downs v. Kroeger, 200 Cal. 743, 254 P. 1101 (1927). The balancing methodology is
sometimes a statutory requirement as well. E.g., N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law §§ 1951-53
(McKinney 1963).
318. Piankay Realties, Inc. v. Romano, 271 App. Div. 104, 62 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1st Dep't
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Invalidating conduct restrictions on the basis of relative hardship
appears at first to be quite defensible. Indeed, if reasonableness is a
test of the validity of such restrictions, it seems to be highly unreasonable to enforce a restriction if observing it causes considerable inconvenience but offers little benefit to those supposedly protected thereby.
However, several objections may be posed against using relative
hardship as a basis for determining the reasonableness and validity of
lease-prescribed conduct restrictions.
The first objection is that any attempt to treat relative hardship as a
criterion of unreasonableness would tend to defeat the substantive
objective of protecting the special concerns which law-imposed behavioral norms ignore. For resorting to the sort of relativistic analysis
which a relative hardship theory entails is to convert every conduct
restriction case into something of a case of nuisance.
The appropriateness of relativistic analysis may be clear enough
when the gist of the landlord's action is tort; for in tort analysis, the
relativism of circumstances lies at the heart of the fundamental question of whether the defendant's conduct constituted a tort at all. 3 19 It is

certainly less clear why relativistic analysis should have any role in
deciding whether to enforce the terms of a contract. For contract
methodology is essentially the application of positive standards established by the parties themselves. 32 0 The primary task in contract is not
to weigh competing interests, policy objectives and the like for the
purpose of deciding whether the duty to observe a particular behavioral standard is one that the law should create. The behavioral
standard has already been created by the undertaking of the promisor.
The duty to observe the standard is imposed by law on the basis of
1946), aff'd, 296 N.Y. 920, 73 N.E.2d 39 (1947); Jerome Realty Co. v. Yankovich, 37 Misc. Zd

433, 235 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See also 930 Fifth Corp. v. King, 71 Misc. 2d 359, 336
N.Y.S.2d 22 (App. T.), rev'd, 40 App. Div. 2d 140, 338 N.Y.S.2d 773 (1st Dep't 1972).
Unfortunately, since a preponderance of lease restriction cases arise as actions to enforce a
forfeiture, it is often hard to tell, where the court grants relief from forfeiture, whether the
relative hardship of the restriction itself or merely of the remedy was the reason for the court's
holding.
319. See notes 260-62 supra and accompanying text.
320. The contract may of course define the duty in relativistic terms (e.g., "tenant shall not
use the demised premises in any objectionable manner" or "tenant shall make only such use of the
included utilities as is consistent with residential use"), and if the contract does establish a
relativistic standard, then relativistic analysis will of course be necessary in deciding whether, in
each instance, particular acts or conduct are prohibited or mandated by the standard. This still
does not mean that the tort standards automatically apply, for the objective of contract
interpretation should remain primarily the ascertainment and effectuation of the parties' intentions. Nonetheless, a reference to a tort concept in the contract (e.g., "tenant shall not suffer any
nuisance on the demised premises') should indicate that the ordinary tort standard would prima
facie apply.
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policies (concerning the social utility of enforcing agreements) which
are independent of the substantive content of the standard itself. Thus,
the question of whether, on balance, it was desirable to create the
standard has no bearing on the issue of whether to enforce it. The
question is solely: Did the promisor do what he has undertaken?
The determination of whether or not the contractual duty was
breached may perhaps require interpretation of intention (and therein
a certain amount of subjectivity 3 2 1), but essentially the process is one
of simple comparison-comparing the behavioral requirements of the
contract with the provable conduct of the promisor. This process
should not require or even admit of any sort of balancing of interests of
the kind characteristic in defining torts; this is especially true if
avoiding uncertainty-of standards and of proof-was a reason
for
322
creating particularized conduct standards in the first place.
Of course, comparing agreed behavioral requirements with provable
conduct is not the only function performed by courts in contract cases,
even though it is the primary one. The court must be satisfied that
enforcement of the agreed behavioral requirement is not inconsistent
with some policy more important than the policy of enforcing contracts. 32 3 This does require some balancing by the court, 324 though in
most traditional cases of nonenforcement (e.g., on grounds of illegality
or fraud) the outcome of the balancing is so obvious as not to be open
to dispute. While historical precedent does not strictly speaking support nonenforcement of contracts on the grounds of relative hardship 325 (not at law, at least 3 26), the more recent trend-particularly
through the expanded application of "unconscionability" notionsseems to be to legitimize relative hardship (in its more extreme
manifestations) as a ground for contract invalidity. That is, the policy

321. The subjectivity involved in the interpretation process may not be limited to subjective
conclusions concerning what is, purely speaking, intent. As has been earlier noted (see notes 162
& 190 supra and accompanying text), courts sometimes make conscious modifications of the
substantive meaning of contracts under the guise of "strict interpretation."
322. See text accompanying notes 257-63 supra.
323. For example, courts will not enforce a contract calling for illegal acts by the breaching
party. 6A A. Corbin, Contracts § 1375 (1962).
324. See section III(D)(2)(d) infra, especially note 374 and text accompanying notes 383-88
infra.
325. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts §§ 55, 56 (1970); 1 A. Corbin, Contracts § 127
(1963). See also Blakeley v. W. T. Rabon, 266 S.C. 681, 221 S.E.2d 767 (1976); 3 J. Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence § 928 (5th ed. 1941); 1 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence §
245 (13th ed. 1886).
326. Id.; cf. 5A A. Corbin, Contracts §§ 1164-65 (1964).
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of avoiding relative hardship is perhaps becoming 32a7 policy which
outweighs the general policy of enforcing contracts.
If avoidance of relative hardship in contract enforcement is indeed a
transcendent policy, its inclusion as a criterion of unreasonableness for
conduct restrictions would seem appropriate as would the relativistic
analysis which it entails.
However, although compliance with lease conduct restrictions can
result in relative hardship, it turns out on analysis to be most unlikely
that, consistently with protecting special concerns, relative hardship
can serve as a basis for holding particular restrictions invalid.
In order for compliance with a conduct restriction to cause relative
hardship, such compliance must result in burdens to the obligor which
are out of proportion to the benefits to the beneficiaries of the
restriction. However, this disproportionality would not occur, in an
objective sense, where the obligor's duty to comply was knowingly and
willingly assumed in exchange for corresponding duties assumed by
other obligor-beneficiaries of the restriction. 32 8 Suppose, for example,
that one of two knowledgeable bargaining neighbors willingly relinquishes something (e.g., the right to practice a trombone at home) in
exchange for, say, $100 paid by the other. The fact of exchange is
objective evidence that the trombone player considered the benefit of
practicing at home to have a value of less than $100 and the other
neighbor considered the burden of such home practice to have a
negative "value" of more than $100.329 Although the absolute values of

the benefit and burden are unknown, the relative burden and benefit
of the restriction agreement are demonstrated by the exchange transaction, viz., the fact of the exchange shows that both parties bargained to
reap a net benefit from the restriction agreement and, hence, the
agreement results in no relative hardship to either. Similarly, if each of
two neighbors willingly relinquishes a right (e.g., to hold large parties
at home) in exchange for a corresponding relinquishment by the other,
we have objective evidence that, for both, the right relinquished was
considered less valuable than the right (restraint in party-giving by the
other) which was received. Again, we do not know the absolute values
which either neighbor placed on the rights relinquished or received.
327.

For a discussion of this trend, stressing the myopia of its assumptions, see Epstein,

Unconscionability- A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. Law & Econ. 293 (197S).
328. Cf. the language quoted in note 302 supra.
329. One or both of the two values might also be equal to $100. In that case the exchange

would result in no net benefit or burden to either or both of the two parties; but still, there would
be no relative hardship, since each party would be getting a value which was at least the
equivalent of that which he had given up.
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But we do have objective evidence to show that each placed a higher
value on the other's restraint than the other placed on freedom from
the restraint. Otherwise, they would never have willingly made the
exchange.

33 0

By parity of reasoning, if every tenant willingly and knowledgeably
agrees with the landlord to observe certain conduct restrictions, with
the substantial expectation that compliance with like restrictions will
be required of all other tenants, we have objective evidence to show
that each tenant places a higher value on conferring upon the landlord
the power to limit certain freedoms of others than he (or any of the
others) places on having those freedoms himself. 3 3 1 Hence, the universal agreement for restrictions is--objectively-of net benefit to all, and
it may be concluded that the agreement would not result in net
hardship to anyone. 3 32 Objectively, there is no relative hardship
which could constitute an appropriate basis for holding such restrictions either unreasonable or unenforceable; where the restrictions
apply universally 3 33 to all tenants by virtue of their willing and
330. Once again, any two or more of the values (on restraint or freedom from restraint) might
have been equal and the voluntary exchange might still have occurred. However, just as In the
case in note 329 supra, the presence of equality of values would mean, at worst, that the
transaction resulted in neither net benefit nor net burden (and, hence, no relative hardship) to
either party.
331. Landlord-imposed conduct restrictions do pose a case distinctive from the previous two
hypotheticals set forth in the text insofar as tenants are disabled by the lease or the law from
enforcing conduct restrictions contained in other leases. See note 39 supra and accompanying
text. The difference is that, in exchange for the assumption of conduct restrictions, the tenant
gets, not a right to enforce like restrictions on other tenants, but rather an expectation that the
landlord will provide such enforcement. However, this difference does not ipso facto deprive the
restrictions of their reciprocal character since the benefit which each tenant gets as his quid pro
quo for assuming the restrictions is still identical to that received by the other tenants for their
assumptions. If all willingly agree to the restrictions in exchange for such expectation, we can still
conclude that there is no net burden, and no relative hardship, in enforcing the restrictions.
332. Obviously, enforcement of the exchange causes some "disadvantage" to the party against
which it is enforced, because such enforcement prevents him from having the performance of the
other party while he himself does not perform. But the "disadvantage" of not being able to breach
a contract and still have the quid pro quo is hardly the kind of hardship which kindles fires in the
heart of equity.
333. For convenience of exposition, it has been assumed that the conduct restrictions in
question are uniformly applicable to all tenants. However, the result is the same even if the
restrictions are nonuniform. Of course, if the restrictions are not uniform, it cannot be said that
the restricted tenant receives the expectation of comparable restrictions on others as his quid pro
quo. But if the tenant willingly and knowingly entered the lease, it may be assumed that there
were other offsetting counterbenefits to the tenant which induced the tenant's overall satisfaction.
See the discussion of "willingness" in note 336 infra and section III(D)(1)(a) supra. An obvious
example is a lease to a pharmacy restricting use to drug sales. The pharmacist would hardly
desire like restrictions to apply throughout the building, but he might like the other tenants to be
restricted to, say, the practice of medicine. Cf. Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse,
21 Cal. 2d 411, 132 P.2d 457 (1942).
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334
knowing agreements, there is objectively no hardship at all.
But even though agreement-based universally applicable conduct
restrictions cannot result in any relative objective hardship, the potential for relative subjective hardship, which is the "real" relative hardship, remains. Consider, for example, a prohibition on large parties at
home. Whatever may be the burden of such a prohibition and whatever may be its benefit to others, if every tenant gets both the benefit
and the burden, then compliance with the prohibition gives no tenant
an advantage or disadvantage which is greater or less, in an objective
sense, than that of the others. Subjectively, however, the differences in
advantage may be considerable. A gregarious party-giver may find the
prohibition a great burden with little special benefit, and his introverted neighbor may find it a tremendous boon causing no inconvenience whatsoever. As a result of these subjective differences, which are
based on the different values and special concerns of different people,
the "real" hardship of compliance could, in many cases, exceed the
hardship to others resulting from a breach. There could, in other
words, be real subjective relative hardship in complying.
There are several possible explanations for this disparity between
"real" or subjective relative hardship and the relative hardships which
are evidenced objectively by the fact of agreement. One of these is that
the agreement may not have been entered into "knowingly."133" Another is that it may not have been entered into "willingly." 3 36 A third

The point, which may be generalized, is that in determining the relative hardship of
agreements, the relative burdens and benefits of the entire agreement must be considered, and the
focus cannot properly be limited only to particular terms while ignoring the rest.
334. To reiterate from notes 329 & 330 supra, for some tenants the values placed upon some
lost freedom and getting corresponding protection may be equal, in which case there would be
neither net burden nor benefit. Still, however, there would be no relative hardship in enforcement.
335. That the restrictions were not assented to "knowingly" suggests such standard excuses
for contract nonperformance as fraud, mistake and the "unfair surprise" aspect of unconscionability. See R. Nordstrom, Sales § 44, at 127-28 (1970). The common feature of these excuses for
nonperformance is that they offer relief from enforcement of an apparent agreement where the
objective manifestation of assent is belied by evidence of facts sufficiently compelling to justify
resort to the subjective or "real" mental state of the parties involved. However, lack of knowledge
in this sense, though it may lead to real (subjective) relative hardship, is irrelevant to the
reasonableness of particular restrictions per se. Such lack of knowledge goes at most to the
appropriateness of enforcing the restriction in a particular case. But cf. Southbridge Towers, Inc.
v. Rovics, 76 Misc. 2d 396, 350 N.Y.S.2d 62 (App. T. 1973) (no duty on landlord to notify tenant
of clear language of lease). And, if relief from enforcement is appropriate in a particular case, the
relief should be conferred without invalidating the restriction per se. Rather, recourse should be
had to one of the legal doctrines mentioned above pursuant to which enforcement may be refused
despite the restriction's basic validity.
336. That the restrictions were not assented to "willingly" also suggests several standard
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reason is that, in making their agreements, tenants do not necessarily
3 37
act "rationally.
None of these reasons for the objective-subjective disparity offers
any grounds for questioning the "reasonableness" of particular restrictions per se; they go, not to the substance of the restrictions themselves, but only to the agreement process which gives the restrictions
their legal force. Obviously, defects in the agreement process may
contractual defenses based on lack of "real" consent, including duress, overreaching and the
"oppression" aspect of unconscionability. See R. Nordstrom, Sales § 44, at 128-30 (1970). The
whole problem of willingness may be viewed broadly as a consequence of the fact that many
leases, especially residential leases, tend to be contracts of adhesion, offered on a take-it-or-leaveit basis by the landlord. Whether lease-contained conduct restrictions ought not to be enforced
because they constitute contracts of adhesion has been discussed in greater detail under section
III(D)(1)(a) supra. Suffice it to say here that, for purposes of determining reasonableness by
reference to relative hardship, it can be assumed that the conduct restrictions were "willingly"
entered into if the lease as a whole was satisfactory to the tenant and "willingly" entered Into
despite the undesired term. More particularly, even though a tenant may not have desired a
particular nonnegotiable conduct restriction in his lease (e.g., because the freedom constraints on
others were not worth the freedom restraints on himself), if the tenant accepted the lease
anyway-deciding to take the good with the bad-it may be assumed (given knowledge and
rationality) that there was some other benefit in having the lease which made the overall
exchange beneficial to the tenant. See note 333 supra. Thus, even though the burden of
complying with the restriction is not outweighed by the benefits of compliance with It by others,
there would be no overall or net hardship when one takes into account the other benefits which
the tenant gets under the same lease.
337. That the restrictions were not assented to "rationally" suggests perhaps the traditional
excuse of incapacity or incompetence. But the traditional notion of incapacity would have to be
extended almost beyond recognition in order to make all "irrational" undertakings voidable by the
promisor.
There is, to be sure, a tendency among contracting parties to not think about all of the
consequences of an agreement, to trade off values which may be very important in exchange for
countervalues which are not, subjectively speaking, comparable. Thus, the tenant may give up a
particular freedom (e.g., to keep a dog) not realizing that it may be more important to him or his
family to have a dog than it is to live in a building where the neighbors have no dogs. Or
circumstances may change unpredictably, after agreement, modifying the tenant's relative values.
In these sorts of cases, the apparent values which the tenant placed on elements of his exchange,
as demonstrated by the willingness to enter the exchange, do not correspond to the real subjective
values which he placed, or now places, upon them. Thus, the enforcement of the tenant's
agreement may cause a real net burden to the tenant, one which is out of proportion to the benefit
to the other tenants. However, such relative hardship would not indicate unreasonableness of the
conduct restriction per se, nor, it may be added, would it seem to be the sort of case where the
application of ordinary contract rules would prevent enforcement of the tenant's agreement.
The policy of enforcing agreements based upon objective manifestations of assent would be
undermined entirely if a promisor could avoid enforcement on the grounds that he, without fault
of the promisee or anyone else, miscalculated the appropriateness of the bargain for his own
purposes and did not really intend its effect. Moreover, as will be shown presently in the text,
there is no way to accurately estimate the real subjective values in any event. Thus, lack of
"rationality" should not, short of incompetence, vitiate the tenant's agreement to observe conduct
restrictions.
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suggest any of several traditional bases for excusing performance, 338
but none of the bases are related to the character of the restrictions
themselves (and none, it may be added, depends on the presence of
"relative hardship" for its applicability). Nevertheless, given this potential disparity between subjective relative hardships and the apparent relative hardships shown by objectively manifested intentions, it
would be clearly preferable, if it were possible, to measure the relative
hardship of restrictions according to subjectively held values rather
than their objectively manifested counterparts. 339 Unfortunately, however, it is not possible.
It is impossible accurately to compare subjective benefit against
subjective burden because to do so would require an interpersonal
comparison of utility which simply cannot be accurately achieved.
There is no way to tell whether a prohibition (e.g., on large parties,
piano playing or dogs) causes a greater burden on a person who wants
these things than it does a benefit for another who does not. Sometimes
the courts are required to make such interpersonal comparisons, for
example, in cases brought in nuisance. Recognizing the futility of
attempting to compare subjective or "real" values, the law of nuisance
is content to proceed with only approximate comparisons, making its
determinations on an objective basis, looking at the benefits and
burdens as experienced by ordinary persons, and excluding the
idiosyncratic concerns of the hypersensitive. 340 But it would not be
appropriate to follow the example of the law of nuisance in testing the
reasonableness and enforceability of stricter-than-law conduct standards. For if such standards were tested on the objective basis applied
in nuisance cases, then the only enforceable standards would be those
which are no more restrictive than the law of nuisance itself. The
protection of special concerns (of the hypersensitive or for special
situations) would be left--despite the possibility of resolution by
agreement-in a legal vacuum, protectable only by one or another
method of self-help.
Thus, unless the law is to abandon the protection of special concerns, the only acceptable method for comparing relative subjective
338. E.g., fraud, mistake, duress, incompetence, procedural unconscionability. See notes
335-37 supra.
339. It should be noted that measuring the subjective relative hardship necessarily implies a
case-by-case approach (since different people have different values), and such casuistry means
that no generalizations about the "reasonableness" of particular types of restrictions (as based on
relative hardship) would be possible. Still, inasmuch as subjective relative hardship may appear
to be a proper basis for nonenforcement, it seems suitable (if not entirely logical) to discuss it at
this point.
340. See text accompanying notes 264-75 supra.
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benefits and burdens is to observe an exchange or exchanges between
the persons in question. As an indicator of relative subjective values,
an exchange agreement is admittedly not perfect. The possible disparity between the parties' real subjective values and those objectively
shown by the fact of the exchange means that the agreement, the
objective showing of subjective values, may mis-indicate. Nonetheless,
reliance on agreement-shown comparative values is better than resort
to the objective standards of nuisance. For to rely on the latter would
be necessarily 34 ' to disregard the differing values and special concerns
which different people have. It would be to invalidate any agreements
that "ordinary" persons would not make.
b. Lack of Potentialfor Injury to Any Legitimate Interests
Another factor bearing quite directly on the "reasonableness" and
appropriateness for judicial enforcement of landlord-prescribed restrictions is the extent to which such restrictions protect some legitimate
interest of the landlord or neighboring tenants. For if there is no
legitimate interest being protected by a stricter-than-law restriction, or
if there is no potential for injury to any such interests, the freedom
constraints involved in the restriction have no countervailing justification.
One type of restriction which would normally seem to be unreasonable on this basis is a restriction on off-premises activities. The
legitimate interest of the landlord and neighboring tenants is in the
building, its internal environment and what goes on there. Offpremises activities generally have no bearing on this. Thus, if a
landlord attempted to regulate, say, off-premises drinking or sexual
activities, chances are good that his motivation would not be the
protection of building-related interests but rather would be goals of a
somewhat more general social or paternalistic nature. Were it not that
34 2
residential leases are almost inevitably "adhesive" in character,
there might be no objection to such paternalism or social crusades on
the part of landlords, however misguided they may be. But given the
somewhat special leverage which landlords do have in imposing their
philosophies of life and lifestyle on others, courts should be wary that
341. "Necessarily" because, as previously stated, interpersonal comparisons of (actual) utility
are impossible. Relativistic analysis (as characterized in nuisance) could not possibly adapt Itself
to take into account special concerns-of the hypersensitive or for special situations. The specter
of testimony such as "I like big parties more than the neighbors dislike the noise from them" Is
enough to dissuade one from even considering an attempt at such adaptation. Yet, other than
looking at people's exchanges, there is no better way to probe the subjective values which people
"really" have.
342. See section IlI(D)(1)(a) supra.
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this leverage is not abused in promoting objectives which have nothing
to do with the subject matter of the lease.
An argument might be made that a few types of off-premises activity
(e.g., drug-abuse or prostitution) have such a potential of leading to
on-premises trouble that they are, by extension, building-related and
hence appropriate for lease-prescribed restriction. 343 However, for the
most part, the off-premises activities of a tenant would seem to be
beyond the scope of proper concern of a landlord or neighboring
tenants. Accordingly, lease restrictions concerning such activities
would be "unreasonable."
Similarly, activities on-premises but having no spill-over effects into
others' apartments or common areas would seem to be inappropriate
subjects for landlord restrictions. Such activities, if they have no effect
on anyone outside the apartment where carried on, present no threat to
psychic tranquility or any other interest of neighboring tenants or
(absent waste) the landlord. The same may be said of activities which
344
do have some spill-over effects but which result in no injury.
However, if special concerns are to be protectable by agreement, care
must be taken in determining whether in fact there is a spill-over effect
and whether such effect causes injury. 34s Does prostitution carried on
(silently) in an apartment have a spill-over effect if the neighbors are
aware of and bothered by the reason for the comings and goings in346the
corridor? Should such activities be prohibitable by agreement?
One can easily conceive of many other special concerns as to which
it is difficult to determine whether there are spill-over effects, or
whether such effects cause injury. Among these might be listed type of
vocation, age, sexual orientation, current marital status, and school
background. 347 Each of these cases, though somewhat "close," might
343.

See, e.g., Campbell v. Henry Phipps Plaza S., Inc., 45 App. Div. 2d 684, 356 N.Y.S.2d

326 (1st Dep't 1974).
344. Compare text accompanying notes 192-99 supra.
345. For example, is a sign in the window within the landlord's "legitimate" concerns? See
Cooley v. Bettigole, 301 N.E.2d 872 (Mass. App. 1973) (prohibition upheld). How about the fact
that a tenant cohabits with a member of the opposite sex? See Atkisson v. Kern County Housing
Authority, Cal. App. 3d -,
130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Dist. Ct. App. 1976).

346.

See Remedco Corp. v. Bryn Mawr Hotel Corp., 45 Misc. 2d 586, 257 N.Y.S.2d 525

(N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1965).

347.

The listed items, and several others which will be cited in this section, do not of course

involve "activities" as such, but rather involve "status." However, the potential concerns which
people may have about others' status (e.g., a neighbor who has been twice convicted of
child-molesting) are basically the same as potential concerns about activities as such. The
activities which a person is likely to engage in are very often a function of status, especially in the
types of cases listed here. Furthermore, in terms of the impact on the psychic character of the

intrabuilding environment, the presence of, e.g., a drug addict, may be the same whether or not
he actually shoots up on the premises. But cf. 190 Stanton Inc. v. Santiago. 60 Misc. 2d 224, 302
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under certain circumstances, conceivably represent cases of legitimate
concern even in the landlord-tenant context: school background in a
building for Princeton alumni, type of vocation in a building for
doctors and dentists, age in a building for senior citizens, current
marital status in a building for singles, and sexual orientation in a
building inhabited by persons who are revolted by such things. One
may scoff at those who would want this sort of social inbreeding for
themselves, but a self-righteous narrowness of sensitivity is required to
say that all such desires are incomprehensible. Certainly they are
building-related in the sense that they reflect concerns about matters
affecting the intrabuilding environment.
A number of even closer cases could be mentioned: style of dress,
identity of guests (though not necessarily their behavior as such) and
political leanings. In other contexts such concerns may be very understandable and appropriate for agreement-provided protection, e.g.,
dress codes in employment, or identity of friends or political leanings
where sensitive security problems are involved. If they do not seem to
be legitimate concerns in the landlord-tenant context, it is only because
it is hard to see, in that context, why anyone should possibly care
about such things, even if they may be "building-related." But if the
objectionable political leanings are neo-Nazi, and friends are fellow
sympathizers who show up in their neo-SS regalia, it is easy to see that
many might understandably be quite uncomfortable and concerned.
Where do we draw the line on understandability-Nazis, Communists,
socialists, hippies?
What develops is a definition of legitimacy or reasonableness of
special concerns which is based on whether or not such special
concerns are building-related and, secondly, whether such concerns (be
they subscribed to by the observer or not), are at least understandable.
If understandable (in the landlord-tenant context) they should be
eligible for protection by agreement (in that context) because their
understandability gives countervailing justification for the freedom
constraints which protection of the concerns entails. If not understandable, there is nothing at all to be gained by the freedom constraint and
hence no justification for it at all. 348 Unfortunately, the spectrum of
N.Y.S.2d 693 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969). Accordingly, conduct restrictions and those related to
status are considered comparable and have not been distinguished.
348. Note that no mention is made of whether the benefits of protecting special concerns are
understandable enough to outweigh the burden of freedom constraints. That is a question of
relative hardship which was treated in the preceding section.
It should be observed that arguments raised in the preceding section against using supposed
relative hardship as a ground for invalidity would have no application if compliance results in no
subjective benefit at all to the "protected" class. Hence, restrictions may be invalidated on the
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understandable concerns runs all the way from desiderata having a
near consensus to the paranoid yearnings of a schizophrenic. A line
probably has to be drawn somewhere, and one would hope that the
line between sane and insane would be the recourse of very last resort.
The trouble is that drawing any line at all would inevitably involve a
subjective process, and that in turn means judicial intervention in the
norm-creation process-an invitation to the courts to substitute objective standards for those agreed to by the parties. And 9this would tend
34
to defeat the protection of "real" special concerns.
In this state of affairs, perhaps the only practicable test of the "understandability" of a concern is the fact that someone has gone to the
trouble of getting a protective agreement and proceeding in the courts
to enforce it. That is at least an indication that somebody believes that
a valuable interest is at stake, be it an economic asset or psychic
tranquility. Accordingly, there should be a strong presumption that the
concern sought to be protected is at least prima facie "legitimate." Any
lingering doubts on legitimacy would be more appropriately directed
towards the legitimacy (or abusiveness) of the motives for seeking
enforcement in the particular case, i.e., to whether such motives are
building-related or, more particularly, related to the intrabuilding
environmental character which the restriction is supposed to protect. 35 0 There will still be some tendency to limit "understandability"

to that which or~,dinary persons would understand-for the court to say
(perhaps implicitly), "no one could possibly be concerned about that,"
as with off-premises activities, lack of spill-over effect or paranoid
concerns of the mentally ill. However, with a presumption of validity,
these tendencies to substitute objective values for the real values of
those directly concerned will at least be kept in check, and such
tendencies will thus interfere minimally with protecting the special
concerns of the perfectly sane.
c.

Excessive Strictness of Standards

The freedom constraints attendant to lease-prescribed conduct restrictions tend to be very personal. Their focus is upon the private lives
of tenants and therefore, compared with other contracts, such restrictions can have an unusually extensive or "oppressive" impact on the
overall life activities of those whose freedoms they limit. This is
grounds that they benefit nobody even though, when they do offer some benefit, the supposed
"relative hardship" required to achieve such benefit is an inappropriate basis for invalidating
them.
349. See text accompanying notes 334-41 supra.
350. See discussion of abusive motivation as a grounds for nonenforcement at notes 50 & 55
supra and accompanying text.
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because such restrictions limit what may be done at home, and home
is, in the densely interactive daily lives of many, perhaps the only
resort of comparatively uninhibited freedom. For most, probably, it is
the place of maximum freedom.
Of course, lease-prescribed conduct restrictions should not be held
ipso facto "unreasonable" (and hence inappropriate for enforcement)
simply because they impose stricter-than-law limitations on tenant
freedom. All contracts restrict freedom. The protection of special
concerns requires this. Still, because lease-prescribed conduct restrictions do limit freedom at home, constituting the perhaps ultimate
barrier to the acting out of personality itself, particular scrutiny may
be drawn to the character and strictness of the constraints which such
restrictions impose. One is tempted to assume that there is a point of
strictness beyond which stricter-than-law conduct norms should not be
permitted to go.
Yet, just because home may be the last resort of comparative
uninhibitedness, it does not follow that it, any more than the job, the
streets or business relations, should be entirely without "rules" or
norms of behavior. For in order to enjoy "freedom" at home it is
necessary to have at least some degree of cooperation from the
neighbors. It is important to keep in mind the familiar paradox that
rules are just as necessary to protect freedom as they are usable to
destroy it; to protect some freedoms, other freedoms must inevitably be
constrained. 3 5 1 The freedom to enjoy a book, listen to quiet music or
merely relax may require that the neighbors not be free to enjoy loud
music. Conversely, the freedom to enjoy loud music may require that
the neighbors not be free to relax. Thus the fact that the home is the
last resort where people can be maximally free to act out their desires
may argue as muchfor freedom constraints as it argues against them.
Unhappily, trying to limit the strictness of lease-prescribed freedom
constraints appears at once to be incompatible with permitting the
protection of the special concerns which may be preconditions to the
enjoyment of freedom. For in order to apply "excessive strictness" as a
criterion of "unreasonableness" (and hence nonenforceability), the level
or degree of freedom constraint must be measured, at least implicitly,
against some sort of external objective standards. But measuring the
parties' agreement against any such external standards is at odds with
the agreement-autonomy which the protection of special concerns
requires. 3.52
351. Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1090-93 (1972).
352. The level or degree of constraint is in any event highly subjective and hence not
measurable. Compare the discussion accompanying notes 334-41 supra. Which has the greater

1976]

LANDLORD CONTROL OF TENANTS

In fact, though, the protection of special concerns can be achieved
even if unqualified autonomy is not conceded with respect to
agreements imposing restraints on conduct. For example, the protection of special concerns does not require the enforcement of restrictions
on conduct where the restricted conduct would cause no injury (or
virtually no injury) to others. 353 Restrictions on such conduct would be
excessively strict, and hence, "unreasonable," in the sense that their
35 4
enforcement would result in a pointless constraint upon freedom.
The refusal to concede agreement-autonomy with respect to such
restrictions prevents excessive strictness without interfering at all with
the protection of special concerns.
There is also no incompatibility between preventing excessive strictness and protecting special concerns where restrictions are struck down
because they cannot, as legal mechanisms, serve their intended purpose. Consider for example a rule which provides: "Tenant shall make
no noises which are audible in neighboring apartments." It is probable
that almost everybody would like to have the protection of such a rule.
No more shoes crashing, one after the other, on the ceiling above, no
more shouts of interspousal discord, no more children's cartoons at
seven o'clock on Sunday morning. But given the architectural characteristics of modern construction, few could really comply with such a
impact on freedom, a prohibition on dogs or a prohibition on piano playing? The answer depends
on the desires with respect to either of these on the part of the persons constrained, the intensity
of such desires, the convenience and availability of alternatives (e.g., off-premises practice
studios) and the like. Thus, without resort to objective notions about what "ordinary" persons
desire, the level or degree of constraint cannot be estimated at all. And measuring levels of
constraint against such objective standards gives no realistic estimate because the differences in
people mean that any such objectively based estimates will be almost inevitably wrong. Neither
piano playing prohibitions nor prohibitions on keeping dogs, for example, would be likely to
involve any freedom constraint on "ordinary" apartment dwellers if the majority of apartment
dwellers do not do these things anyway. For a pianist or dog-lover, however, such constraints
may be almost intolerable.
Comparative estimates of level or degree of constraint may sometimes appear possible. For
example, a rule which prohibits practice of music instruments after 7:30 p.m. appears more
constraining than one which prohibits such practice after 9:00 p.m. But applied to particular
cases, when the subjectively held values of a real person are involved, the two rules may be
practically identical in their oppression (for example, if the person in question only really wants to
play the piano after midnight).
353. It has previously been observed that lack of resulting injury should be proper grounds
for refusing to allow forfeiture for breach of a restriction (see section III(B)[2)(c)(ii) supra) and that
lack of injurious consequences also argues for the invalidity of the restriction itself (see text
accompanying notes 344-46 supra). However, as was also observed in both earlier discussions,
care must be taken in supposing that the restricted conduct causes no injury if the possibility of
protecting special concerns is to be preserved.
354. In this sense, the "lack of potential for injury to any legitimate interests," discussed in
the preceding section, may be considered a subdivision of "excessive strictness."
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rule without almost impossible inconvenience. When padding to the
refrigerator during T.V. commercials or "the tread of a woman's bare
foot" can become a contributing cause of litigation, 35 5 the inability of
legal mechanisms to surmount certain physical problems becomes
obvious. If landlords were permitted to enforce a rule as strict as the
"no spill-over noise" rule above, the potential for random injustice
would be as great as or greater than if stricter-than-law conduct
restrictions were prohibited altogether.
The problem with such a rule is not the degree to which it constrains
freedom (though such constraint is considerable indeed). The problem
is that it attempts to confer a protection which legal mechanisms, the
regulation of human behavior, simply cannot provide. Occasionally,
but seldom, this may occur because the state of technology or physical
laws themselves prevents alleviation of the annoyance. Mostly though,
it will occur merely because it is uneconomical (albeit theoretically
feasible) to provide the protection. In any event, however, even though
we may wish to permit the hypersensitive to contract away from
annoyance whenever possible, some things nonetheless simply must be
endured. And the ordinary life sounds of neighboring tenants, like
sirens in the streets and sour glances from passersby, are examples of
these.
Similarly, there are annoyances which are not "ordinary" in the
sense that they are generally omnipresent in multi-tenant buildings but
which, nevertheless, are practically unavoidable. These are the isolated, temporary occurrences which inevitably cause bother, sometimes considerable bother, to those in close proximity, but which
hardly can be anticipated or prevented, let alone effectively regulated
by contracts. Most such annoyances, such as a guest or party that
becomes unexpectedly raucous, a family quarrel at 3:00 a.m. or a
pervasive odor from burnt bacon, sound trivial at their mention,
however great an upset they may cause others at the time. Nonetheless, as has been previously argued, 3 56 objective notions about what is
a trivial annoyance would be a dangerous basis for judging what is
subjectively important to others. And in any event, if objectionable
conduct is isolated and temporary in character, that fact alone should
supply a sufficient basis for holding the conduct inappropriate for
restriction. 3 57 The same may be said for acts which are accidental or
355. Pool v. Higginson, 8 Daly 113, 117 (N.Y.C.P. 1878); see Louisiana Leasing Co. v.
Sokolow, 48 Misc. 2d 1014, 266 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1966).
356. See text accompanying notes 339-41 supra.
357. Cf. rules applicable to evictions for illegal uses of premises. E.g., Murphy v. Traynor,
110 Colo. 466, 135 P.2d 230 (1943). See also Lituchy v. Lathers, 35 Misc. 2d 556, 232 N.Y.S,2d

627 (App. T. 1962); Di Lella v. O'Brien, 187 Misc. 922, 68 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Albany City Ct. 1946).

1976]

LANDLORD CONTROL OF TENANTS

occur by mistake. 35 8 The occasional annoyances which are inevitable
(even if not routine) in multi-tenant buildings simply cannot be regulated or prevented by contracts. And lease restrictions which attempt
to do so go beyond their possibilities of establishing an overall intrabuilding environmental "character." Such restrictions are, therefore,
pointlessly (and hence, excessively) strict.
Thus, in cases where stricter-than-law restrictions attempt to alleviate that which cannot be avoided, such restrictions can be invalidated on grounds of excessive strictness without jeopardizing the
protection of special concerns. In nuisance cases, courts sometimes
express this as the "price" or "penalty" of urban life, 35 9 the suggestion
apparently being that those whose hypersensitivities do not permit
them to suffer these things should not live in cities. 360 The same sort of
idea, that enduring certain annoyances is the price or penalty of urban
living, can also be found in cases refusing to enforce lease conduct
restrictions. 3 6 1 The language of the nuisance cases can perhaps, in its
abstractness, be applied with equal aptness in cases of excessively
strict lease conduct norms. However, the price or penalty of city living
exacted by the law of nuisance must be considerably higher than the
rock bottom price or penalty which cannot be avoided even by
contracting. For in nuisance law, which protects only the ordinarily
sensitive, references to the price or penalty of urban life serves mainly
to admonish the hypersensitive that the law of torts will not protect
their needs. 362 To apply that same test to lease conduct restrictions
would mean that special concerns could not be protected even by
contract.

363

What then is the price or penalty which cannot be avoided even by
contract? Minimally, we have seen, it is endurance of the annoyances
against which the legal mechanisms of contracting cannot protect. But

what of spill-over annoyances which are not always associated with
multi-tenant buildings of the type in question and which are not
isolated, unexpected or the result of accident, mistake or the like?
358. Cf. relief against forfeitures given in cases of accident, fraud, mistake or surprise. See text
accompanying notes 226-27 supra. See also Note, Equitable Relief from Forfeiture of a Lease
Incurred by Breach of Covenant, 20 Harv. L. Rev. 640 (1907).
359. Ryan v. Steele, 6 Misc. 2d 370, 371, 163 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (Sup. Ct. 1957; Ihornburg
v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 184, 376 P.2d 100, 103 (1962).

360. "[P]eople [who] indulge their inclination to be gregarious. . . must not expect the quiet
that belongs to solitude." Pool v. Higginson, 8 Daly 113, 118 (N.Y.C.P. 1878).
361.

See, e.g., Douglas L. Elliman & Co. v. Karlsen, 59 Misc. 2d 243, 245, 298 N.Y S.2d

594, 597 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969). See also Louisiana Leasing Co. v. Sokolow, 48 Misc 2d
1014, 266 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1966).
362. See note 260 and text accompanying notes 264-75 supra.
363. Cf. text accompanying notes 339-41 supra.
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Examples of these might include constant dog barking, recurrent foul
odors from "exotic" cooking, loud music played every evening or
frequent noisy parties. Are these things (or some of them) also part of
the price or penalty of urban life? The legal mechanism of contracting
is capable of protecting against them. The question remains whether it
should always be available for this purpose, whether making restrictions on these things can ever be "excessive."
The question is one of public policy and will be examined in the next
section.
d. Public Policy Conflicts
Those who choose to live where population density is high (suburbs,
cities, or multi-tenant buildings) must expect to have more encounters, including personally unpleasant encounters, than those who live
in a "sylvan glen."' 364 However, it has been herein suggested that, at
least as to the home environment, the frequency of unpleasant encounters to a very considerable extent can and ought to be reducible by
agreements, that patterns of lease restrictions can offer city dwellers
considerable insulation from subjectively perceived unpleasantness.
But even though agreements can provide protection from neighbor
annoyances somewhat comparable to rural isolation, the question
remains whether agreements which attempt to do so should in all
instances be legally permitted. The question is whether the price or
penalty of urban living does not include the enduring of certain types
of annoyances which, though excludable by agreements, should as a
policy matter be borne nonetheless.
Clearly, there are some public policies which will always outweigh
any possible interest of individuals to enforce isolation from that which
they do not like. The policy against discrimination based upon race,
color or national origin 3 65 is an obvious example. A racial bigot may be
described as a person whose special concern is to live in a building
which excludes members of certain racial groups. Yet, for reasons
unrelated to the policies in favor of contract enforcement, freedom of
association (or disassociation), autonomy in the disposition of property
and the like, there is a public policy against countenancing the sort of
self-segregation which such bigots may desire.
In a different vein, the public policy against monopolization and
restraints on trade may outweigh the interest in protecting a special
364.

Louisiana Leasing Co. v. Sokolow, 48 Misc. 2d 1014, 1015-16, 266 N.Y.S.2d 447, 449

(N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1966), citing Twin Elm Management Corp. v. Banks, 181 Misc. 96, 97, 46
N.Y.S.2d 952, 953 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1943); see cases cited in notes 360-61 supra.
365. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (Supp. IV, 1974);
N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
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concern such as, say, keeping salesmen out of the premises. 366 Conceivably, the policies favoring freedom of expression, 367 of association
or of political leanings 368 may outweigh any concerns which underlie
lease-contained
conduct restrictions limiting the exercise of these free9
doms.

36

Other potential public policy conflicts are more problematical. Consider, for example, restrictions on having children, on changing marital status or on age. A restriction against children living in a building
has been upheld, 370 and it is realistic to assume that people who are
not interested in children may wish to self-segregate into buildings
where no children are allowed. On the other hand, several states have
statutes prohibiting restrictions on children. 3 71 And as a policy matter,
allowing landlords to "penalize" tenants or prospective tenants with
children seems, to say the least, hard. Similar are restrictions on
changing one's marital status. To allow lease provisions discouraging
marriage is to permit a fairly drastic interference with a very personal
matter, and it incidently is also inconsistent with a longstanding
(though perhaps waning) common law policy. 372 On the other hand,
should singles not be permitted to self-segregate into buildings catering
to singles? Or the elderly into buildings reserved exclusively for the
elderly?
Even the clearly transcendent policies, can present doubts. Prohibitions on religious discrimination can make it impossible for reclusive
sects to isolate themselves and their children from the perhaps much
despised ways and temptations of nonbelievers. 3 73 Immigrants of like
366.

See Southland Dev. Co. v. Ehrler's Dairy, Inc., 468 S.W.2d 284 (Ky. 1971) (regulation

under lease); Thousand Island Park Ass'n v. Tucker, 173 N.Y. 203, 65 N.E. 975 (1903); Eagle
Spring Water Co. v. Webb & Knapp, Inc., 236 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
367.

But cf. Aluli v. Trusdell, 54 Hawaii 417, S08 P.2d 1217, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1040

(1973), indicating that a landlord's interference with a tenant's free expression would not
constitute an unconstitutional deprivation, even if the landlord resorted to the courts to effectuate
an eviction for such purpose.
368. Cf. Elrod v. Burns, 96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976) (non-civil service public employee cannot be
discriminated against on basis of political leanings).
369. But cf. Ginsberg v. Yeshiva of Far Rockaway, 45 App. Div. 2d 334, 339, 358 N.Y.S.2d
477, 483 (2d Dep't 1974), aff'd mem., 36 N.Y.2d 706, 325 N.E.2d 876, 366 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1975)

("Should the plaintiffs and others who bought in reliance on the restrictive covenant be helpless to
protect themselves?").
370. Lamont Bldg. Co. v. Court, 147 Ohio St. 183, 70 N.E.2d 447 (1946).
371. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 33-303 (1956); Del. Code Ann. tit. 25, § 6503 (1974); Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 80, §§ 37, 38 (Smith-Hurd 1966); id. § 38 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1976); N.Y.
Real Prop. Law § 237 (McKinney 1968).
372. See 6 Am. L. Prop., supra note 3, §§ 27.12-.17; 6 Powell, supra note 24, 1 853.

373. A transcendent policy such as "right of privacy" may make it impossible for families to
isolate their children from conduct which is (in traditional terms) apparently immoral. See
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national origin may prefer to congregate where they will be among
people who share their customs, language and heritage. Laws prohibiting discrimination based on national origin prevent this, and perhaps
self-segregation of this type is bad. But in any case, the antighettoization laws which promote assimilation (and, in one sense,
equality) do so at the expense of immigrant ethnic heritages and with
the implication that such heritages are subequal to the prevailing
American lifestyle which supplants them.
It is not the point to reargue the desirability or undesirability of
policies which may or do exist in relation to any of these. The public
policies against racial or religious discrimination have been established
after taking into account, hopefully, all of the considerations mentioned above and many others. Living with them is part of the price or
penalty of urban life. The point is that courts should be chary about
creating new public policies, ad hoc, as a basis for invalidating lease
restrictions which they happen not to like. In particular, the creation
of policies, however formulated, prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of lifestyle are questionable since the protection of special concerns is, by and large, the protection from the offensiveness which
others' lifestyles can entail. As already stated, such concerns are
matters of importance to many, and people do act upon and try to
achieve protection for them. Accordingly, in the absence of some
clearly more compelling contravening interest, the law should intervene supportively to harmonize the interchanges in which such protection is sought rather than leaving the entire area to the vagaries of
3 74
self-help.
130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Dist. Ct.
Atkisson v. Kern County Housing Authority, - Cal. App. 3d App. 1976) (invalidated landlord prohibition on cohabitation by unmarried members of the

opposite sex).
374. The implication of the textual discussion is that some forms of discrimination are proper
subjects of public policy prohibitions (e.g., discrimination on the basis of race or religion) while
others (e.g., discrimination on the basis of activities or lifestyle) are not. The difficult question
may be posed as to whether there exists any principle for distinguishing improper kinds of
discrimination from "legitimate" discrimination and, indeed, as to whether the law should permit
any discrimination at all in association or proximity relations.
The very fact that people perceive definite psychic benefits in being able to select whom they
will be near (as discussed in text accompanying notes 283-84 supra) suggests the inappropriateness
of a policy which prohibits all discrimination in association. Basic notions of freedom would seem
to require at least an official attitude of laissez-faire in this regard. The further step of actually
lending the state's assistance to exercises of this freedom may also be necessary if the freedom is to
have any meaning. It is probably true that informal pressures, self-help and the like, are usually
adequate to preserve the proximity groupings into which people voluntarily distribute themselves.
But even given the usual efficacy of extra-legal measures to preserve voluntary proximity
patterns, the further step of state assistance may be nonetheless desirable to (i) reduce the
possibility of breaches of the peace which can result from informal pressures or self-help, and (ti)
protect against aberrational and randomly "unfair" intrusions which will inevitably occur.
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Lastly, attention is turned to the question left open in the preceding
section; namely, how should the law deal with recurring or continuous
annoyances which are not inevitable concomitants of urban or multitenant building life. These are, broadly speaking, the lifestyle or life
activities annoyances which are bottomed in basic personality or
interests incompatibilities and which, it is argued, ought usually to be
avoidable by agreements aimed at the protection of special concerns.
Already mentioned examples include constant dog barking, recurrent
foul cooking odors, loud music played regularly or frequent noisy
parties. Other examples could be named, such as nightly piano or horn
practice or mischievous, uncontrolled children, until the entire range of
noncontainable activities and life variations were exhausted.
If lease restrictions aimed at these kinds of annoyances are to be
limited, it must be on the basis of some public policy which outweighs
the enforcement of the agreement-based protections which are
involved. Unlike the cases of, say, racially discriminatory or
monopolizing lease restrictions, the annoyances considered here are not
protected by any specific, articulable public policies; there is, for
example, no known public policy which specially favors the keeping of
dogs. 37 5 And, as already indicated, the law should be careful about
The real question is when should the state refuse to assist in the private selection of neighbors,
associates and the like, even to the point of imposing certain associations or proximity relationships. A general answer which accounts for all cases may be impossible, even within the
comparatively narrow context of lease restrictions. One possibility, however, is that discrimination should be unlawful (and hence opposed by the state) when based on immutable personal
characteristics such as race, color or national origin. Religion is not immutable in the same sense
as race, but the policy of permitting free religious exercise may support treating religion on the
same basis as race (whereas, for example, sexual orientation, which may be immutable only in the
sense that religion is, would not necessarily receive the same policy protection). But cf. Ginsberg
v. Yeshiva of Far Rockaway, 45 App. Div. 2d 334, 339, 358 N.Y.S.2d 477, 483 (2d Dep't
1974), aff'd mem., 36 N.Y.2d 706, 325 N.E.2d 876, 366 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1975). On the other
hand, characteristics such as lifestyle, which are not immutable, and which at least can be
accommodated to the sensitivities of others, would not be indicated for special protection as a
matter of policy. People whose lifestyle or activities are annoying to others should expect either to
accommodate themselves to others' sensitivities or to be discriminated against by others who wish
to keep their distance.
Finally, in passing, it should be noted that the "irrationality" of the discrimination is not
mentioned as a basis for making it unlawful. This is on the assumption that it is always "rational"
to discriminate against that which is not liked. However, even if rational, discrimination may be
appropriately prohibited if the social cost-for example, the cost in dignity to those having certain
immutable characteristics---is too high. See text accompanying notes 383-88 infra.
As hereinafter discussed, intolerably high social cost or detriment would seem itself to be an
appropriate basis for invalidating restrictions, and invalidating restrictions based on immutable
characteristics would thus only be a subdivision of the more general "social cost or detriment"
basis. Id.
375. Apart from pure personal freedom considerations, the right to keep a dog for purposes of
personal security may be argued. See East River Housing Corp. v. Matonis, 34 App. Div. 2d
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creating new specific objects of favored policy protection. Hence the
question is whether there are any general policies which argue for the
invalidation of lease-prescribed restrictions on activities, conduct or
the like. Two possible such general policies have already been discussed, viz., the policy against enforcing adhesive contracts 3 76 and the
relative hardship grounds of not enforcing agreements; 37 7 both have
been seen to be unlikely as appropriate bases for nonenforcement.
Another general policy which is at least conceivable would be a
policy which disfavors private constraints on freedom generally, or on
the use of land in particular. A policy disfavoring constraints on
freedom in general would effectively be, in this context, a policy
against the enforcement of contracts, and as such it probably does not
exist. On the other hand, a policy disfavoring transferor-imposed
constraints on the free use of land has traditionally received recognition at common law. 378 This is a special case where the general policy

favoring the enforcement of contracts may be outweighed by other
factors. As was pointed out at the beginning of this Article, the
antagonism towards transferor-imposed land use controls arose at a
time when such controls were usually for the benefit of the transferor
only and when an abundance of under-used land made restrictions on
development and use socially undesirable. 379 The question which now
arises is whether such disfavor would still be appropriate in cases
where the direct beneficiaries of the controls are the restricted
transferee-possessors themselves and at a time when use controls in
general are regarded as almost essential to maximizing the overall
usefulness of society's real property assets.
It has already been seen that utter freedom for any one possessor
means restricted freedom for others; the spill-over effects of one
possessor's activities place limits on the activities of others. 38 0 Thus, if
the law is hostile to positive constraints on the freedom of one
possessor, it does not necessarily promote freedom thereby; it merely
exalts the freedom of one over the freedom of his neighbors. 38 1 Nor
937, 312 N.Y.S.2d 461 (lst Dep't), aff'd mem., 27 N.Y.2d 931, 266 N.E.2d 825, 318 N.Y.S.2d
146 (1970) (prohibition upheld).
376. See section III(D)(1)(a) supra.

377. See section IIl(D)(2)(a) supra.
378. See notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text.
379. See note 11 supra.
380. See notes 9, 10, 46 & 351 supra and accompanying text.
381. The result may be a net gain or a net loss in the overall freedom to benefit from the use
of land or space. It is impossible to say which it is without comparing the subjectively held values
of the persons involved. Cf. note 352 supra. However, because such interpersonal comparison is
estimable only by looking at an exchange agreement among the parties in question (see text
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does the fact that residential lease restrictions reduce behavioral freedom at home supply justification for their nonenforcement. Nonenforcement itself also may constrain activities at home, viz., the activities of the neighbors in their homes. 382 Accordingly, in cases where
use restrictions benefit the transferee-possessors, the reasons which
may otherwise exist for treating such restrictions "specially" are not
present. Hence, they should be treated like any other contractual
undertakings; that is to say, they should usually be enforced.
There remains, however, one possible general policy basis upon
which lease contained conduct restrictions may sometimes properly be
questioned and invalidated. Such restrictions should not be enforced if
their enforcement would exact an intolerable social cost or detriment.
Some very obvious instances of intolerable social cost or detriment
have already been mentioned, viz., the costs which would be involved
in the enforcement of restrictions based on race or religion, where the
public policy conflict is clear. 383 In jurisdictions which prohibit restrictions on children, 384 the social costs of discouraging people from
bearing children or the social detriment of hindering families with
children in their search for suitable housing may be considered to be
intolerable. Other, more difficult, cases can be mentioned. For example, prohibitions on practicing musical instruments may involve an
intolerable social detriment if the result is to make it difficult or
impossible for the musically talented to attain proficiency. Courts have
38
struck down such home practice prohibitions on just this basis. S
It should be noted that, in holding restrictions invalid because of
their social cost or detriment, an analysis akin to that of relative
hardship is required. 38 6 The social cost or detriment of requiring
compliance must, in effect, be measured against the personal (and
perhaps social) benefits which would result from compliance. Howaccompanying notes 329-41, 352 supra), the existence of restrictions (i.e., such an exchange
agreement) would itself usually indicate that the enforcement thereof will result in a net gain.
382. See text accompanying note 351 supra. See also notes 9, 10 & 46 supra and accompanying text.
383. See text accompanying note 365 supra.
384. See note 371 supra and accompanying text.
385. Justice Court Mut. Housing Cooperative, Inc. v. Sandow, 50 Misc, 2d 541, 270
N.Y.S.2d 829 (Sup. CL 1966); Douglas E. Elliman & Co. v. Karlsen, 59 lisc. 2d 243, 245, 298
N.Y.S.2d 594, 597 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1969). Before it is decided that the social cost or
detriment of a prohibition is intolerable, consideration ought to be given to all of the alternatives.
For example, a prohibition on music practice at home may not involve intolerable social cost if
practice studios, the use of which bothers no third parties, are realistically available. In the two
cited cases, no mention of this rather obvious solution was made. But cf. O'Connor v. Lahm
(N.Y. City Civ. Ct.), in 168 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 18, 1972, at 17, col. 5.
386. See section M(D)(2)(a) supra.
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ever, the major objection to invalidating restrictions on relative hardship grounds (that subjective or "real" relative hardship is unknowable
except as evidenced by the parties' exchange agreement 3 87 ) is inappropriate here. For the social costs or detriments of compliance are
"objectively" known, at least in the sense that it is the court's and
legislature's function to make such determinations in formulating
public policy. The court or legislature can quite properly conclude that
such social costs or detriments outweigh any subjective personal
benefits which particular restrictions may provide. 388
In summary, contravention of public policy is an appropriate basis
for invalidating restrictions whenever the restrictions are inimical to
some recognized defined policy and, more generally, whenever the
court concludes that the social costs or detriments (meaning usually the
external costs) of enforcing the restriction are intolerably high. In such
cases, the discomfitures which such restrictions are intended to protect
against may be said to be a part of the price or penalty of choosing to
live near others, even though they may theoretically be avoidable by
agreements. However, in the absence of such defined public policies or
high social costs or detriments, the parties' agreement-autonomy
should be preserved, and the restrictions protective of special concerns
38 9
should be enforced.
387. See notes 329-41 supra and accompanying text.
388. Of course, the social costs or detriments will include the personal costs or detriments
experienced by those subject to the particular restriction. For example, a prohibition on piano
practice at home tends to deprive society of accomplished musicians (an external cost) but also
deprives the potential pianist of-the pleasure, acclaim, profits and other benefits of virtuosity.
However, such personal costs or detriments should usually be irrelevant to the public policy
validity of the restriction; as purely personal costs and detriments, they should be properly
compared only against the personal benefits which the restriction provides to the persons
protected by it (and such a comparison can be made, as previously shown, only by reference to
exchange agreements among the parties (see section III(D)(2)(a) supra)). Thus, widespread
prohibitions on loud recorded music may result in many unhappy listeners, and the sum of their
personal detriments may be a considerable "social" detriment. However, the absence of such
prohibitions may result in a lot of unhappy neighbors, also a considerable social detriment. For
the courts to invalidate the restrictions in such cases would be subject to the objections posed in
section III(D)(2)(a) since the "social" detriments and "social" benefits are really only the sums of
the personal detriments and benefits which contracts cause to the contracting parties.
The one exceptional kind of case, where personal costs or detriments are properly taken into
account, is that where the detriment is of a type or magnitude that the contract should not be
countenanced even if no one but the contracting parties are adversely affected. Lease restrictions
imposing such detriments are a little hard to imagine outside perhaps of restrictions based on race
or religion or other well-known articulated public policies, usually involving (to borrow from fifth
and fourteenth amendment nomenclature) "fundamental rights."
389. Cf. the several apparently frivolous conditions cited in Scott, Control of Property by the
Dead, 65 U. Pa. L. Rev. 527, 535-37 (1917). It was observed that "[aplthough conditions like these
may be arbitrary, or even foolish, they are not contrary to any public policy." Id. at 537
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IV.

CONCLUSION

An attempt has been made to describe and evaluate justifications for
allowing landlords the legal power to exert control over tenant behavior.
Not only does the landlord's direct interest in his property offer
justification for such control powers. More importantly, the control
may be justified by the interest which the preponderance of tenants
have in the conditions or "character" of the buildings in which they
live. Because such conditions or character may be significantly affected
by the spill-over effects of tenant activities, landlord control of such
activities is, essentially, a form of private environmental regulation.
By permitting such intrabuilding environmental regulation to be effectuated privately, the law can promote (or at least not stifle) the variety
of intrabuilding environments which corresponds to the varied tastes
and needs of different people. It permits the protection of special
concerns so that, in addition to protecting the preponderance of a
building's tenants from aberrational acts, landlord control of tenant
conduct can also protect the needs of idiosyncratic or hypersensitive
individuals.
The landlord's law-conferred power to control tenant behavior (and
the intrabuilding environmental characteristics) is comparatively
slight. Accordingly, provisions in leases are generally necessary in
order for landlords to have such power of control. Furthermore, lease
provisions may also be desirable (and are frequently or even usually
included) to give a remedy (forfeiture) which the law does not provide
and to simplify the proof of "objectionability." The latter is achieved
by setting out in the lease formulations of conduct norms which are
more susceptible to proof than the relativistic standards of tort law.
Both of these drafting objectives commend themselves to judicial
support. The forfeiture remedy may well be, in the conduct restriction
context, the only really effective remedy since only it offers any
assurance of relief from long-term arrangements which have gone sour.
In any case, powers of forfeiture should not (as applied to conduct
restrictions) be regarded as merely a "security" or a penalty. Forfeiture
is a bargained-for contract alternative, to put the parties back where
they were when the lease was still prospective and its mutual desirability could still, at best, only be guessed at. It allows the landlord to
rectify mistakes which the majority of his tenants may find intolerable
to live with. Likewise, the goal of providing clearer formulations of
conduct standards deserves judicial support not only because clearer
standards simplify proof in litigation but, even more importantly,
because reducing the doubt in litigation may eliminate the need for
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resort to the courts entirely. Nonjudicial settlements would be thereby
facilitated.
Finally, landlords may wish to prescribe stricter-than-law conduct
standards in order to protect special concerns which are not so
commonly shared as to justify the attention of the legislative or judicial
lawmakers. Such special concerns-of the idiosyncratic or the
hypersensitive-are not protected by the law of nuisance or other tort
law; but since they are nonetheless real and presumably sought after,
efforts to protect them by agreement should (like the subject matter of
most contracts) receive the support of the courts. They should not be
left, by an attitude of hostility, to extra-legal solutions, such as
self-help. However, because the "contract of adhesion" nature of leases
means the landlord is in a somewhat special position to impose his life
philosophy on tenants, courts should exercise some supervision to
assure that the power to protect special concerns is not abused.
Although relative hardship is a specious basis for invalidating attempts
to protect special concerns, other appropriate bases for invalidation
(e.g., lack of legitimate concern, futility of the restriction or "public
policy" conflict) may appear. Apart from these types of cases, however, landlords' attempts to provide specially protected environments
for their tenants should be valid and enforced. For it is only through
such enforcement that the pluralistic rental market can provide the
maximum contentment to the maximum number of residential tenants.

